MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2026 ME 11 Docket: Lin-25-56 Argued: October 9, 2025 Decided: February 10, 2026
Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, CONNORS, DOUGLAS, and LIPEZ, JJ.
PATRICIA M. MINERICH et al.
v.
BOOTHBAY-BOOTHBAY HARBOR COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT et al.
MEAD, J.
[¶1] Patricia Minerich and seven other residents of Boothbay and
Boothbay Harbor1 (collectively, the Residents), appeal from a judgment of the
Superior Court (Lincoln County, Cashman, J.) denying their Rule 80B complaint
for judicial review of a decision of the Boothbay-Boothbay Harbor School Board
(the Board) denying their petition for reconsideration of a bond question. They
also appeal the dismissal of their independent claims against the Board and
several individuals2 for a declaratory judgment that their First Amendment
rights had been violated and for attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983
1 The other named residents are James Farrin, Virginia Farrin, Elizabeth Grant, Roy Tholl, Stephen
Carbone, Pamela Mancusco, and Daniel Zajdel.
2 The individuals are Ronnie Campbell, Troy Lewis, Matt Doucette, Paul Roberts, Darrell Gudroe, and Sewall Maddocks. 2
(Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 119-59). Finding no error with the Board’s denial
of the petition and the Superior Court’s dismissal of independent claims, we
affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] The following facts are drawn from the Superior Court’s decision
and are supported by the record. Hurricane Island Found. v. Town of Vinalhaven,
2023 ME 33, ¶ 2, 295 A.3d 147. On February 6, 2024, the Boothbay-Boothbay
Harbor Community School District initiated a referendum to vote on a bond of
$29,950,000 to renovate the elementary and middle schools in the district.
A special election was held on April 24, 2024, and voters approved the bond.
[¶3] On May 1, 2024, the Residents, from both Boothbay and Boothbay
Harbor, submitted a petition to the Board containing two articles requesting “a
Reconsideration Referendum” of the April 24th election. Article 1 asked: “Shall
Article 1 as approved by the voters of the Boothbay-Boothbay Harbor
Community School District on April 24, 2024, and reprinted as follows, be
reconsidered and repealed pursuant to 20-A M.R.S. § 1504?” Article 2 asked: “If
Article 1 on this ballot is validly approved, resulting in the repeal of the April 24,
2024 vote regarding the Elementary/Middle School Project as described on the
April 24, 2024 ballot, do you favor authorizing the board of Trustees of 3
Boothbay-Boothbay Harbor Community School District (the ‘District’) to
update and renovate the existing Boothbay Region Elementary School as
further described below (the ‘Project’), and to issue bonds of notes (the ‘Bonds’)
in the name of the District solely for the Project in an amount not to exceed
$10,250,300.”
[¶4] On May 14, 2024, the Board rejected the petition because it
requested a referendum on “(i) an article that is different from the article
considered by the District Voters on April 24, 2024, and (ii) a second article that
is unrelated to the April 24, 2024, referendum.” The Board did not reform the
submitted articles, because doing so “would change what the voters who signed
the petition put their name to.”
[¶5] The Residents filed a complaint in the Superior Court seeking
review of the Board’s decision pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80B and asserting
independent claims seeking a declaratory judgment to recognize their
compliance with 20-A M.R.S. § 1504 (2025) and attorney fees based on
deprivation of their First Amendment rights to petition the government
pursuant to section 1983. On December 31, 2024, the Superior Court denied
both the 80B complaint and the independent claims, finding that the petition
was not a petition for reconsideration because of the inclusion of Article 2 and 4
that the independent claims were barred by the exclusivity principle. The
Residents timely filed a notice of appeal on January 17, 2025. See M.R.
Civ. P 80B(n); M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
[¶6] The District argues that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to
review the Board’s decision under Rule 80B because the Board’s duty is
discretionary and neither section 1504 nor its statutory scheme provide for
judicial review. The District argues that only a writ of mandamus could provide
a mechanism for judicial review and because mandamus applies only to
ministerial duties, not discretionary duties, the Superior Court should have
dismissed the 80B complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
[¶7] We review de novo whether the Superior Court has jurisdiction over
a complaint for review of governmental action pursuant to Rule 80B, Hurricane
Island Found., 2023 ME 33, ¶ 10, 295 A.3d 147, because “Rule 80B itself does
not confer jurisdiction to review a municipal action; it simply prescribes the
procedure for judicial review when there is a separate basis for such
jurisdiction.” 15 Langsford Owner LLC v. Town of Kennebunkport, 2024 ME 79,
¶ 12, 327 A.3d 1093. Jurisdiction exists over an 80B complaint if it is “provided 5
by statute or is otherwise available by law.” M.R. Civ. P. 80B(a). Judicial review
is not provided for in section 1504, nor in its statutory scheme. See 20-A M.R.S.
§§ 1501-1506 (2025). “Because the extraordinary writs were virtually
eliminated as separate procedural devices, Rule 80B is ordinarily the only
procedural path to assert against the government the substantive rights
protected by the extraordinary writs.” Hurricane Island Found., 2023 ME 33,
¶ 10, 295 A.3d 147.
1. Availability of the Writ of Mandamus
[¶8] Review is “otherwise available by law” if “it is in the nature of that
formerly available under the common law extraordinary writs, such as
certiorari, mandamus or prohibition.” Dowey v. Sanford Hous. Auth., 516 A.2d
957, 959 (Me. 1986). A writ of mandamus functions “to compel the
performance of a ministerial act.” 15 Langsford Owner LLC, 2024 ME 79, ¶ 17,
327 A.3d 1093. We have previously spoken to whether a duty is ministerial or
discretionary, and thus whether a writ of mandamus could issue:
When the law requires the public officer to do a specified act, in a specified way, upon a conceded state of facts, without regard to his own judgment as to the propriety of the act, and with no power to exercise discretion, the duty is ministerial in character and performance may be compelled by mandamus if there is no other remedy. When, however, the law requires a judicial determination to be made, such as the decision of a question of fact, or the exercise of judgment in deciding whether the act should be done or not, the 6
duty is regarded as judicial and mandamus will not lie to compel performance.
Id. (quotation marks omitted). Because the determination of Superior Court
jurisdiction turns on whether the Board’s duty is ministerial or discretionary,
see 14 M.R.S. § 5301 (2025), we must interpret the statute at issue, namely
section 1504.
2. Interpretation of Section 1504
[¶9] “We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo,” first
looking to “the statute’s plain meaning.” Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 37 v. Pineo,
2010 ME 11, ¶ 16, 988 A.2d 987. Section 1504(1) provides:
The regional school unit board shall, within 60 days, initiate a new regional school unit referendum to reconsider the vote of the previous referendum if, within 7 days of the first referendum, at least 10% of the number of voters voting for the gubernatorial candidates in the last gubernatorial election in the municipalities within the regional school unit petition to reconsider a prior regional school unit referendum vote.
20-A M.R.S. § 1504(1) (emphasis added). The Legislature has explicitly stated
that “‘[s]hall’ and ‘must’ are terms of equal weight that indicate a mandatory
duty, action or requirement. ‘May’ indicates authorization or permission to
act.” 1 M.R.S. § 71(9-A) (2025). Further, we have “consistently held that the
word shall is to be construed as must, and that such statutory language 7
indicates a mandatory duty.” Pineo, 2010 ME 11, ¶ 18, 988 A.2d 987 (quotation
marks omitted).
[¶10] The plain language of the statute establishes that the Board’s duty
is ministerial, not discretionary, so long as the minimum statutory criteria are
met. See 1 M.R.S. § 71(9-A); infra ¶ 13. While the District is correct that the
prior cases of Heald v. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 74 and Dobbs v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist.
No. 503 hold that school district boards have discretionary authority to manage
the referendum process, they were decided under section 1504’s predecessor
statute, 20 M.R.S.A. § 225(2)(A) (1964 & Supp. 1980).4 Heald, 387 A.2d 1, 3-4
(Me. 1978); Dobbs, 419 A.2d 1024, 1027-28 (Me. 1980).
[¶11] Our determination in Heald and Dobbs that section 225 conferred
discretionary authority upon school boards was predicated upon the statutory
language that preceded subsection 2(A): “[S]chool directors shall be authorized
to call such meeting as follows.” 20 M.R.S.A. § 225 (Supp. 1980); Heald, 387
3 In Dobbs, the ultimate question was whether the Board had the authority to seek reconsideration
on a prior bond question, not whether the Board had authority to refuse to submit a resident led reconsideration effort for referendum. 419 A.2d at 1028. Accordingly, its precedential value is limited.
4 The applicable portion of section 225(2)(A) reads: “When requested by 10% of the number of voters voting for the gubernatorial candidates at the last statewide election in the municipalities comprising the district, the directors shall call a district meeting, placing before the voters the specific school construction article which has been requested by the petitioners.” 20 M.R.S.A. § 225(2)(A) (Supp. 1980). 8
A.2d at 4 (“The quoted language does not require the directors to call such a
meeting. It merely authorizes them to do so at their discretion.”). We noted
that if section 225(2)(A) “were to require the directors to order a new election
at the request of 10% of the voters in the district,” then the Board’s duty would
have been ministerial. See Heald, 387 A.2d at 3 n.5.
[¶12] In this matter, by contrast, section 1504 contains no such
“authorizing” language. Instead, it provides an unambiguous mandate that the
Board must put the articles up for reconsideration if the statutory requirements
are met. The Legislature could have included the language of authorization but
did not. See 21-A M.R.S. § 901(3-A) (2025) (conferring on the Secretary of State
the power to review direct initiative legislation before putting it out to the
voters). Moreover, we declared when interpreting another Title 20-A statute
that, because the statute “requires the selectmen to meet, countersign, and post
the warrants, and does not afford them any discretion or offer an alternative
procedure, the selectmen of each town had a mandatory duty to comply with
the statute.” Pineo, 2010 ME 11, ¶ 18, 988 A.2d 987.
[¶13] Section 1504 has three requirements that must be met in order to
trigger the obligation to initiate a new referendum: (i) the number of
signatories to the petition must be at least ten percent of the number of voters 9
voting for the gubernatorial candidates in the last gubernatorial election in the
municipalities within the school regional unit, (ii) the petition must be received
by the regional school unit within seven days after the first referendum vote,
and (iii) the petition must specifically be to reconsider a prior regional school
unit referendum vote. See 20-A M.R.S. § 1504(1).5 The Board is vested with a
limited degree of gatekeeping discretion to determine that the threshold
requirements have been met, but once they are met, the Board’s duty to put the
reconsideration question up for a referendum is ministerial.
[¶14] The District also relies on this Court’s decision in Dunston v. Town
of York for the notion that a school board’s authority over reconsideration
articles is discretionary. 590 A.2d 526 (Me. 1991). However, our rationale in
Dunston in finding that the statute containing the procedure for calling a town
meeting did not create a mandatory duty for municipal officers was predicated
upon the specific language of the statute at issue that provided an alternative
method for convening a meeting if the municipal officers unreasonably refused
to call the meeting. Id. at 527. We concluded that the combination of the
standard and alternative methods “recogniz[ed] the authority of the selectmen
to exercise their sound discretion” in determining whether a petition met the
5 Sections 1504(2) and (3) provide additional requirements related to quorum and bonds that are not at issue here. 10
statutory requirements. Id. Here, section 1504 does not provide an alternative
pathway should the Board decide not to put the reconsideration question up
for a referendum. As a result, “[n]o such discretion exists in this case because
there is no method for calling a referendum other than the one outlined in
[20-A M.R.S. § 1504].” Pineo, 2010 ME 11, ¶ 19, 988 A.2d 987.
[¶15] In sum, we conclude that the Board’s duty to initiate a referendum
upon receipt of a reconsideration petition is ministerial, provided that the
petition meets the statutory requirements of section 1504. As a result, the
Superior Court had jurisdiction to hear the request for judicial review of the
Board’s decision, see 14 M.R.S. § 5301, because a writ of mandamus could
function to compel the Board to put the article up for a referendum if the
petition was a proper reconsideration petition.6 Therefore, we reach the merits
of the case.
6 In the alternative, the District argues that if the Board’s duty is ministerial, the case is moot
because the statutory deadline of sixty days for reconsideration motions has passed and thus a writ of mandamus is no longer viable. This matter is not moot because the bonds in dispute have not been issued, so we can still provide meaningful relief. See Brunswick Citizens for Collaborative Gov’t v. Town of Brunswick, 2018 ME 95, ¶ 8, 189 A.3d 248 (finding moot a declaratory judgment action seeking to allow an initiative to overrule the sale of property by a town council because the property had already been sold, making it so that any ruling would be without effect).
Even if a case is moot, we may still address it if it falls into one of the three recognized exceptions to the mootness doctrine: (i) the collateral consequences exception, (ii) the public interest exception, and (iii) the exception for issues that are repetitive, yet evade review. Me. Civ. Liberties Union v. City of S. Portland, 1999 ME 121, ¶ 9, 734 A.2d 191. We conclude that both the second and third exceptions apply here. See Pineo, 2010 ME 11, ¶¶ 9-10, 988 A.2d 987. 11
B. Petition for Reconsideration
[¶16] The Residents contend that (1) the Board erred in finding that the
petition was not a reconsideration petition because section 1504 does not place
any limitations on the form or contents of a reconsideration petition, and
(2) Article 2 constituted a distinct budget question with a separate procedure
under 20-A M.R.S. § 1482-A(3) (2025). The District maintains that the petition
was not a reconsideration petition because a normal reading of the phrase
“petition to reconsider,” which is undefined in statute, would preclude the
Board from taking up a petition to reconsider and repeal the prior referendum
vote plus another article that is conditioned upon whether Article 1 passes.
1. Scope of the Petition Language
[¶17] “When the Superior Court acts in an appellate capacity,” we
directly review the operative administrative decision “to determine whether
the findings are unsupported by substantial evidence in the record, and
whether there was any abuse of discretion or error of law.” Penkul v. Town of
Lebanon, 2016 ME 16, ¶ 14, 136 A.3d 88 (quotation marks omitted).
[¶18] As the District accurately noted, the term “reconsideration” is
undefined in section 1504. As a result, we must interpret the term to determine
whether the petition was in fact a petition for reconsideration. We review 12
questions of statutory interpretation de novo, focusing on the plain language,
see supra ¶ 9, while “considering the entire statutory scheme to achieve a
harmonious result,” Cassidy Holdings, LLC v. Aroostook Cnty. Comm’rs, 2023 ME
69, ¶ 6, 304 A.3d 259 (quotation marks omitted). When construing an
undefined statutory term, courts “often rely on the definitions provided in
dictionaries.” Apex Custom Lease Corp. v. State Tax Assessor, 677 A.2d 530, 533
(Me. 1996). Reconsideration means “[t]o discuss or take up (a matter) again.”
Reconsider, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).
[¶19] Here, the Residents’ petition does not request a reconsideration as
provided by the limited and specific context of the statute. Because of the
inclusion of the language “and repeal” emphasized by the Residents in their
petition, Article 1 was not merely seeking a referendum to reconsider the
April 24th vote. Rather, the Residents made a request to affirmatively repeal
the result of that vote. Plainly, this is not what “reconsideration” means. See
supra ¶ 18. As the Superior Court correctly stated, “a proper [section] 1504
reconsideration request does not propose a different or replacement ballot
initiative. It can only ask if a previous referendum should be revisited at the
ballot.” The Superior Court’s concise language accurately reflects how a
reconsideration referendum is meant to work: voters are invited to revisit a 13
ballot question and have the option of either re-approving it or denying it. By
adding in the additional language of “and repeal,” the Residents have changed
how reconsideration works in the context of a referendum vote. Because
section 1504 provides for a referendum to only reconsider the prior
referendum vote, the Residents’ petition exceeds the scope of the statute’s
provisions by seeking something beyond a true reconsideration initiative.
[¶20] Moreover, Article 2 is unquestionably not a question on
reconsideration. Because it asks the voters to approve an entirely distinct
replacement initiative, not to merely take up a previous matter again, the article
does not and cannot fall into the statutory definition of “reconsideration” as
provided by section 1504.
[¶21] While the Residents contend that Article 2 was meant to be a
separate article submitted under section 1482-A, the article contains no
reference to that statute, nor does it give any indication that the signatories to
the petition should consider it to be a separate referendum initiative. The
Residents cannot “backdoor” an entirely separate and independent budgetary
initiative by submitting it as part and parcel of a reconsideration petition. The
Residents’ petition makes no suggestion that they were not proceeding, in
Article 2, pursuant to section 1504, but rather were attempting a separate, 14
de facto referendum initiative pursuant to section 1482-A. In any event, section
1482-A affords the Residents no independent process to trigger a
reconsideration vote.
2. Severability of the Articles
[¶22] The Residents argue the introduction of Article 2 is not fatal to
their case and that the Board could have severed Article 2 from Article 1; this
argument is unavailing. Even if we determined that either article constituted a
reconsideration petition, we have previously warned against joining multiple
issues in referenda because of the confusion it can cause. See Common Cause v.
State, 455 A.2d 1, 13 (Me. 1983). The Board had no way of knowing which
article motivated the signatories to the petition, and it is certainly possible that
the inclusion of Article 2 helped induce the signers’ support of Article 1.
[¶23] Prospective signers were presented with a unitary two-article
petition that carries no suggestion of a later severance of the articles. A person
signing the petition might reasonably believe they were “pre-approving”
authority for the District to “issue bonds or notes . . . in the name of the District
solely for the Project in an amount not to exceed $10,250,300” (emphasis
omitted). Neither the Board nor the court can speculate upon the signatories’ 15
motive or intent in signing the two-article petition or whether they would have
signed the petition had it contained only a single article.
[¶24] The Board properly concluded that the Articles could not be
severed from each other, and the reconsideration petition, as drafted and
signed, could not be submitted to referendum.
C. Independent Claims
[¶25] Because we determine that the Superior Court had jurisdiction to
hear the Residents’ Rule 80B complaint, and because the Residents’ claims were
fully adjudicated in that context, the exclusivity principal bars the independent
claims;7 we affirm the Superior Court’s denial of the independent claims. See
Cayer v. Town of Madawaska, 2016 ME 143, ¶¶ 16-17, 148 A.3d 707; Fair
Elections Portland, Inc. v. City of Portland, 2021 ME 32, ¶ 21 n.7, 252 A.3d 504;
Cape Shore House Owners Ass’n v. Town of Cape Elizabeth, 2019 ME 86, ¶¶ 7-9,
209 A.3d 102.
7We also note an additional ground for the denial of the Residents’ First Amendment claim. See Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. Wilk, 2013 ME 79, ¶ 19, 76 A.3d 363 (stating that this Court “may affirm a trial court’s judgment on a ground not relied upon by the trial court.” (quotation marks omitted)). Because we hold that there has been no violation of the reconsideration process provided by section 1504, the Residents’ First Amendment claim fails on the merits as they have not demonstrated any abridgements of their right to petition. 16
III. CONCLUSION
[¶26] Because Article 1 did not constitute a proper reconsideration
petition given that it requested affirmative action beyond the scope of the
statutory provisions, and because Article 2 simply did not constitute a
reconsideration petition of a previous vote, the Board did not abuse its
discretion or commit an error of law in declining to submit the articles in the
petition to the voters in a referendum pursuant to section 1504. The Superior
Court’s affirmance of the Board’s decision is therefore affirmed.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Kristin M. Collins, Esq. (orally), Preti Flaherty Beliveau & Pachios, LLP, Augusta, for appellants Patricia M. Minerich, James Farrin, Virginia Farrin, Elizabeth Grant, Roy Tholl, Stephen Carbone, Pamela Mancusco, and Daniel Zajdel
David Kallin, Esq. (orally), and Amy K. Olfene, Esq., Drummond Woodsum, Portland, for appellee Boothbay-Boothbay Harbor Community School District, Ronnie Campbell, Troy Lewis, Matt Doucette, Paul Roberts, Darrell Gudroe, and Sewall Maddocks
Lincoln County Superior Court docket number AP-2024-5 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY