Patricia Lilly v. United States Postal Service

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedAugust 25, 2022
DocketCH-0353-16-0244-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Patricia Lilly v. United States Postal Service (Patricia Lilly v. United States Postal Service) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Patricia Lilly v. United States Postal Service, (Miss. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

PATRICIA A. LILLY, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, CH-0353-16-0244-I-1

v.

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, DATE: August 25, 2022 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Patricia A. Lilly, Evanston, Illinois, pro se.

Deborah W. Carlson, Chicago, Illinois, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. For the reasons set forth below, the appellant’s petition for review is DISMISSED as untimely filed without good cause shown. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(e), (g).

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

¶2 In an initial decision dated May 19, 2016, the administrative judge dismissed the appellant’s restoration appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the appellant had waived her right to appeal under a prior settlement agreement. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 15, Initial Decision (ID) at 3-4. On July 20, 2016, the appellant filed a petition for review, arguing that the Board has jurisdiction over her appeal and reasserting her restoration claim. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 1-4. The agency responded to the appellant’s petition, arguing that it is untimely filed and asserting that the initial decision properly dismissed the appellant’s claim for lack of jurisdiction. PFR File, Tab 3 at 8-10. In accordance with the Office of the Clerk of the Board’s acknowledgment letter, PFR File, Tab 2, the appellant also has filed a motion to accept the filing as timely and/or to ask the Board to waive or set aside the time limit, asserting that she missed the filing deadline due to the recent deaths of her aunt and father and because she was not represented by an attorney, PFR File, Tab 4 at 1-2. ¶3 The Board’s regulations provide that a petition for review must be filed within 35 days of the issuance of the initial decision or, if the appellant shows that the initial decision was received more than 5 days after the issuance, within 30 days after the date she received the initial decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(e). Here, the appellant has not alleged or established that she received the initial decision more than 5 days after its issuance on May 19, 2016. PFR File, Tab 4 at 1-2. Thus, any petition for review was due no later than June 23, 2016, making her petition for review untimely by 27 days. ID at 4. ¶4 The Board will waive its filing deadline only upon a showing of good cause for the delay in filing. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(g). To determine if an appellant has shown good cause, the Board will consider the length of the delay, the reasonableness of her excuse and her showing of due diligence, whether she is proceeding pro se, and whether she has presented evidence of the existence of circumstances beyond her control that affected her abili ty to comply with the time limits or of unavoidable casualty or misfortune which similarly shows a causal 3

relationship to her inability to timely file her petition. Moorman v. Department of the Army, 68 M.S.P.R. 60, 62-63 (1995), aff’d, 79 F.3d 1167 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Table). ¶5 Applying the relevant factors set forth in Moorman, we find that the appellant has not made a showing of good cause. Here, the appellant’s delay of almost 1 month is significant. See Summers v. U.S. Postal Service, 87 M.S.P.R. 403, ¶¶ 6, 12 (2000) (finding that a delay of nearly 1 month and a delay of 15 days were significant), aff’d, 25 F. App’x 827 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Further, we find that the appellant’s inability to secure an attorney due to the financial cost is not good cause for an untimely filing. See Georgeoplous v. U.S. Postal Service, 61 M.S.P.R. 411, 413 (1994). ¶6 The appellant’s motion states that the deaths of her aunt and father, the attendant circumstances, and her subsequent grieving were factors in her untimeliness and constitute good cause. PFR File, Tab 4 at 1-2. She submitted evidence of her father’s death on April 22, 2016, id. at 3, which was just under 1 month before the issuance of the initial decision, 2 months before the deadline to file a petition, and 3 months before she ultimately filed her petition for review. While we are sympathetic toward her situation, we find that her explanation does not provide good cause for the delay in filing her petition. See Stephens v. Department of Health & Human Services, 95 M.S.P.R. 600, ¶ 6 (2004) (finding that family difficulties that predated the initial decision did not establish good cause for a 1-month delay in filing a petition for review), aff’d, 128 F. App’x 147 (Fed. Cir. 2005). ¶7 Further, the appellant has failed to show that her father’s death, while unfortunate, created any circumstances beyond her control that affected her ability to comply with the time limits. See Alonzo v. Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 180, 184 (1980). She did not assert any details, such as whether she had to leave the area, and, if so, when she returned. She also has not explained why no one else could have assumed the duties of making the 4

appropriate arrangements for filing a petition for review in her absence. See Taylor v. U.S. Postal Service, 53 M.S.P.R. 27, 28 (1992). Furthermore, while the appellant’s distress from losing family members is understandable, we find that such distress does not itself establish good cause for the 27-day filing delay. See Cunningham v. Department of Transportation, 35 M.S.P.R. 674, 677-78 (1987) (finding that, in the absence of corroborating evidence, an appellant’s allegation that he was emotionally upset over a friend’s death is insufficient to establish good cause for an untimely filing); Ruoff v. Federal Aviation Administration, 16 M.S.P.R. 249, 250-52 (1983) (finding that the appellant’s bare assertion that he was in “serious mental trauma” due to his daughter’s death was insufficient to establish good cause for failing to follow orders and timely prosecuting his appeal). ¶8 We further find that the appellant has failed to demonstrate due diligence in filing her petition. The record shows, and the appellant h as not alleged otherwise, that she was aware of the time limit and procedure for filing a petition for review. ID at 4; see Moles v. Office of Personnel Management, 43 M.S.P.R. 89, 90 (1989) (considering as a factor in a good cause analysis that the initial decision explicitly provided the appellant with the deadline for petitioning the Board for full review). Prior to the due date, she failed to request an extension of the filing deadline or notify the Board of any extenuating circumstances that would have prohibited her from filing a timely petition. As such, we find that she failed to take the diligent steps that would be expected of a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances. See Alonzo, 4 M.S.P.R. at 184 n.1. ¶9 We acknowledge the appellant’s allegations that she called the Clerk’s Office several times but was not provided with the assistance she sought.

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Stephens v. Merit Systems Protection Board
128 F. App'x 147 (Federal Circuit, 2005)
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582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)
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55 F. App'x 559 (Federal Circuit, 2003)

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Patricia Lilly v. United States Postal Service, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/patricia-lilly-v-united-states-postal-service-mspb-2022.