Patricia Diffley v. Department of Homeland Security

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedApril 19, 2023
DocketNY-1221-17-0237-W-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Patricia Diffley v. Department of Homeland Security (Patricia Diffley v. Department of Homeland Security) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Patricia Diffley v. Department of Homeland Security, (Miss. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

PATRICIA DIFFLEY, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, NY-1221-17-0237-W-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND DATE: April 19, 2023 SECURITY, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Alan E. Wolin, Esquire, Jericho, New York, for the appellant.

Cynthia J. Pree, Esquire, New York, New York, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed her individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction . On petition for review, the appellant argues that she did establish Board jurisdiction over her IRA appeal under 5 U.S.C. §§ 2302(b)(8) and 2302(b)(9). Generally, we

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to clarify why the appellant failed to establish Board jurisdiction based on 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9), we AFFIRM the initial decision. ¶2 Between November 24, 2014, and August 8, 2016, the appellant disclosed to agency management and to her U.S. Senator that her supervisor had obtained personal information from the appellant’s therapist and disclos ed it to others, violating her privacy and causing her embarrassment. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tabs 1, 5. After two investigations, on October 24, 2016, the agency proposed to suspend the appellant for 3 days, based on charges of disruptive behavior an d inappropriate conduct. IAF, Tab 10 at 180. On February 14, 2107, she filed a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), alleging that the agency had proposed her suspension and taken other alleged personnel actions because of her disclosures. IAF, Tab 1 at 21-40. After OSC advised the appellant that it had closed its file, id. at 54, she filed an IRA appeal, id. at 1-14, and requested a hearing, id. at 2. ¶3 In her initial decision based on the written record, the administrative judge dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 12, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 17-18. She found that, while the appellant exhausted her remedy before 3

OSC, ID at 8-9, she failed to nonfrivolously allege that her disclosures were protected. ID at 10-15. Despite that finding, the administrative judge further found that, even if the appellant’s disclosures were protected, she failed to nonfrivolously allege that they were a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to propose her suspension. ID at 15-17. ¶4 On review, the appellant disputes the administrative judge’s findings that she failed to nonfrivolously allege that her disclosures were protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 7-14, and that her disclosures were not a contributing factor to her proposed suspension or to other alleged personnel actions, id. at 14-18. We have reviewed the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that her disclosures were protected because her allegations regarding her supervisor do not satisfy the reasonable belief requirement; that is, because a disinterested observer with knowledge of the essential facts known to and readily ascertainable by her could not reasonably conclude that the agency’s actions evidenced a violation of law, rule, or regulation, gross mismanagement, an abuse of authority, or any of the other conditions set forth at 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). Lachance v. White, 174 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Regarding these issues, the record reflects that the administrative judge considered the evidence as a whole, drew appropriate inferences, and made reasoned conclusions. ID at 9-15; see, e.g, Clay v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 245, ¶ 6 (2016) (finding no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s findings when she considered the evidence as a whole, drew appropriate inferences, and made reasoned conclusions) ; Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 105-06 (1997) (same). We therefore agree with the administrative judge that the appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege 4

that she made a protected disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) and that, on that basis, her appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 2 ¶5 However, the appellant raised another possible basis for Board jurisdiction. The record reflects that, on September 25, 2013, she initiated a complaint with the agency’s Office of Internal Affairs (OIA), in which she raised the same allegations she raised in her other alleged disclosures regarding her supervisor. IAF, Tab 10 at 45-106. The appellant referenced this filing in her OSC complaint, IAF, Tab 1 at 34, and in her Board appeal, id. 7, alleging Board jurisdiction based not only on 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), but also (b)(9). IAF, Tab 1 at 9; Tab 5 at 4. Although the administrative judge did, both in her jurisdictional order and initial decision, set out the basis for Board jurisdiction over an IRA appeal based on 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9), IAF, Tab 3 at 3; ID at 7, she did not analyze the appellant’s appeal under that statutory provision. We do so now. ¶6 Under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A), it is protected activity to exercise “any appeal, complaint, or grievance right granted by any law, rule, or regulation— (i) with regard to remedying a violation of [5 U.S.C.

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Patricia Diffley v. Department of Homeland Security, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/patricia-diffley-v-department-of-homeland-security-mspb-2023.