Patricia Buggs v. Department of the Navy

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedMay 31, 2024
DocketDC-0752-21-0674-I-2
StatusUnpublished

This text of Patricia Buggs v. Department of the Navy (Patricia Buggs v. Department of the Navy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Patricia Buggs v. Department of the Navy, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

PATRICIA A. BUGGS, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DC-0752-21-0674-I-2

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, DATE: May 31, 2024 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Patricia A. Buggs , Fredericksburg, Virginia, pro se.

Eva M. Clements , Quantico, Virginia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed her involuntary resignation appeal for lack of jurisdiction. On petition for review, the appellant argues that the Board’s March 4, 2022 ratification of the Merit Systems Protection Board’s administrative judges’ appointments is unconstitutional and requests that the Board forward her case to arbitration. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 4. Generally, we grant petitions such as 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. 2 Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). The appellant filed an appeal alleging that her resignation from Federal service was involuntary. Buggs v. Department of the Navy, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-21-0674-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1. Thereafter, the agency filed a motion to dismiss the appeal without prejudice in which it asserted that there was a question as to whether Board administrative judges were properly appointed under the Appointments Clause. IAF, Tab 8. Specifically, the agency contended that, pursuant to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Lucia v. Securities Exchange Commission, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018), the administrative judge may not have the authority to decide the appeal because the administrative judge may qualify as an Officer of the United States subject to the Appointments Clause, rather than as a mere employee. Id. The agency recognized that this

2 Following the petition for review, the appellant filed a motion for leave to submit additional documentation she received pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request to substantiate her constructive discharge claim. PFR File, Tab 4 at 4. Nonetheless, because the appellant has failed to sufficiently explain how this purported new evidence would be material, i.e., of sufficient weight to warrant a different outcome from that of the initial decision, we DENY her motion. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(k); see Russo v. Veterans Administration, 3 M.S.P.R. 345, 349 (1980). 3

question was currently pending before the Board on interlocutory appeal, and it requested that the appeal be dismissed without prejudice pending review of this question by the Board. On October 18, 2021, the administrative judge dismissed the appeal without prejudice in order for the Board to address this issue. IAF, Tab 9, Initial Decision. The appeal was automatically re-docketed on April 18, 2022. Buggs v. Department of the Navy, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-21-0674-I-2, Appeal File (I-2 AF), Tab 1. After the case was refiled, the appellant filed a response to the agency’s statement on jurisdiction in which she stated that she “has no objection to the current Judge handling the case at hand.” I-2 AF, Tab 5. On July 6, 2022, the administrative judge issued an initial decision dismissing the involuntary resignation appeal for lack of jurisdiction. I-2 AF, Tab 10, Initial Decision. On petition for review, the appellant argues that the ratification of the Board’s administrative judges’ appointments is unconstitutional because only two Board members ratified the appointments. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. The appellant also challenges the authority of the administrative judge by contending that the administrative judge has two layers of removal protections. Id. We need not, however, address these arguments because we find that the appellant waived any objection to the administrative judge’s authority. The appellant was apprised by the agency’s motion to dismiss the appeal and the initial decision dismissing the appeal without prejudice that there was a question pending before the Board on interlocutory appeal regarding whether administrative judges were properly appointed pursuant to the Appointments Clause. IAF, Tab 8-9. The appellant nonetheless expressly waived any objection to the administrative judge adjudicating her appeal in her response to the agency’s pleading on jurisdiction. I-2 AF, Tab 5; see Wynn v U.S. Postal Service, 115 M.S.P.R. 146, ¶ 9-10 (2010) (explaining the circumstances under which an appellant may be deemed to have expressly waived an affirmative defense), overruled on other grounds by Thurman v. U.S. Postal Service, 2022 MSPB 21. 4

Furthermore, the appellant did not raise any objections to the administrative judge’s authority to adjudicate her appeal in her other pleadings below. Thus, even if the appellant’s statement below did not constitute an express waiver on its own, the appellant effectively waived any such objection to the administrative judge’s authority by not pursuing it below. See Thurman, 2022 MSPB 21, ¶¶ 17-18 (explaining that the ultimate question in determining whether an appellant waived an affirmative defense is whether an appellant demonstrated his intent to continue pursuing his affirmative defense, and whether he conveyed that intent after filing the initial appeal). In addition, the Board’s regulations impose particular requirements on litigants who wish to challenge the qualifications of the individual assigned to hear their cases. McClenning v. Department of the Army, 2022 MSPB 3, ¶ 14. 3 Specifically, a party seeking to disqualify a judge must file a motion to disqualify as soon as the party has reason to believe there is a basis for disqualification and, if the administrative judge denies that motion, the party must request certification of an interlocutory appeal or the disqualification issue is considered waived. Id.; 5 C.F.R. § 1201.42(b)-(c); see Thomas v. Office of Personnel Management, 350 F. App’x 448, 451 (Fed. Cir.

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Related

Thomas v. Office of Personnel Management
350 F. App'x 448 (Federal Circuit, 2009)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)
Lucia v. SEC
585 U.S. 237 (Supreme Court, 2018)
Gary Thurman v. United States Postal Service
2022 MSPB 21 (Merit Systems Protection Board, 2022)
Chong McClenning v. Department of the Army
2022 MSPB 3 (Merit Systems Protection Board, 2022)

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Patricia Buggs v. Department of the Navy, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/patricia-buggs-v-department-of-the-navy-mspb-2024.