Patrice Mckoy v. U.S. Postal Service

Merit Systems Protection Board·Decided August 3, 2026·No. PH-0353-25-1293-I-1·Unpublished

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

PATRICE V. MCKOY, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, PH-0353-25-1293-I-1

v.

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, DATE: August 3, 2026 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Quinn Patton , Severna Park, Maryland, for the appellant.

Roderick Eves , Esquire, and Jessica Dixon , Esquire, St. Louis, Missouri, for the agency.

BEFORE

Henry J. Kerner, Vice Chairman James J. Woodruff II, Member

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed her appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED (1) to supplement the initial decision to clarify why the Board lacks jurisdiction over the appellant’s restoration claim and (2) to find that the Board lacks jurisdiction over this matter as a chapter 75 adverse action appeal , we AFFIRM the initial decision.

We agree that the Board lacks jurisdiction over the appellant’s restoration claim; however, we supplement the initial decision to clarify the basis for this finding.

The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those matters over which it has been given jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation. Maddox v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985). To establish jurisdiction over a claim of a denial of restoration as a partially recovered employee, 2 an appellant is required to make nonfrivolous allegations 3 of the following: (1) she was absent from her position due to a compensable injury; (2) she recovered sufficiently to return to duty on a part-time basis or to return to work in a position with less demanding physical requirements than those previously required of her; (3) the agency denied her request for restoration; and (4) the denial was arbitrary and 2 Partially recovered employees are those who, “though not ready to resume the full range” of duties, have “recovered sufficiently to return to part-time or light duty or to another position with less demanding physical requirements.” Kingsley v. U.S. Postal Service, 123 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 9 (2016); 5 C.F.R. § 353.102. 3 A nonfrivolous allegation is an assertion that, if proven, could establish the matter at issue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s); see Hessami v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 979 F.3d 1362, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2020).

capricious because of the agency’s failure to perform its obligations under 5 C.F.R. § 353.301(d). 4 Cronin v. U.S. Postal Service, 2022 MSPB 13, ¶¶ 12, 19-20.

Here, the appellant’s Board filings were sparse; however, she has seemingly alleged that she is a partially recovered employee who has been restored to duty; she avers that the agency should have, but did not, restore her for a roughly 4-month period from February 16, 2024, to June 3, 2024. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 2, 7; Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 2. The appellant has alleged that the agency did not restore her during this 4-month period because of disability discrimination and equal employment opportunity (EEO) reprisal, and she has also alleged that the agency’s actions violated a union contract. IAF, Tab 1 at 2; PFR File, Tab 1 at 2.

In the initial decision, the administrative judge found that the appellant did not allege facts that would place her appeal within the Board’s jurisdiction because she did not contest the agency’s evidence that she had been restored. IAF, Tab 8, Initial Decision at 3. We supplement the initial decision to find that the appellant did not make nonfrivolous allegations sufficient to satisfy criterion (4) of the jurisdictional standard, i.e., she did not allege that the agency’s denial of restoration was arbitrary and capricious because of the agency’s failure to perform its obligations under 5 C.F.R. § 353.301(d). Cronin, 2022 MSPB 13, ¶¶ 12, 19-20. To this end, as indicated, the appellant has alleged that the agency violated a union contract and denied her restoration for a 4-month

4 The administrative judge did not provide the appellant with notice regarding the jurisdictional burden for her restoration claim prior to the issuance of the initial decision; however, both the agency’s filings and the initial decision provided such notice. See Burgess v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 758 F.2d 641, 643-44 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (indicating that an appellant must receive explicit information on what is required to establish an appealable jurisdictional issue); see also Easterling v. U.S. Postal Service, 110 M.S.P.R. 41, ¶ 11 (2008) (indicating that, when an administrative judge does not provide sufficient notice of the appellant’s burden of proving jurisdiction, that notice may be cured by the initial decision or by an agency pleading, which allows the appellant to satisfy the burden on review).

period because of disability discrimination and EEO reprisal. PFR File, Tab 1 at 2. These assertions are unavailing for purposes of criterion (4). See Cronin, 2022 MSPB 13, ¶¶ 20-21 (explaining that neither an agency’s failure to comply with self-imposed obligations nor claims of discrimination and reprisal provide a basis for showing that a denial of restoration was arbitrary and capricious). 5 Thus, even assuming that the appellant satisfied criteria (1)-(3), her allegations are nonetheless insufficient.

The Board lacks chapter 75 jurisdiction over this appeal.

We supplement the initial decision to find that the Board lacks jurisdiction over this matter as a chapter 75 suspension appeal. See Jenkins v. U.S. Postal Service, 2025 MSPB 6, ¶¶ 19-20 (indicating that rights and remedies under chapter 75 are not subsumed in restoration appeals); see also Abbott v. U.S. Postal Service, 121 M.S.P.R. 294, ¶ 10 (2014) (indicating that placement on enforced leave for more than 14 days may constitute an adverse action within the Board’s jurisdiction). Indeed, in order for a Postal Service employee to appeal an adverse action under chapter 75, the employee must (1) be a preference eligible, a management or supervisory employee, or an employee engaged in personnel work in other than a purely nonconfidential clerical capacity; and (2) have completed 1 year of current continuous service in the same or similar positions. See 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(B)(ii); 39 U.S.C. § 1005(a)(4)(A)(ii); Clark v. U.S. Postal Service, 118 M.S.P.R. 527, ¶ 7 (2012). Here, the agency’s pleadings notified the appellant of this standard, IAF, Tab 4 at 8, 14, and she has not alleged facts that would avail her of chapter 75 adverse action appeal rights, see Easterling v. U.S. Postal Service, 110 M.S.P.R. 41, ¶ 11 (2008).

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Patrice Mckoy v. U.S. Postal Service, (Miss. 2026).

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