Patel v. United States

CourtDistrict Court, D. Montana
DecidedFebruary 5, 2024
Docket6:23-cv-00094
StatusUnknown

This text of Patel v. United States (Patel v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Montana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Patel v. United States, (D. Mont. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA HELENA DIVISION

THE EXCELLENT THE EXCELLENT RAJ K. PATEL, from CV 23-94-H-BMM-KLD all capacities

Plaintiff, ORDER and FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION vs.

THE UNITED STATES, PRESIDENT JOE BIDEN, VICE PRESIDENT KAMALA HARRIS, ALL BIDEN CABINET OFFICERS, ATTORNEY GENERAL MERRICK GARLAND, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES XAVIER BECERRA, SURGEON GENERAL DR. VIVEK MURTHY, and UNITED NATIONS AMBASSADOR LINA THOMAS-GREENFIELD,

Defendants,

On December 26, 2023, pro se Plaintiff The Excellent The Excellent Raj K. Patel filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2) and lodged an Emergency Pro Se Petition for a Writ of Mandamus against the above-named Defendants. (Doc. 1). Patel has also filed a Motion to Perfect Service (Doc. 4), a nearly identical Emergency Pro Se Amended Petition for a Writ of Mandamus 1 (Doc. 7), a Motion to Expedite a favorable decision (Doc. 8), and a Motion to Skip Magistrate Judge (Doc. 10).

I. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), a civil proceeding may be commenced without prepayment of fees upon filing an affidavit showing inability to pay. On December

26, 2023, Patel completed an “Application to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs.” (Doc. 2). The information provided in the application is sufficient to make the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and the Court grants his request to proceed in forma pauperis.

II. Screening Requirement Because Patel is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review his complaint to determine if the allegations are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. If so, the complaint must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The court retains discretion in determining whether a pleading is “frivolous.”

Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). A pleading is frivolous if it has no “arguable basis in law or fact.” Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1984). See also, Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).

2 The term “frivolous . . . embraces not only the inarguable legal conclusion, but also the fanciful factual allegation.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325. In considering

whether a pleading is frivolous, the court need not “accept without question the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32. Rather, the court may “pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations” and consider whether the

allegations are fanciful, fantastic, or delusional. Denton, 504 U.S. at 32-33 (citing Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325, 327-8). “As those words suggest, a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts

available to contradict them.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 33; see also, In re Thomas, 508 F. 3d 1225, 1227 (9th Cir. 2007) (reaffirming that a court may dismiss an in forma pauperis case “as frivolous before service of process when the complaint recites

‘bare legal conclusions with no suggestion of supporting facts, or postulat[es] events and circumstances of a wholly fanciful kind’…”) (citations omitted). Where, as here, the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court has an obligation “to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the [plaintiff] the benefit of any

doubt.” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012). But even where the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the complaint should be dismissed if it appears “beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim.”

3 See Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1997). A pro se plaintiff must be given leave to amend unless it is “absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the

complaint cannot be cured by amendment.” Weilburg v. Shapiro, 488 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2007). If it clear that the complaint’s deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment, dismissal without leave to amend is appropriate. See e.g. Chaset v.

Fleer/Skybox Int’l, 300 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 200); Klamath-Lake Pharmaceutical Ass’n v. Klamath Medical Services Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276, 1293 (9th Cir. 1983). III. Analysis

Patel identifies himself as a citizen and resident of Indiana, has provided the Court with an Indiana mailing address, and has no apparent connection to Montana. (Doc. 1). Patel’s pleadings are difficult if not impossible to understand,

and are filled with delusional and fantastical factual allegations. Patel alleges that Defendants entered into an agreement with him by which they promised to protect him from assault and battery. (Doc. 1 at 2). He asserts that Defendants then breached that agreement by assaulting and battering him and

failing to protect him, and “negligently, recklessly, or wantonly caused or allowed a thing to assault and batter” him. (Doc. 1 at 2-3). Patel accuses Defendants of

4 causing him to suffer from “[f]atigue, depression, stress, laziness, nuisance,” and a litany of “physical deformities.” (Doc. 1 at 3).

Patel states “[t]here is a los[s] of control of what is inside plaintiff’s own person.” (Doc. 1 at 4). He asserts he “is under a stress technology that throws a ‘punch’ every second,” and that “[t]he stress technology causes fatigue, depression,

stress, laziness, nuisance, and physical deformities, including through obesity.” (Doc. 1 at 5). Patel claims he “has no other means of requesting relief,” and alleges he is entitled to mandamus relief because he is a “Basis Officer,” and the United States

“government has created treaties to protect one’s person, privacy, and other liberties,” including his right to be “free from a nuisance of a ringing sound inside [his] ears.” (Doc. 1 at 11). Patel accuses Defendants of violating these “intuitive”

treaties, and asks the Court to grant complete relief and “terminate the mental pain and suffering of the ringing sound” in his ears. (Doc. 1 at 12). Patel provides an Appendix of Sample Claims, ranging from Assault and Battery to Common Law Fraud and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

(Doc. 1 at 14-21). The claims contain similarly delusional allegations, including for example that in 2018 Patel “realized that white, ring-shaped circular lights flew out of his computer and then his window and went up plaintiff’s eyes and nose

5 which began a severe depression episode,” and the Defendants “entered into a contract for the purpose against abnormally dangerous things such as human nature

and its inherent dominate kvanish desires to inflict harm or those who are unreasonable.” (Doc. 1 at 15, 20) Patel has recently been described as “a serial litigant who has filed a series

‘of a sprawling complaint[s]’ in courts across the nation.” The Excellent the Excellent Raj K. Patel, 2023 WL 8447935, at *2 (D. N.J. Dec. 6, 2023) (quoting Patel v.

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Related

Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Denton v. Hernandez
504 U.S. 25 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Harry Franklin v. Ms. Murphy and Hoyt Cupp
745 F.2d 1221 (Ninth Circuit, 1984)
Javiad Akhtar v. J. Mesa
698 F.3d 1202 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
In Re Thomas
508 F.3d 1225 (Ninth Circuit, 2007)
Weilburg v. Shapiro
488 F.3d 1202 (Ninth Circuit, 2007)
Lopez v. Smith
203 F.3d 1122 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)

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Patel v. United States, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/patel-v-united-states-mtd-2024.