Patel v. State

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Patel v. State

545 S.E.2d 383, 247 Ga. App. 815, 2001 Fulton County D. Rep. 674, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 133

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedFebruary 5, 2001

DocketA00A2390

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 545 S.E.2d 383 (Patel v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Patel v. State, 545 S.E.2d 383, 247 Ga. App. 815, 2001 Fulton County D. Rep. 674, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 133 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).

Pincite

Opinion

Miller, Judge.

Pulin R. Patel was tried before a jury in the City Court of Atlanta and found guilty of following too closely, leaving the scene of an accident, reckless driving, and driving under the influence of alcohol. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. In Case No. A00A2390, Patel appeals from the denial of his subsequent motion to modify his four misdemeanor sentences.

1. The trial court’s order denied Patel’s motion on the ground that “[a] trial court loses power to modify, suspend or vacate its judgments after the term at which they are rendered.” ¹ That is the general rule for both felony and misdemeanor convictions, but the rule is different for misdemeanor sentences imposed under OCGA § 17-10-3 (a) (l).² “The sentencing courts shall retain jurisdiction to amend, modify, alter, suspend, or probate sentences under paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of [OCGA § 17-10-3] at any time. . . .”³ Thus, the trial court here retained the discretionary authority to grant Patel’s motion to modify any misdemeanor sentences imposed under that Code section.⁴ But such discretion does not extend to the sentence for driving under the influence. Sentences for driving under the influence are otherwise provided for by OCGA § 40-6-391 (c).

2. The Solicitor urges an affirmance under the theory that a [816]*816judgment that is right for any reason must be affirmed. But the court clearly did not exercise any discretion because it erroneously believed it had no discretion to grant Patel’s motion for leniency in misdemeanor sentencing since the term of court had passed. Where a ruling committed to the discretion of the trial court shows that no such discretion was in fact exercised and that the judgment rendered was based on an erroneous theory of law or a misapprehension of the applicable law, the “right for any reason” rule cannot ratify the result.⁵ The judgment of the trial court denying Patel’s motion to modify misdemeanor sentences is vacated and the case is remanded with direction to consider the merits of this motion in the full exercise of the court’s enlightened discretion.

Decided February 5, 2001. Morriss, Lober & Dobson, Bruce F. Morriss, Daniel Shim, for appellant. Joseph J. Drolet, Solicitor, Shukura L. Ingram, Craig E. Miller, Assistant Solicitors, for appellee.

Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction.

Pope, P. J., and Mikell, J., concur.

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Miller, Judge.

Pulin R. Patel was tried before a jury in the City Court of Atlanta and found guilty of following too closely, leaving the scene of an accident, reckless driving, and driving under the influence of alcohol. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. In Case No. A00A2390, Patel appeals from the denial of his subsequent motion to modify his four misdemeanor sentences.

1. The trial court’s order denied Patel’s motion on the ground that “[a] trial court loses power to modify, suspend or vacate its judgments after the term at which they are rendered.” ¹ That is the general rule for both felony and misdemeanor convictions, but the rule is different for misdemeanor sentences imposed under OCGA § 17-10-3 (a) (l).² “The sentencing courts shall retain jurisdiction to amend, modify, alter, suspend, or probate sentences under paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of [OCGA § 17-10-3] at any time. . . .”³ Thus, the trial court here retained the discretionary authority to grant Patel’s motion to modify any misdemeanor sentences imposed under that Code section.⁴ But such discretion does not extend to the sentence for driving under the influence. Sentences for driving under the influence are otherwise provided for by OCGA § 40-6-391 (c).

2. The Solicitor urges an affirmance under the theory that a [816]*816judgment that is right for any reason must be affirmed. But the court clearly did not exercise any discretion because it erroneously believed it had no discretion to grant Patel’s motion for leniency in misdemeanor sentencing since the term of court had passed. Where a ruling committed to the discretion of the trial court shows that no such discretion was in fact exercised and that the judgment rendered was based on an erroneous theory of law or a misapprehension of the applicable law, the “right for any reason” rule cannot ratify the result.⁵ The judgment of the trial court denying Patel’s motion to modify misdemeanor sentences is vacated and the case is remanded with direction to consider the merits of this motion in the full exercise of the court’s enlightened discretion.

Decided February 5, 2001. Morriss, Lober & Dobson, Bruce F. Morriss, Daniel Shim, for appellant. Joseph J. Drolet, Solicitor, Shukura L. Ingram, Craig E. Miller, Assistant Solicitors, for appellee.

Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction.

Pope, P. J., and Mikell, J., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

545 S.E.2d 383, 247 Ga. App. 815, 2001 Fulton County D. Rep. 674, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 133, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/patel-v-state-gactapp-2001.

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