Patel v. City of Los Angeles

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 26, 2026
• Docket: 24-7302
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 26 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HIREN PATEL; JAY DESAI; YASHVI No. 24-7302 HOSPITALITY, LLC, D.C. No. 2:24-cv-04265-JLS-JPR Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v. MEMORANDUM*

CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a municipal corporation; DOES, 1-10 inclusive,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Josephine L. Staton, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 21, 2026** Pasadena, California

Before: LEE, BUMATAY, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.

Hiren Patel, Jay Desai, and Yashvi Hospitality, LLC, are owners of a motel in

South Central Los Angeles that the City of Los Angeles declared to be a hub of

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). prostitution and other criminal activity. The City found it to be a public nuisance

and revoked the use permit for the motel. The owners sued, raising several

constitutional challenges and a state law writ of mandate claim. They now appeal

the district court’s dismissal of the complaint. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.

We review de novo a district court’s grant of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

Est. of Bride v. YOLO Techs., Inc., 112 F.4th 1168, 1174–75 (9th Cir. 2024). We

accept the factual assertions of a complaint as true, but those facts must “state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

For the plaintiffs to prevail against the City in their § 1983 claims, they must

prove that the City acted in accordance with “official municipal policy.” Monell v.

Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Connick v. Thompson, , 60 (2011).

As the district court noted, the plaintiffs fail to allege or identify “official municipal

policy” that violates their constitutional rights. Id. While they claim the city council

time limits and reliance on partially redacted police reports are official policy, they

fail to connect that alleged policy to the adverse decision, let alone any constitutional

harm. They thus fail to adequately plead a Monell claim.

The § 1983 claims are also legally deficient. The Fifth Amendment takings

claim fails as the City acted in response to criminal activity and public nuisance,

2 24-7302 both of which are outside of takings protections. See Keystone Bituminous Coal

Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 492 n.22 (1987).

The Fourteenth Amendment due process claim fails, too. The limited

redactions of personal information in the police reports do not amount to a due

process violation, especially when the plaintiffs fail to identify how redactions

unduly prejudiced their case. The plaintiffs were also provided with notice and a

hearing about the administrative decision. The reasonable limits on that hearing do

not violate the plaintiffs’ due process rights. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,

267 (1970); ASSE Intern., Inc. v. Kerry, 803 F.3d 1059, 1074 (9th Cir. 2015).

The dismissal is further supported by the complaint’s lack of specificity and

clarity. These generalized and unsupported claims do not meet the plausibility

threshold. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The district court previously identified these flaws

and granted leave to amend. Yet another opportunity to amend would be futile and

unnecessary. Cf. Brown v. Stored Value Cards, Inc., 953 F.3d 567, 574 (9th Cir.

2020) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) factors including “repeated

failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed” and “futility”).

Finally, the district court appropriately dismissed the state law writ of mandate

claim. Because all federal claims were properly dismissed, the district court had the

discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over this state law claim. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c)(3); Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 32 (2025)

3 24-7302 (“[A]lthough supplemental jurisdiction persists [under § 1367(c)(3)], the district

court need not exercise it: Instead, the court may (and indeed, ordinarily should) kick

the case to state court.”).

AFFIRMED.

4 24-7302