Patel v. American Dental Association

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: January 30, 2026
• Docket: 24-7797
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 30 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SACHIN PATEL II, No. 24-7797 D.C. No. 2:24-cv-08762-WLH-AS Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM* AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION; JOINT COMMISSION ON NATIONAL DENTAL EXAMINATIONS; AMERICAN STUDENT DENTAL ASSOCIATION; AMERICAN DENTAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION; CAAPID; PROMETRIC, INC.,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Wesley L. Hsu, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted January 22, 2026**

Before: WARDLAW, CLIFTON, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

Sachin Patel II appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various federal and state law claims. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s

dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the basis of the

applicable statute of limitations. Mills v. City of Covina, 921 F.3d 1161, 1166 (9th

Cir. 2019). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed as time-barred Patel’s action because

Patel filed his complaint outside the applicable statutes of limitations and failed to

allege facts sufficient to show that he was entitled to tolling. See Fox v. Ethicon

Endo-Surgery, Inc., 110 P.3d 914, 917 (Cal. 2005) (explaining that under the

delayed discovery rule, a cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations

begins to run “when the plaintiff has reason to suspect an injury and some

wrongful cause, unless the plaintiff pleads and proves that a reasonable

investigation at that time would not have revealed a factual basis for [the] cause of

action”); see also Oliver v. SD-3C LLC, 751 F.3d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 2014)

(setting forth requirements for the “continuing conspiracy” doctrine under federal

antitrust law); Hexcel Corp. v. Ineos Polymers, Inc., 681 F.3d 1055, 1060 (9th Cir.

2012) (explaining that to toll the statute of limitations on the basis of fraudulent

concealment, a plaintiff “must plead facts showing that the defendant affirmatively

misled it, and that the plaintiff had neither actual nor constructive knowledge of

the facts giving rise to its claim despite its diligence in trying to uncover those

2 24-7797 facts); Stoll v. Runyon, 165 F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that

equitable tolling is warranted “when extraordinary circumstances beyond the

plaintiff’s control made it impossible to file a claim on time”); Fink v. Shedler, 192

F.3d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 1999) (discussing requirements for equitable tolling under

California law).

Patel’s challenge to the denial of his motion for a temporary restraining

order is moot. See Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441, 1449-50

(9th Cir. 1992) (explaining that when underlying claims have been decided,

reversal of denial of preliminary injunctive relief would have no practical

consequences, and the issue is therefore moot).

We reject as without merit Patel’s contention that the district court was

biased against him.

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Patel’s unopposed motion (Docket Entry No. 36) to file a document under

seal is granted. The clerk will file publicly the motion to seal (Docket Entry No.

36-1). The clerk will maintain under seal the reply to response to motion to

expedite and supporting declaration (Docket Entry Nos. 36-2, 36-3, and 37).

All other pending motions and requests are denied.

AFFIRMED.

3 24-7797