Pastva v. Forge Coal Mining Co.

15 A.2d 682, 142 Pa. Super. 42, 1940 Pa. Super. LEXIS 516
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedMay 8, 1940
DocketAppeal, 203
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 15 A.2d 682 (Pastva v. Forge Coal Mining Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pastva v. Forge Coal Mining Co., 15 A.2d 682, 142 Pa. Super. 42, 1940 Pa. Super. LEXIS 516 (Pa. Ct. App. 1940).

Opinion

Cunningham, J.,

Opinion by

This is another workmen’s compensation case in which a preexisting physical ailment of a serious and dangerous character is an extremely important element. The immediate cause of the death of claimant’s husband, in 1931, was the strangulation of an intraabdominal hernia.

Decedent had been afflicted for a long time with a preexisting inguinal hernia. The intra-abdominal hernia was formed, according to the medical testimony, when a portion of the bowel slipped into the old sac which had been pushed back through the inguinal ring and had become fastened to the abdominal wall by adhesions.

Pastva was employed as a digger in one of the mines of the defendant company and it became his duty in the course of his employment, two days prior to his death, to “pull” a number of iron spikes, fastening the rails of the mine track to wooden ties, with a “spike bar” — an iron implement about three feet long with a “claw” on one end. After making three attempts to remove a certain spike he desisted and lay down, remarking to his “buddy,” “I have the cramps.” He was removed from the mine and taken to a hospital where an operation disclosed the condition above mentioned.

Compensation was awarded claimant upon the theory of overexertion by her husband in endeavoring to remove the spike. Upon the appeal of the employer to this court from the judgment entered upon the award, we reversed (119 Pa. Superior Ct. 455, 179 A. 919), but remitted the record for the taking of additional testimony if so desired by the parties. Additional hearings were had by a referee and compensation was again awarded, but upon the employer’s appeal to the common *44 pleas, its exceptions were sustained in an opinion by Greer, J., tbe award was set aside and judgment, in effect, entered for tbe defendant coal company. The present appeal is by the claimant from that judgment.

All the circumstances surrounding the attempt of decedent to draw the spike, and a summary of the medical testimony, are set forth in our former opinion. The controlling question in the case is whether claimant met the burden resting upon her of adducing competent evidence which would support a finding that the fatal strangulation of the hernia was caused by an “accident” in the course of her husband’s employment, within the meaning of Section 301 of our Workmen’s Compensation Act of June 2, 1915, P. L. 736, 77 PS §411, and was not a natural and to be expected development of his physical ailment.

In our former opinion we said it was difficult to see, under all the evidence then of record, anything more than that Pastva had for a number of years an internal abdominal hernia which might at any time become strangulated from any one of many different causes— one expert said a man ceuld have such a strangulation lying in bed — and that while engaged in his usual work the strangulation occurred.

Further, that there was no evidence that decedent was doing anything unusual or out of the ordinary course of his work at the time the chronic condition of the hernia became acute; nor was there any evidence from which it could reasonably be found that the strangulation resulted from the application by the decedent of such abrupt violence, force, effort or strain to the physical structure of his body as is necessary to support an inference of “accidental” injury. See Hoffman v. Rhoads Const. Co., 113 Pa. Superior Ct. 55, 172 A. 33.

As claimant had appeared before the referee without counsel, we returned the record to afford her an opportunity to supply, if she could, the above defects in her proofs.

*45 A number of additional hearings were had, 'but, as we read the testimony taken thereat, the indicated defects in claimant’s case were not cured.

The principal testimony at the first three hearings was that of engineers who had conducted laboratory tests to ascertain the pressure in pounds at which spikes similar to those used in the mine track would stretch and at which the heads would shear off, as well as the pressure a workman would have to apply to the handle end of a spike bar to produce these results. Its admission was objected to upon the ground that it was purely hypothetical and was not based upon the actual conditions in this case. As there was no evidence that the spike decedent was trying to pull was stretched or that its head had sheared off, the opinions of these experts were of little, if any, value upon the issue of alleged overexertion. Moreover, the evidence at one of the original hearings contains a full and practical answer to these theories of stretching, or shearing the head off, the spike. Decedent’s “buddy,” who died before the second series of hearings had begun, testified at one of the early hearings that after decedent declared he had a cramp and desisted from his attempt to remove the spike he, the “buddy,” pulled it. An excerpt from his testimony reads: “Q. Did the prong or the fork of the bar get hold of the spike, or don’t you know that? A. Yes, he had a hold on it. Q. But didn’t budge it? A. No, sir. Q. Was it hard for you to remove? A. Yes, sir, it was.”

In addition to the fact that the idea of some difficulty in pulling the spike was suggested by the last question and merely assented to by the witness, the term “hard” is a relative one and gives no more definite information with respect to the amount of force, actually exerted by the witness than do the words “fast” or “slow” when used to describe speed.

Dr. C. F. Zobel, who never saw deceased, and, of *46 course, had no personal knowledge of the conditions disclosed by the operation, undertook to express an opinion, based on a history of the case alone, that it would require “extraordinary and unusual pressure” to cause the strangulation of decedent’s hernia. His testimony added nothing, however, to the previous medical evidence.

Frank Warner and John Sendig testified they had laid the track in question, some three months prior to the occurrence; that the spikes used were a little heavier, with slightly flatter heads, than those offered in evidence and tested by the engineers, and that the ties were mostly of oak. They had no knowledge of the actual circumstances of Pastva’s collapse.

Additional testimony related to the usual method of taking up track in a mine; the difficulties involved, depending upon the kind of wood in the ties, whether the spikes were rusty or the wood wet; and the proportionate number of spikes usually found difficult to draw. As expressed by one witness, an experienced miner, it is “all in a day’s work” for a miner to remove spikes and trackage.

It seems to us that the additional testimony, instead of helping claimant, tended to establish that in performing the work her husband had been engaged in for a long time it was quite the usual and ordinary thing for him to find spikes the drawing of which was difficult, but a part of the work to which he was accustomed. There is no evidence, in addition to that in the record on the former appeal, showing that Pastva did, as a matter of actual observed fact, exert any unusual pressure on the spike bar or do anything out of the line of his usual work in attempting to remove the spike from the tie.

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Bluebook (online)
15 A.2d 682, 142 Pa. Super. 42, 1940 Pa. Super. LEXIS 516, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pastva-v-forge-coal-mining-co-pasuperct-1940.