Pastor Isabel Vela v. County of Tulare, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: February 17, 2026
• Docket: 1:26-cv-01279
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 PASTOR ISABEL VELA, Case No. 1:26-cv-01279 JLT SAB 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 13 v. (Doc. 3.) 14 COUNTY OF TULARE, et al., ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE DISMISSAL 15 Defendants. Deadline: March 6, 2026 16 17 I. INTRODUCTION 18 Pastor Isabel Vela, proceeding pro se, brings this suit against the County of Tulare, Tulare 19 County Child Welfare Services, and others, alleging that five children who were apparently 20 entrusted to her care in October 2025 were removed from her custody by Defendants on February 21 6, 2026. (Doc. 1.) The Complaint alleges: (1) a Fourth Amendment claim for “unreasonable 22 seizure of persons” (id. at 8); (2) a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim that 23 appears to relate to a state court or state administrative procedure (id. at 9–10); (3) a claim 24 entitled “Family Integrity and Sibling Association” (id. at 11–12); (4) a “Free Exercise and 25 Ecclesiastical Interference” claim that appears to invoke the First Amendment (id. at 12–13); and 26 (5) a claim for municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 27 (1978). (Id. at 13–14). The Complaint requests a declaratory judgment that Defendants “violated 28 constitutional rights,” immediate return of the children or an emergency hearing, an injunction 1 against continued detention, damages, and attorney’s fees. (Id. at 14.) 2 On February 13, 2026, Plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary restraining order, 3 demanding that the children be immediately returned to Plaintiff’s care and that the siblings be 4 immediately reunified. (Doc. 3 at 14.) Alternatively, if detention continues, the motion demands a 5 hearing within 72 hours and an injunction against further detention. (Id.) 6 For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES the request for a TRO because the 7 Court must abstain from exercising jurisdiction over this case. Therefore, Plaintiff is not likely to 8 succeed on the merits. For the same reason, the Court will ORDER Plaintiff to SHOW CAUSE 9 in writing why the case should not be dismissed. 10 II. STANDARD OF DECISION 11 The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order is identical to the standard for 12 issuing a preliminary injunction. R.F. by Frankel v. Delano Union Sch. Dist., 224 F. Supp. 3d 13 979, 987 (E.D. Cal. 2016). Injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy, never awarded as of 14 right.” Winter v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). As such, the Court may only 15 grant such relief “upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Id. at 22. To 16 prevail, the moving party must show: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood 17 that the moving party will suffer irreparable harm absent preliminary injunctive relief; (3) that the 18 balance of equities tips in the moving party’s favor; and (4) that preliminary injunctive relief is in 19 the public interest. Id. Local Rule 231 governs the filing of requests for TROs in this District. 20 III. ANALYSIS 21 In essence, Plaintiff asks this Court to intervene in an ongoing dispute she is having with 22 the County of Tulare over the placement of the five children. It is well-established that “the whole 23 subject of the domestic relations of ... parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States, and not 24 to the laws of the United States.” Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383 (1930) 25 (citation omitted). As a result, the Ninth Circuit has determined federal courts “should not 26 adjudicate cases involving domestic relations, including ‘the custody of minors and a fortiori, 27 rights of visitation.’” Peterson v. Babbit, 708 F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting Hernstadt v. 28 Hernstadt, 373 F.2d 316, 217 (2d Cir. 1967) ). Thus, matters regarding “the proper care, custody 1 and control of juveniles ... have traditionally been left to the states.” Id. Under the doctrine of 2 equitable abstention, “federal courts traditionally decline to exercise jurisdiction in domestic 3 relations cases when the core issue involves the status of parent and child,” even when the 4 plaintiff raises a constitutional claim. Coats v. Woods, 819 F.2d 236, 237 (9th Cir. 1987). 5 Moreover, in general, federal courts are required to abstain from interfering in ongoing 6 state matters. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-45 (1971). Although Younger dealt with a 7 criminal prosecution, the Supreme Court has extended the abstention principles to civil actions. 8 Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Assoc., 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982); see also 9 Potrero Hills Landfill, Inc. v. County of Solano, 657 F.3d 876, 882 (9th Cir. 2011). 10 The Younger abstention doctrine applies if four conditions are met: “(1) a state-initiated 11 proceeding is ongoing; (2) the proceeding implicates important state interests; (3) the federal 12 plaintiff is not barred from litigating federal constitutional issues in the state proceeding; and (4) 13 the federal court action would enjoin the proceeding or have the practical effect of doing so, i.e., 14 would interfere with the state proceeding in a way that Younger disapproves.” San Jose Silicon 15 Valley Chamber of Commerce Political Action Comm. v. City of San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1092 16 (9th Cir. 2008). First, the Complaint indicates that a state court proceeding is ongoing. (See Doc. 17 1 at 6 (“Plaintiff later learned a hearing was scheduled for April 2026 in Porterville.”); see also 18 Doc. 1 at 4 (“Removal relied on approximately four-month-old warrant.”).) Second, as discussed 19 above, the custody and conservatorship proceedings implicate important state interests. See 20 Peterson, 708 F.2d at 466; Hernstadt, 373 F.2d at 217. Third, there is no showing Plaintiff cannot 21 raise her constitutional concerns in the state court proceeding. Finally, Plaintiff's complaint seeks 22 to insert the federal court into the ordinary course of state proceedings which, if permitted, would 23 threaten the autonomy of the state court. Thus, the Court finds Plaintiff's claims are barred by the 24 Younger abstention doctrine. 25 For all these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff is unlikely to succeed on the merits of 26 any of her claims. Thus, the TRO request is DENIED. 27 /// 28 /// 1 IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 2 For the reasons set forth above, the Court ORDERS: 3 1. The request for a temporary restraining order (Doc. 3) is DENIED. 4 2. In light of the above conclusion, Plaintiff is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE in 5 | writing on or before March 6, 2026, why the Court should not dismiss this action under the 6 | doctrine of equitable abstention and/or the Younger abstention doctrine. 7 g IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 | Dated: _ February 14, 2026 Cerin | Tower TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28