Pastor Gallo v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: August 18, 2025
• Docket: 24-5039
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 18 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DANJANA ARLETH PASTOR No. 24-5039 GALLO; J.M., Agency Nos. A241-899-126 Petitioners, A241-899-127 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted August 14, 2025** Seattle, Washington

Before: HAWKINS, McKEOWN, and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.

Danjana Arleth Pastor Gallo and her minor daughter (Petitioners), natives

and citizens of Peru, seek review of the final removal order from the Board of

Immigration Appeals (BIA). The BIA affirmed the decision of the immigration

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). judge (IJ) to deny asylum, statutory withholding of removal, and protection under

the regulations implementing the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). We deny the petition.

Where, as here, the BIA reviews the factual findings and legal conclusions

of the IJ, rather than adopting the IJ’s decision in full, our review is limited to the

BIA’s decision wherever the IJ’s opinion is not expressly adopted. Rodriguez

Tornes v. Garland, 993 F.3d 743, 750 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). We

review the BIA’s legal conclusions de novo, and we review the agency’s factual

findings for substantial evidence. Id. (citations omitted). Under the substantial

evidence standard, “we must uphold the agency determination unless the evidence

compels a contrary conclusion.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028

(9th Cir. 2019).

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Pastor Gallo did

not demonstrate a sufficient nexus between her alleged persecution and a protected

ground.1 Nothing in the record indicates that her aggressors pointed a knife in her

face and hit her on the head because of her gender or her domestic relationship to

her partner Carlos Gabriel Melgarejo. And although these attackers did express

1 The BIA explicitly declined to address the cognizability of Pastor Gallo’s three proposed particular social groups—(1) “small business owners who report crimes to the local and state authorities,” (2) “Peruvian women who the local authorities are unable and unwilling to protect,” and (3) “family member and domestic partner of Mr. Melgarejo”—so our review is limited to the nexus determination.

2 24-5039 dissatisfaction that Pastor Gallo had filed a police report accusing their “cousin” of

fraud, they were not motivated by her status as a “business owner[] who report[s]

crimes” so much as her report of one crime that they wanted her to retract. In this

respect, the record does not “compel[] a contrary conclusion” to the agency’s no-

nexus determination. Duran-Rodriguez, 918 F.3d at 1028. Pastor Gallo’s

proposed particular social groups did not constitute “one central reason” or “a

reason” for the harm that she suffered, pursuant to the respective requirements for

asylum and withholding of removal. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(C).

Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s determination that

Petitioners can be reasonably expected to internally relocate within Peru to avoid

future harm. Here, the BIA adopted the reasoning of the IJ, who relied on Pastor

Gallo’s testimony that her parents could help her relocate and that none of her

family members had been physically harmed since her departure. The IJ also

noted that Pastor Gallo is “highly educated” and “has the type of business

background that could be utilized anywhere.” These findings are substantial

evidence that Pastor Gallo could move elsewhere to avoid her alleged persecutors

and, therefore, that she has not established the “reasonable possibility” of future

persecution necessary for asylum eligibility. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(i)(B).

Consequently, she also fails to meet the higher “clear probability” threshold for

withholding of removal. Davila v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2020)

3 24-5039 (internal quotation marks omitted) (“An applicant who fails to satisfy the lower

standard for asylum necessarily fails to satisfy the more demanding standard for

withholding of removal.”).

Finally, we uphold the denial of CAT relief because Pastor Gallo did not

establish (1) that it is “more likely than not that [] she would be tortured if

removed,” and (2) that public officials would either “carr[y] out or knowingly

acquiesce[] in” the torture. Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 361 (9th Cir.

2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). Pastor Gallo’s fears of being assaulted

and assertion that “the government cannot manage the level of violence in Peru” do

not overcome the agency’s factual determinations not only that she was never

tortured, but also that the country conditions evidence did not demonstrate that

officials would consent or acquiesce to her torture. Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755

F.3d 1026, 1034 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[E]vidence that a government has been generally

ineffective in preventing or investigating criminal activities [does not] raise an

inference that public officials are likely to acquiesce in torture.”). Thus, Petitioners

are ineligible for CAT relief.

PETITION DENIED.2

2 The temporary stay of removal (Dkt. 10) will expire upon the issuance of the mandate.

4 24-5039