J-A17010-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
KATHRYN JEANE PASHUCK, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF EXECUTRIX UNDER WILL OF NELLI : PENNSYLVANIA CZAJKOWSKY AKA ANASTASIA : NELLIE CZAJKOWSKY, DECEASED : : : v. : : : No. 1142 EDA 2020 ANDRE TYLER, KEVIN RAVENELL, : AMIYR A. MUHAMMAD, AND ADAM : BEYAH : : : APPEAL OF: ANTHONY B. QUINN, : ESQUIRE :
Appeal from the Order Entered February 19, 2020 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): No. 181102987
BEFORE: McLAUGHLIN, J., KING, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: Filed: November 4, 2021
Anthony Quinn, Esquire appeals pro se from the order granting Kathryn
Jeane Pashuck’s motion to strike Quinn’s attorney’s charging lien (“Lien”). We
affirm.
Pashuck obtained Quinn’s legal services in connection with a 2018 quiet
title action. When Pashuck’s aunt died in 2008, she left her residence
(“Property”) to Pashuck. Pashuck also served as executrix of her aunt’s estate
but took no action regarding the Property for years and squatters took up
residence. Hence, Quinn helped Pashuck initiate actions in ejectment and quiet ____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-A17010-21
title in 2018. Pashuck and Quinn entered into a written arrangement
acknowledging that Parcel, LLC would be responsible for all fees and costs
related to Quinn’s legal services. Pashuck signed an agreement of sale to sell
the Property to Parcel, LLC.
On April 30, 2019, default judgment was entered in favor of Pashuck in
the quiet title action. Quinn submitted a “Plaintiff’s Bill of Costs” to the
praecipe to enter judgment, listing his fee as totaling $2,313.89. Parcel, LLC
attempted to pay Quinn and requested a bill to do so, but to no avail. On
November 20, 2019, Quinn recorded an Attorney’s Notice of Charging Lien in
the amount of $35,603.61 against Pashuck (“Lien”). The Lien caused a cloud
on Pashuck’s title to the Property and prevented any sale.
Pashuck filed a motion to strike the Lien on January 18, 2020. After
Quinn filed a response, the court granted Pashuck’s motion and struck the
Lien in a February 19, 2020 order. The instant timely appeal followed and both
the trial court and Quinn complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Pashuck raises the following issues:
1. Did motion court lack subject matter jurisdiction to strike charging lien 9-1/2 months after entry of final judgment?
2. Is the exclusive method to try the charging lien a civil action?
3. Is Attorney who completes multiple actions to quiet title to a sole property entitled to a charging lien?
Quinn’s Br. at 4.
In his first and second issues, Quinn argues that the trial court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to consider Pashuck’s motion to strike the Lien. He
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asserts that the operative final order in this case was the court’s April 30,
2019 order entering default judgment in favor of Pashuck in her quiet title
action. According to Quinn, the court had 30 days following the April 30, 2019
order in which to strike Quinn’s Lien. Quinn therefore posits that because
Pashuck did not file her motion to strike until over eight months later in
January 2020, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider it
pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. 5505 (“a court upon notice to the parties may modify
or rescind any order within 30 days after its entry”). Quinn further contends
that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to consider Pashuck’s motion to
strike because, according to Quinn, the only proper course to challenge a
charging lien is a separate civil action. Quinn provides only general statutory
cites, which do not specifically address charging liens, in support of his
argument.
“Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction presents a question of
law, making our standard of review de novo and the scope of our review
plenary.” Orman v. Mortgage I.T., 118 A.3d 403, 406 (Pa.Super. 2015).
Here, the trial court found that Quinn’s jurisdictional arguments were meritless
and we agree. See Tr. Ct. Rule 1925(a) Op., 10/9/20, at 4-5. First, Quinn filed
the Lien in November 2019, well after the 30 day period following the April
30, 2019 order quieting title. It defies logic to suggest that Pashuck was
required to file a motion to strike the Lien prior to Quinn having even filed the
Lien in the first place. Moreover, the court properly points out that
Pennsylvania courts have reviewed the validity of charging liens without the
-3- J-A17010-21
initiation of a separate quiet title action and Quinn provides no legal authority
for his argument that the only proper method to challenge such liens is
through a separate civil action. Accordingly, we conclude that the court
correctly determined that Quinn’s first two issues warranted no relief.
In his third issue, Quinn argues that the court erred by granting
Pashuck’s motion to strike the Lien. He contends that the court erroneously
found that the Lien failed to meet the five-factor test set forth in Recht v.
Urban Redevelopment Authority, 168 A.2d 134, 138 (Pa. 1961). To this
end, he asserts that the court’s conclusion that there is no fund held by the
court to satisfy his Lien was incorrect because his Lien should be deemed to
attach to the potential sale proceeds of the Property. He notes that his
representation agreement with Pashuck indicated that Parcel, LLC was
responsible for his fee and Parcel, LLC has signed an agreement of sale to
purchase the Property from Pashuck. Hence, according to Quinn, his Lien
should be applied against the sale proceeds.
Next Quinn avers that because his services were used to secure title in
the quiet title actions, his Lien should attach to the sale proceeds of the
Property. Although Quinn concedes that there was no express agreement
among the parties, he contends that it was understood that he would get paid
from the Parcel, LLC sale proceeds. Quinn also argues that his over $35,000
Lien is justified because he had to conduct two separate probate proceeding
to quiet title. Lastly, Quinn maintains that equitable considerations compel the
-4- J-A17010-21
application of his Lien because Parcel, LLC committed fraud by allegedly
conspiring to deny him payment upon the sale of the Property.
Quinn’s third issue regarding the Lien relates to the trial court’s exercise
of its equitable powers. We will not disturb the trial court’s decision to grant
Pashuck’s motion to strike the Lien absent a misapplication of the law or a
clear abuse of discretion by the trial court. Boatin v. Miller, 955 A.2d 424,
427 (Pa.Super. 2007). An abuse of discretion occurs only when a trial court’s
determination overrides or misapplies the law, its judgment is manifestly
unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Majczyk v.
Oesch, 789 A.2d 717, 720 (Pa. Super. 2001). If a decision is based on
“findings which are without factual support in the record, however, the
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J-A17010-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
KATHRYN JEANE PASHUCK, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF EXECUTRIX UNDER WILL OF NELLI : PENNSYLVANIA CZAJKOWSKY AKA ANASTASIA : NELLIE CZAJKOWSKY, DECEASED : : : v. : : : No. 1142 EDA 2020 ANDRE TYLER, KEVIN RAVENELL, : AMIYR A. MUHAMMAD, AND ADAM : BEYAH : : : APPEAL OF: ANTHONY B. QUINN, : ESQUIRE :
Appeal from the Order Entered February 19, 2020 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): No. 181102987
BEFORE: McLAUGHLIN, J., KING, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: Filed: November 4, 2021
Anthony Quinn, Esquire appeals pro se from the order granting Kathryn
Jeane Pashuck’s motion to strike Quinn’s attorney’s charging lien (“Lien”). We
affirm.
Pashuck obtained Quinn’s legal services in connection with a 2018 quiet
title action. When Pashuck’s aunt died in 2008, she left her residence
(“Property”) to Pashuck. Pashuck also served as executrix of her aunt’s estate
but took no action regarding the Property for years and squatters took up
residence. Hence, Quinn helped Pashuck initiate actions in ejectment and quiet ____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-A17010-21
title in 2018. Pashuck and Quinn entered into a written arrangement
acknowledging that Parcel, LLC would be responsible for all fees and costs
related to Quinn’s legal services. Pashuck signed an agreement of sale to sell
the Property to Parcel, LLC.
On April 30, 2019, default judgment was entered in favor of Pashuck in
the quiet title action. Quinn submitted a “Plaintiff’s Bill of Costs” to the
praecipe to enter judgment, listing his fee as totaling $2,313.89. Parcel, LLC
attempted to pay Quinn and requested a bill to do so, but to no avail. On
November 20, 2019, Quinn recorded an Attorney’s Notice of Charging Lien in
the amount of $35,603.61 against Pashuck (“Lien”). The Lien caused a cloud
on Pashuck’s title to the Property and prevented any sale.
Pashuck filed a motion to strike the Lien on January 18, 2020. After
Quinn filed a response, the court granted Pashuck’s motion and struck the
Lien in a February 19, 2020 order. The instant timely appeal followed and both
the trial court and Quinn complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Pashuck raises the following issues:
1. Did motion court lack subject matter jurisdiction to strike charging lien 9-1/2 months after entry of final judgment?
2. Is the exclusive method to try the charging lien a civil action?
3. Is Attorney who completes multiple actions to quiet title to a sole property entitled to a charging lien?
Quinn’s Br. at 4.
In his first and second issues, Quinn argues that the trial court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to consider Pashuck’s motion to strike the Lien. He
-2- J-A17010-21
asserts that the operative final order in this case was the court’s April 30,
2019 order entering default judgment in favor of Pashuck in her quiet title
action. According to Quinn, the court had 30 days following the April 30, 2019
order in which to strike Quinn’s Lien. Quinn therefore posits that because
Pashuck did not file her motion to strike until over eight months later in
January 2020, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider it
pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. 5505 (“a court upon notice to the parties may modify
or rescind any order within 30 days after its entry”). Quinn further contends
that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to consider Pashuck’s motion to
strike because, according to Quinn, the only proper course to challenge a
charging lien is a separate civil action. Quinn provides only general statutory
cites, which do not specifically address charging liens, in support of his
argument.
“Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction presents a question of
law, making our standard of review de novo and the scope of our review
plenary.” Orman v. Mortgage I.T., 118 A.3d 403, 406 (Pa.Super. 2015).
Here, the trial court found that Quinn’s jurisdictional arguments were meritless
and we agree. See Tr. Ct. Rule 1925(a) Op., 10/9/20, at 4-5. First, Quinn filed
the Lien in November 2019, well after the 30 day period following the April
30, 2019 order quieting title. It defies logic to suggest that Pashuck was
required to file a motion to strike the Lien prior to Quinn having even filed the
Lien in the first place. Moreover, the court properly points out that
Pennsylvania courts have reviewed the validity of charging liens without the
-3- J-A17010-21
initiation of a separate quiet title action and Quinn provides no legal authority
for his argument that the only proper method to challenge such liens is
through a separate civil action. Accordingly, we conclude that the court
correctly determined that Quinn’s first two issues warranted no relief.
In his third issue, Quinn argues that the court erred by granting
Pashuck’s motion to strike the Lien. He contends that the court erroneously
found that the Lien failed to meet the five-factor test set forth in Recht v.
Urban Redevelopment Authority, 168 A.2d 134, 138 (Pa. 1961). To this
end, he asserts that the court’s conclusion that there is no fund held by the
court to satisfy his Lien was incorrect because his Lien should be deemed to
attach to the potential sale proceeds of the Property. He notes that his
representation agreement with Pashuck indicated that Parcel, LLC was
responsible for his fee and Parcel, LLC has signed an agreement of sale to
purchase the Property from Pashuck. Hence, according to Quinn, his Lien
should be applied against the sale proceeds.
Next Quinn avers that because his services were used to secure title in
the quiet title actions, his Lien should attach to the sale proceeds of the
Property. Although Quinn concedes that there was no express agreement
among the parties, he contends that it was understood that he would get paid
from the Parcel, LLC sale proceeds. Quinn also argues that his over $35,000
Lien is justified because he had to conduct two separate probate proceeding
to quiet title. Lastly, Quinn maintains that equitable considerations compel the
-4- J-A17010-21
application of his Lien because Parcel, LLC committed fraud by allegedly
conspiring to deny him payment upon the sale of the Property.
Quinn’s third issue regarding the Lien relates to the trial court’s exercise
of its equitable powers. We will not disturb the trial court’s decision to grant
Pashuck’s motion to strike the Lien absent a misapplication of the law or a
clear abuse of discretion by the trial court. Boatin v. Miller, 955 A.2d 424,
427 (Pa.Super. 2007). An abuse of discretion occurs only when a trial court’s
determination overrides or misapplies the law, its judgment is manifestly
unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Majczyk v.
Oesch, 789 A.2d 717, 720 (Pa. Super. 2001). If a decision is based on
“findings which are without factual support in the record, however, the
reviewing court will not hesitate to reverse.” Lilly v. Markvan, 763 A.2d 370,
372 (Pa. 2000) (citation omitted).
“The right of an attorney to a charging lien upon a fund in court or
otherwise applicable for distribution on equitable principles, which his services
primarily aided in producing and to which, by agreement with his client, he is
to look for compensation, has long been recognized . . . .” Brandywine Sav.
& Loan Ass’n v. Redev. Auth. of Chester Cnty., 514 A.2d 673, 674
(Pa.Cmwlth. 1986) (quoting Harris’s Appeal, 186 A. 92, 94–95 (Pa. 1936)).
In order to obtain a charging lien, the party seeking the lien must show
five things:
(1) that there is a fund in court or otherwise applicable for distribution on equitable principles, (2) that the services of the attorney operated substantially or primarily to secure the fund out
-5- J-A17010-21
of which he seeks to be paid, (3) that it was agreed that counsel look to the fund rather than the client for his compensation, (4) that the lien claimed is limited to costs, fees or other disbursements incurred in the litigation by which the fund was raised and (5) that there are equitable considerations which necessitate the recognition and application of the charging lien.
Shenango Sys. Sols., Inc. v. Micros-Systems, Inc., 887 A.2d 772, 774
(Pa.Super. 2005) (citing Recht, 168 A.2d at 138-39).
The trial court here concluded that Quinn failed to establish the five
Recht factors. We find no misapplication of the law or abuse of discretion.
The court emphasized that it held no fund for the Lien to attach, nor does
Quinn identify any available fund. The court added that while Quinn’s work did
result in success for Pashuck in the quiet title action, his work does not entitle
him to be paid via funds from the sale of the Property. Neither Quinn’s
representation agreement with Pashuck nor the April 30th default judgement
provide that Quinn is to be paid from sale proceeds upon the sale of the
Property. Indeed, Quinn cannot establish the third Recht factor because the
parties never agreed that Quinn would be paid out of any fund and Quinn’s
representation agreement with Pashuck specifies Parcel, LLC is responsible for
Quinn’s fees.
Next, Quinn has not provided itemized evidence to support his bill for
more than $35,000. This is particularly concerning in light of the fact that he
initially listed his fee in connection with the quiet title action as $2,313.89.
Finally, Quinn provides no equitable reason that would necessitate the Lien. If
a fee dispute exists among the parties, Quinn may pursue action against
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Parcel, LLC, as specified in his representation agreement with Pashuck.
Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
granting Pashuck’s motion to strike the Lien. See Boatin, 955 A.2d at 427.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order striking the Lien.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 11/4/21
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