Pascual-Castro v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: December 16, 2025
• Docket: 25-164
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 16 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SORAIDA NOHEMI PASCUAL No. 25-164 CASTRO, Agency No. A213-090-424 Petitioner,

v. MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

D.P.L.P., No. 25-1801 Petitioner, Agency No. A213-090-425 v.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted December 4, 2025 Pasadena, California

Before: CALLAHAN, NGUYEN, and KOH, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Soraida Nohemi Pascual Castro and her minor child D.P.L.P., natives and

citizens of Guatemala, petition for review of an order by the Board of Immigration

Appeals (“BIA”) denying Pascual Castro’s motion for remand and dismissing her

appeal of an order by the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying asylum and

withholding of removal.1, 2 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.

Reviewing the agency’s denial of the motion to remand for abuse of discretion, see

Ani v. Bondi, 155 F.4th 1118, 1126 (9th Cir. 2025), we deny the petition.

1. Pascual Castro moved the BIA to remand for the IJ “to fully develop the

record as to [a] family-based particular social group,” but a motion for remand to

expand the evidentiary record must “state the new facts that will be proven” and

“be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1);

see Coria v. Garland, 114 F.4th 994, 1001 (9th Cir. 2024) (explaining that a

motion to remand “is evaluated by the same standards” as a motion to reopen),

cert. denied sub nom. Coria v. Bondi, 145 S. Ct. 1961 (2025). Pascual Castro

failed to meet this requirement. Even if, as she argues, “new and [favorable] case

law” can satisfy her burden, she did not cite any such case law in her motion, and

1 D.P.L.P. is a derivative beneficiary of Pascual Castro’s asylum application. D.P.L.P. separately appealed the IJ’s denial of relief to the BIA but does not challenge the BIA’s dismissal of the separate appeal. Therefore, D.P.L.P.’s claims are derivative of Pascual Castro’s. 2 The IJ also denied relief under the Convention Against Torture, but Pascual Castro did not challenge that ruling before the BIA and does not challenge it here.

2 25-164 the BIA did not abuse its discretion by declining to consider the case law she cited

in her briefing waiver. Cf. Guzman v. INS, 318 F.3d 911, 913 (9th Cir. 2003) (per

curiam) (holding that the BIA has discretion to consider separate filings separately

even if they are arguably related).

2. The BIA did not err in concluding that the IJ properly characterized

Pascual Castro’s particular social group as being based on her perceived wealth. In

a declaration, she stated: “I fear that members of Los Chepas will assume that we

have money because we are returning from the [United States].” At the hearing

before the IJ, Pascual Castro reiterated her fear that gang members would harm her

and D.P.L.P. upon their return to Guatemala: “if they know that we are here in the

United States they will think that we have money, a lot of money.” Thus, the

evidence supports the IJ’s characterization.

3. Pascual Castro did not raise her remaining contentions—regarding

persecution based on imputed political opinion and defects in the notice to

appear—before the BIA. Because the government objects to these contentions as

unexhausted, we cannot consider them. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Umana-

Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 550 (9th Cir. 2023).3

PETITION DENIED.

3 The motion for stay of removal, Dkt. No. 7, is denied.

3 25-164