Paschal v. District of Columbia

District of Columbia Court of Appeals

Paschal v. District of Columbia

206 A.2d 402, 1965 D.C. App. LEXIS 144

CourtDistrict of Columbia Court of Appeals

DecidedJanuary 26, 1965

DocketNo. 3568

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 206 A.2d 402 (Paschal v. District of Columbia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District of Columbia Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Paschal v. District of Columbia, 206 A.2d 402, 1965 D.C. App. LEXIS 144 (D.C. 1965).

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Opinion

QUINN, Associate Judge:

This is an appeal from a conviction for operating a motor vehicle at an unreasonable rate of speed. Appellant contends that the trial court erroneously restricted his cross-examination of Officer Griffin, the only government witness. He argues that such cross-examination would have shown that the officer was biased and prejudiced against him. The record reveals, however, that appellant admitted driving his motor vehicle in excess of the posted speed limit of fifty miles per hour. Several witnesses, passengers in appellant’s automobile and one driven by a codefendant, also admitted that appellant had exceeded the fifty-mile limit. A speed in excess of the posted limit is considered “ * * * prima facie evidence that the speed is not reasonable or prudent and that it is unlawful * * ¹ 'Since the evidence establishing appellant’s guilt was uncontradicted, the possible bias or prejudice of the police officer would not affect the finding of guilty as charged.

[403]*403We rule, however, that appellant’s sentence was illegal. After a full presentence investigation and report by the probation department, the court discussed with appellant his traffic record, which included, inter alia, three prior arrests and forfeitures for speeding, and one colliding charge, and sentenced him to serve thirty days in jail and to pay a fine of $150, or, in lieu thereof, to serve an additional sixty days in jail.

Code 1961, § 40-605(d) provides:

“Any individual violating any provision of this section, except where the offense constitutes reckless driving, shall upon conviction thereof be fined not more than $300 or he imprisoned not more than ninety days.”

We hold that this subsection permits either a fine of not more than $300 or imprisonment of not more than ninety days, but not both. Therefore appellant’s sentence of thirty days’ imprisonment ánd $150 fine was improper and the case must be remanded for resentencing.

Judgment of conviction affirmed.

Remanded for resentencing.

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QUINN, Associate Judge:

This is an appeal from a conviction for operating a motor vehicle at an unreasonable rate of speed. Appellant contends that the trial court erroneously restricted his cross-examination of Officer Griffin, the only government witness. He argues that such cross-examination would have shown that the officer was biased and prejudiced against him. The record reveals, however, that appellant admitted driving his motor vehicle in excess of the posted speed limit of fifty miles per hour. Several witnesses, passengers in appellant’s automobile and one driven by a codefendant, also admitted that appellant had exceeded the fifty-mile limit. A speed in excess of the posted limit is considered “ * * * prima facie evidence that the speed is not reasonable or prudent and that it is unlawful * * ¹ 'Since the evidence establishing appellant’s guilt was uncontradicted, the possible bias or prejudice of the police officer would not affect the finding of guilty as charged.

[403]*403We rule, however, that appellant’s sentence was illegal. After a full presentence investigation and report by the probation department, the court discussed with appellant his traffic record, which included, inter alia, three prior arrests and forfeitures for speeding, and one colliding charge, and sentenced him to serve thirty days in jail and to pay a fine of $150, or, in lieu thereof, to serve an additional sixty days in jail.

Code 1961, § 40-605(d) provides:

“Any individual violating any provision of this section, except where the offense constitutes reckless driving, shall upon conviction thereof be fined not more than $300 or he imprisoned not more than ninety days.”

We hold that this subsection permits either a fine of not more than $300 or imprisonment of not more than ninety days, but not both. Therefore appellant’s sentence of thirty days’ imprisonment ánd $150 fine was improper and the case must be remanded for resentencing.

Judgment of conviction affirmed.

Remanded for resentencing.

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206 A.2d 402, 1965 D.C. App. LEXIS 144, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/paschal-v-district-of-columbia-dc-1965.

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