Pascal v. Blanche

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 2 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JEAN PASCAL, No. 25-3636 Agency No. Petitioner, A061-927-746 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 26, 2026**

Before: S.R. THOMAS, MILLER, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

Jean Pascal, a native and citizen of Haiti, petitions pro se for review of the

Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an

immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his applications for asylum,

withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). (“CAT”), and the BIA’s denial of a motion to remand. We have jurisdiction under

8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings.

Arrey v. Barr, 916 F.3d 1149, 1157 (9th Cir. 2019). We review for abuse of

discretion the denial of a motion to remand. Movsisian v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1095,

1098 (9th Cir. 2005). We review de novo constitutional claims. Mohammed v.

Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2005). We deny the petition for review.

Pascal does not challenge the BIA’s conclusion that he waived review of the

IJ’s determination that his conviction for a particularly serious crime rendered him

ineligible for asylum, withholding of removal, and withholding of removal under

the CAT, so we do not address it. See Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1072,

1079-80 (9th Cir. 2013).

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of deferral of removal

under the CAT because Pascal failed to show it is more likely than not he will be

tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to

Haiti. See Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 2009) (no

likelihood of torture). We do not address Pascal’s contentions as to internal

relocation because the BIA did not deny relief on that ground. See Santiago-

Rodriguez v. Holder, 657 F.3d 820, 829 (9th Cir. 2011) (“In reviewing the decision

of the BIA, we consider only the grounds relied upon by that agency.” (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted)). We reject as unsupported by the record

2 25-3636 Pascal’s contentions that the agency found him not credible, did not consider all

the evidence, and did not consider the risk of torture in the aggregate.

Pascal does not challenge the agency’s conclusion that he was ineligible for

cancellation of removal because of a conviction for an aggravated felony, so we do

not address it. See Lopez-Vasquez, 706 F.3d at 1079-80. We also do not address

Pascal’s contentions as to the stop-time rule because the agency did not find him

ineligible for cancellation of removal for lack of continuous physical presence. See

Santiago-Rodriguez, 657 F.3d at 829.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Pascal’s motion to remand

for failure to establish the additional evidence would likely change the outcome of

his case. See Alcarez-Rodriguez v. Garland, 89 F.4th 754, 759 (9th Cir. 2023) (a

motion to remand is treated the same as a motion to reopen); see also Fonseca-

Fonseca v. Garland, 76 F.4th 1176, 1183 (9th Cir. 2023) (“would likely change”

standard applies to decisions made on the discretionary ground).

Pascal’s claim that the issuance of an immigration detainer violated due

process fails because he has not shown error or prejudice. See Padilla-Martinez v.

Holder, 770 F.3d 825, 830 (9th Cir. 2014) (“To prevail on a due-process claim, a

petitioner must demonstrate both a violation of rights and prejudice.”).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

3 25-3636