paSafeShare LLC v. Microsoft Corporation

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Texas
DecidedApril 7, 2021
Docket6:20-cv-00397
StatusUnknown

This text of paSafeShare LLC v. Microsoft Corporation (paSafeShare LLC v. Microsoft Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
paSafeShare LLC v. Microsoft Corporation, (W.D. Tex. 2021).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS WACO DIVISION

PASAFESHARE LLC, § Plaintiff, § § v. § 6-20-CV-00397-ADA § MICROSOFT CORPORATION, § Defendant. § § ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT MICORSOFT’S MOTION FOR INTRA-DISTRICT TRANSFER OF VENUE UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)

Came on for consideration this date is Defendant Microsoft’s Motion to transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) filed on September 3, 2020. Def.’s Mot. at 10, ECF No. 25. Plaintiff PaSafeShare filed its Response (ECF No. 28) on September 25, 2020 and Microsoft filed its Reply (ECF No. 29) on October 9, 2020. After careful consideration of the Motion, the Parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, the Court DENIES Defendant Microsoft’s Motion for Intra-District Transfer to the Austin Division of the Western District of Texas. I. BACKGROUND PaSafeShare filed this lawsuit on May 14, 2020 alleging infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 9,455,961; 9,615,116; and 10,095,848. Pl.’s Compl., ECF No. 1. According to PaSafeShare the patents at issue relate, in part, to the persistent protection of content distributed within and across firewalls. Id. at 10. Microsoft filed this motion to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) requesting that the case be transferred intra-district to the Austin Division of the Western District of Texas (“WDTX”). Microsoft does not dispute that venue is proper in the Waco Division of the WDTX. Therefore, the Court now focuses on whether the Austin Division is clearly more convenient. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) provides that, for the convenience of parties and witnesses, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented. “Section 1404(a) is intended to place discretion in the district court to adjudicate motions for transfer according to an ‘individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness.’” Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988) (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964)). The party moving for transfer carries the burden of showing good cause. In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 314 (5th Cir. 2008) (hereinafter “Volkswagen II”) (“When viewed in the context of § 1404(a), to show good cause means that a moving party, in order to support its claim for a transfer, must . . . clearly demonstrate that a transfer is ‘[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.’”) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)). “The preliminary question under § 1404(a) is whether a civil action ‘might have been brought’ in the destination venue.” Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 312. If so, in the Fifth Circuit, the

“[t]he determination of ‘convenience’ turns on a number of public and private interest factors, none of which can be said to be of dispositive weight.” Action Indus., Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 358 F.3d 337, 340 (5th Cir. 2004). The private factors include: “(1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses; (3) the cost of attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 2004) (hereinafter “Volkswagen I”) (citing to Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6 (1982)). The public factors include: “(1) the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized interests decided at home; (3) the familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case; and (4) the avoidance of unnecessary problems of conflict of laws of the application of foreign law.” Id. Courts evaluate these factors based on “the situation which existed when suit was instituted.” Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343 (1960). A court may “consider undisputed facts outside the pleadings, but it must draw all

reasonable inferences and resolve all factual conflicts in favor of the non-moving party.” Weatherford Tech. Holdings, LLC v. Tesco Corp., No. 2:17-CV-00456-JRG, 2018 WL 4620636, at *2 (E.D. Tex. May 22, 2018). It is this issue that Apple’s post-hearing brief primarily addressed, and the Court has taken its additional arguments into consideration in determining whether to grant the Motion to Transfer. A plaintiff’s choice of venue is not an independent factor in the venue transfer analysis, and courts must not give inordinate weight to a plaintiff’s choice of venue. Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 314 n.10, 313 (“[W]hile a plaintiff has the privilege of filing his claims in any judicial division appropriate under the general venue statute, § 1404(a) tempers the effects of the exercise

of this privilege.”). However, “when the transferee venue is not clearly more convenient than the venue chosen by the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s choice should be respected.” Id. at 315; see also QR Spex, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 507 F.Supp.2d 650, 664 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (characterizing movant’s burden under § 1404(a) as “heavy”). In the Fifth Circuit, these factors apply to both inter-district and intra-district transfers. In re Radmax Ltd., 720 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2013). It is well settled that trial courts have even greater discretion in granting intra-district transfers than they do in the case of inter-district transfers. See, e.g., Sundell v. Cisco Systems Inc., 1997 WL 156824, at *1, 111 F.3d 892 (5th Cir. 1997) (“Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(b), the district court has broad discretion in deciding whether to transfer a civil action from a division in which it is pending to any other division in the same district.”). III. ANALYSIS a. Private Factors i. Relative ease of access to sources of proof In considering the relative ease of access to sources of proof, a court looks to where documentary evidence, such as documents and physical evidence, is stored. Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 316. “In patent infringement cases, the bulk of the relevant evidence usually comes from the accused infringer. Consequently, the place where the defendant’s documents are kept weighs in favor of transfer to that location.” In re Apple Inc., 979 F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2020)

(citing In re Genentech, 566 F.3d at 1345). Here, the Court finds that the location of electronic and physical documents is neutral. Microsoft argues that this factor weighs in favor of transfer because it has no relevant documents pertaining to this matter in the Waco Division. Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 25 at 5.

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Related

Hoffman v. Blaski
363 U.S. 335 (Supreme Court, 1960)
Van Dusen v. Barrack
376 U.S. 612 (Supreme Court, 1964)
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno
454 U.S. 235 (Supreme Court, 1982)
Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.
487 U.S. 22 (Supreme Court, 1988)
In Re Genentech, Inc.
566 F.3d 1338 (Federal Circuit, 2009)
In Re Volkswagen Ag Volkswagen of America, Inc.
371 F.3d 201 (Fifth Circuit, 2004)
In Re: Radmax, Limited
720 F.3d 285 (Fifth Circuit, 2013)
QR Spex, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc.
507 F. Supp. 2d 650 (E.D. Texas, 2007)
In re Volkswagen of America, Inc.
545 F.3d 304 (Fifth Circuit, 2008)

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paSafeShare LLC v. Microsoft Corporation, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pasafeshare-llc-v-microsoft-corporation-txwd-2021.