Partridge v. Heartland Express Inc of Iowa

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: September 12, 2024
• Docket: 3:24-cv-05486
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 9 10 DUANE PARTRIDGE, CASE NO. 3:24-cv-05486-DGE 11 Plaintiff, ORDER ON MOTION TO 12 v. REMAND 13 HEARTLAND EXPRESS INC OF IOWA, 14 Defendant. 15

16 I INTRODUCTION 17 This case was removed to the Court on June 20, 2024. (Dkt. No. 1.) Before the Court is 18 Plaintiff Duane Partridge’s motion to remand, filed on August 8, 2024. (Dkt No. 12.) Defendant 19 Heartland Express, Inc. of Iowa filed its opposition on September 3, 2024 (Dkt. No. 15), which 20 Plaintiff replied to on September 10, 2024. (Dkt. No 16). Having considered the Parties’ 21 briefing in full, the Court REMANDS the action to Pierce County Superior Court for lack of 22 subject matter jurisdiction. 23 24 1 II BACKGROUND 2 On May 20, 2024, Plaintiff filed this class action in Pierce County Superior Court, 3 alleging that Defendant violated the Washington Equal Pay and Opportunities Act (“EPOA”), 4 Washington Revised Code § 49.58.110, by failing to disclose the wage scale and salary range in 5 its job postings. (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 3.)

6 A. Statutory Background 7 In 2018, the EPOA was amended for the first time since its original passage in 1943. The 8 Washington Legislature found that “despite existing equal pay laws, there continues to be a gap 9 in wages and advancement opportunities among workers in Washington, especially women” and 10 updated the EPOA “to address income disparities, employer discrimination, and retaliation 11 practices, and to reflect the equal status of all workers in Washington state.” Wash. Rev. Code 12 § 49.58.005. The law was updated again in 2019 to prevent employers “from seeking the wage 13 or salary history of an applicant for employment” or requiring that “the applicant’s prior wage or 14 salary history meet certain criteria.” Wash. Rev. Code § 49.58.100. The 2019 amendments

15 established that “individual[s]” were entitled to remedies for statutory violations, including 16 “actual damages; statutory damages equal to the actual damages or five thousand dollars, 17 whichever is greater;” as well as costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. Wash. Rev. Code 18 § 49.58.060–070. 19 The most recent EPOA amendment, which became effective in January 2023, requires 20 employers to “disclose in each posting for each job opening the wage scale or salary range, and a 21 general description of all of the benefits and other compensation to be offered to the hired 22 applicant.” Wash. Rev. Code § 49.58.110. The provision applies to employers with 15 or more 23 employees and replaces the term “individual” in the relief section with “job applicant or 24 1 employee,” thus establishing that job applicants are entitled to remedies. Id. The statute, 2 however, does not provide a definition of “job applicant.” See id.; see also Floyd v. Insight 3 Glob. LLC, No. 23-CV-1680-BJR, 2024 WL 2133370, at *2 (W.D. Wash. May 10, 2024) (noting 4 the same). The 2023 amendment was enacted “in part to allow a discussion at the start of the 5 process instead of after an offer has been made, which will increase the ability to negotiate pay.”

6 Spencer v. Vera Whole Health, Inc., No. C24-337 MJP, 2024 WL 3276578, at *1 (W.D. Wash. 7 July 2, 2024) (quoting H.B. Rep. ESSB 5761, at 2) (internal quotations and brackets omitted). 8 “The Legislature was also concerned that many candidates spend hours going through rounds of 9 interviews only to find out they can’t live on the offered pay.” Id. 10 B. Factual and Procedural Background 11 The facts alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint are sparse. Plaintiff states that “in or around 12 April 2023, Plaintiff applied for a job opening in Washington State with Defendant.” (Dkt. 1-2 13 at 3.) Plaintiff asserts that “Defendant’s job postings do not disclose the wage scale, salary 14 range, or a general description of the benefits or other compensation to be offered” and thus that

15 “Plaintiff lost valuable time applying for a job with Defendant for which the wage scale or salary 16 range was not disclosed.” (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff claims to represent “hundreds” of individuals who 17 applied for a job opening in the State of Washington with Defendant between January 1, 2023, 18 and the present. (Id. at 4). Plaintiff claims that “[a]s a result of Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ 19 inability to evaluate the pay for the position, negotiate that pay, and compare that pay to other 20 available positions in the marketplace, Plaintiff and Class Members were harmed.” (Id.) 21 Plaintiff seeks declaratory judgement, statutory damages, and reasonable attorneys’ fees. (Id. at 22 7). 23 24 1 Defendant removed the case to this Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction under 28 2 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). (Dkt. No. 1 at 2-3). Plaintiff then filed the instant motion to remand, 3 asserting that Plaintiff himself lacks standing in this Court. (Dkt. No. 12 at 2). To support his 4 argument, Plaintiff points out that the language of his complaint and EPOA claim is “virtually 5 identical to the complaints and EPOA claims filed in” eight cases recently remanded by courts in

6 this district for lack of standing. Id. at 3. Indeed, in one recent such order, Judge Rothstein 7 noted that the matter was “one of 27 lawsuits with virtually identical [EPOA] complaints filed in 8 King County Superior Court and subsequently removed to this Court.” Floyd, 2024 WL 9 2133370, at *1. 10 III DISCUSSION 11 A. Legal Standard 12 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a defendant may remove a civil action from state court 13 to the appropriate federal district court so long as that court would have had original jurisdiction 14 over the action. Ansley v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 340 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The

15 threshold requirement for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 is a finding that the complaint 16 contains a cause of action that is within the original jurisdiction of the district court.”). “If at any 17 time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the 18 case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). “The removal statute is strictly construed, and 19 any doubt about the right of removal requires resolution in favor of remand.” Moore-Thomas v. 20 Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009). “This rule of narrow construction 21 both recognizes the limited jurisdiction of federal courts and ‘protect[s] the jurisdiction of state 22 courts.’” Casola v. Dexcom, Inc., 98 F.4th 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2024). The presumption against 23 removal places the burden on the defendant to establish that removal is proper. Id. “Where 24 1 doubt regarding the right to removal exists, a case should be remanded to state court.” Matheson 2 v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003). 3 B. Plaintiff Lacks Article III Standing 4 “Under Article III, the Federal Judiciary is vested with the ‘Power’ to resolve not 5 questions and issues but ‘Cases’ or ‘Controversies.’” Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v.

6 Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 132 (2011). “To state a case or controversy under Article III, a plaintiff 7 must establish standing.” Id. at 133. Federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over a 8 plaintiff that lacks standing. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498–499 (1975). The standing 9 requirement remains a “threshold issue” in class action cases; “[i]f the individual plaintiff lacks 10 standing, the court need never reach the class action issue.” Lierboe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 11 Ins. Co., 350 F.3d 1018, 1022 (9th Cir. 2003). 12 “[T]o establish standing, a plaintiff must show (i) that he suffered an injury in fact that is 13 concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury was likely caused by the 14 defendant; and (iii) that the injury would likely be redressed by judicial relief.” TransUnion LLC

15 v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing each 16 element of the standing requirement; “[a]t the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury 17 resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 18 561 (1992). 19 The Supreme Court is clear that a plaintiff does not “automatically satisfy[y] the injury- 20 in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize 21 that person to sue to vindicate that right.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 341 (2016). 22 Thus, when an alleged injury is premised on the violation of a statutory right, the plaintiff must 23 show that the harm incurred is concrete and particularized and not “a bare procedural violation.” 24 1 Id. This entails a showing of “physical, monetary, or cognizable intangible harm.” TransUnion 2 594 U.S at 427. “[A]n intangible injury may be concrete if it presents a material risk of tangible 3 harm or ‘has a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a 4 basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts,’ like common law torts or certain 5 constitutional violations.” Phillips v. United States Customs & Border Prot., 74 F.4th 986, 991

6 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 340–41). 7 Although “the omission of statutorily required information can constitute a distinct, 8 concrete injury,” not “every minor inaccuracy reported in violation of [a statute] will ‘cause real 9 harm or present any material risk of real harm.’” Magadia v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc., 999 F.3d 10 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Robins v. Spokeo, Inc. (“Spokeo II”), 867 F.3d 1108, 1116 (9th 11 Cir. 2017)). “A procedural violation of an informational entitlement does not by itself suffice to 12 keep a claim in federal court.” Id. at 679 (quoting Brintley v. Aeroquip Credit Union, 936 F.3d 13 489, 493 (6th Cir. 2019)). In cases such as this one, “[t]o determine whether the violation of a 14 statute constitutes a concrete harm, we engage in a two-part inquiry.” Id. “We first consider

15 ‘whether the statutory provisions at issue were established to protect . . . concrete interests (as 16 opposed to purely procedural rights).’” Id. (quoting Spokeo II, 867 F.3d at 1113). “If so, we 17 then assess ‘whether the specific procedural violations alleged in this case actually harm, or 18 present a material risk of harm to, such interests.’” Id. (quoting Spokeo II, 867 F.3d at 1113). 19 As Plaintiff points out, courts in this district have repeatedly found that litigants who 20 alleged materially identical statutory violations of the EPOA lacked Article III standing under 21 the two-step Magadia inquiry. (Dkt. No. 16 at 5–6); see, e.g., Floyd, 2024 WL 2133370, at *8, 22 Vera Whole Health, 2024 WL 3276578, at *3. Defendant responds that “those cases were . . . 23 distinct from this case” because the “plaintiffs in those cases did not allege that they had wasted 24 1 time and effort.” (Dkt. No. 15 at 2). Defendant devotes the majority of its reply brief to this 2 argument. (See generally Dkt. No. 15.) However, the complaints in each of the eight cases 3 contained language about “valuable time” wasted. (See Dkt. No. 16 at 4) (citing Dkt. Nos. 17-1– 4 17-8). For example, in Vera Whole Health—which was handed down by this court only two 5 months ago—the complaint used the same exact language as the instant complaint, alleging that

6 “Plaintiff and the Class members lost valuable time applying for jobs with Defendants for which 7 the wage scale or salary range was not disclosed.” Spencer v. Vera Whole Health, Inc., No. 8 2:24-cv-00337-MJP, Dkt. No. 1 at 5 (W.D. Wash.). The Vera Whole Health court ultimately 9 concluded that “[a]lthough the EPOA protects concrete interests of job applicants . . . the alleged 10 violation Spencer identifies did not cause an actual harm or present a material risk of harm to 11 that interest.” Vera Whole Health, 2024 WL 3276578, at *3. This Court agrees with Vera 12 Whole Health’s conclusion. 13 First, the disclosure requirement in the EPOA was established to protect job applicants 14 and employees and increase their ability to negotiate pay. The Washington Legislature amended

15 the EPOA to address the issue that “[p]ay transparency . . . impacts women and minorities the 16 most,” in part because “some folks do not have the networks or ability to negotiate for salaries.” 17 H.B. Rep. ESSB 5761, at 2. Thus, the bill protects job applicants’ concrete interest in receiving 18 “sufficient information to ensure fair and equitable pay negotiations.” Vera Whole Health, 2024 19 WL 3276578, at *3. The provision was also designed to prevent harm to those who might 20 “‘spend hours going through rounds of interviews only to find out they can’t live on the offered 21 pay.’” Vera Whole Health, 2024 WL 3276578, at *3 (quoting S.B. Rep. ESSB 5761, at 3). 22 Second, the conclusory statements in Plaintiff’s complaint do not support a finding that 23 Defendant’s lack of disclosure caused Plaintiff the sort of “real harm” the EPOA was “designed 24 1 to prevent.” Spokeo II, 867 F.3d at 1115. In full, Plaintiff asserts three boilerplate claims: that 2 he “applied for a job opening” without a listed salary range, that he lost “valuable time” in doing 3 so, and that his “inability to evaluate the pay for the position, negotiate that pay, and compare 4 that pay. . . harmed [him].” (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 3–4.) Plaintiff does not allege that he was offered 5 employment or an interview. Thus, he does not suggest that the deprivation of information

6 compromised his bargaining power in pay negotiations, placed him at a disadvantage relative to 7 other applicants, or resulted in him having to exit a lengthy interview process after learning the 8 pay was insufficient for his needs. As in Vera Whole Health, Plaintiff “does not even allege he 9 was qualified for the position” or provide any information about what harm he incurred other 10 than time “lost.” Vera Whole Health, 2024 WL 3276578, at *3. 11 In Magadia, the court found that Walmart’s statutory violation—depriving employees of 12 itemized wage statements—presented a material risk of harm to employees’ interest in the 13 statutorily guaranteed information, because without that information, the employees had no way 14 of knowing whether wage statements were calculated correctly. Magadia, 999 F.3d at 679. The

15 court found the California statute in question was designed to prevent exactly that harm: refusal 16 to provide information that would allow employees to “tell from their wage statements how the 17 company calculated their wages or which dates the paystub covered.” Id. Likewise, in this 18 instance, Plaintiff must allege that the lack of salary information caused or put him at risk of 19 concrete and particularized harm contemplated by the EPOA. “A plaintiff may not bring a 20 generalized grievance, but rather must show a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.” 21 Dutta v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 895 F.3d 1166, 1172-73 (9th Cir. 2018). But time lost 22 in merely submitting an application is “not an injury that the EPOA seeks to prevent or redress.” 23 24 1 Vera Whole Health, 2024 WL 3276578, at *3. A generalized assertion of time lost, therefore, 2 does not support Article III standing. 3 Defendants’ attempt to inject additional factual information into this matter to support a 4 finding of standing is futile, as Defendants’ declarations about the time-intensive nature of its job 5 application process are not part of Plaintiff’s complaint. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 15 at 7)

6 (“Heartland’s application is extremely involved, and requests detailed information regarding 7 work history, licensing, accidents, safety, and traffic convictions. . . . While Plaintiff ultimately 8 aborted the process . . . there is no doubt that he invested time into the process of potentially 9 going to work for Heartland.”). It is well-settled law that “[t]he plaintiff may by the allegations 10 of his complaint determine the status with respect to removability of a case.” Caterpillar Inc. v. 11 Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 n.7 (1987) (quoting Great North R. Co. v. Alexander, 246 U.S. 276, 12 282 (1918)). As the court commented in Floyd, “[a]lthough Mr. Floyd’s declaration shows that 13 he may be capable of amending his complaint to support standing, the Court does not consider 14 his declaration as part of his pleading.” Floyd, 2024 WL 2133370 at *8. In this instance,

15 Defendant’s postulations of what injury may have happened to Plaintiff are even further from the 16 mark, as it is Plaintiff himself who strenuously denies meeting the Article III standing 17 requirement. 18 As was the case in Floyd and Vera Whole Health, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to identify a 19 concrete and particularized injury sufficient to give rise to Article III standing. Without 20 standing, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Warth, 422 U.S. at 498. The case is 21 therefore REMANDED to Pierce County Superior Court. 22 23 24 1 IV CONCLUSION 2 The Court concludes it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this matter because 3 Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege a concrete harm sufficient to satisfy Article III standing. 4 Because the Court may not preside over this matter, it REMANDS the matter to Pierce County 5 Superior Court.

6 Dated this 12th day of September, 2024. 7 8 A 9 David G. Estudillo 10 United States District Judge

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