Partridge v. Dzurenda

CourtDistrict Court, D. Nevada
DecidedJuly 20, 2020
Docket2:19-cv-01355
StatusUnknown

This text of Partridge v. Dzurenda (Partridge v. Dzurenda) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Partridge v. Dzurenda, (D. Nev. 2020).

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 CHARLES PARTRIDGE, Case No. 2:19-cv-01355-RFB-VCF

4 Plaintiff SCREENING ORDER

5 v.

6 JAMES DZURENDA et al.,

7 Defendants

8 9 Plaintiff, who is incarcerated in the custody of the Nevada Department of 10 Corrections (“NDOC”), has submitted a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 11 and has filed an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1, 1-1). The matter 12 of the filing fee will be temporarily deferred. The Court now screens Plaintiff’s civil rights 13 complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 14 I. SCREENING STANDARD 15 Federal courts must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which an 16 incarcerated person seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of 17 a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any 18 cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim 19 upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 20 immune from such relief. Id. at § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings, however, must be 21 liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 22 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 23 (1) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and 24 (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. 25 West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 26 In addition to the screening requirements under § 1915A, pursuant to the Prison 27 Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a federal court must dismiss an incarcerated person’s 28 claim if “the allegation of poverty is untrue” or if the action “is frivolous or malicious, fails 1 to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a 2 defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Dismissal of a 3 complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is provided for in 4 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and courts apply the same standard under § 5 1915 when reviewing the adequacy of a complaint or an amended complaint. When a 6 court dismisses a complaint under § 1915(e), the plaintiff should be given leave to amend 7 the complaint with directions as to curing its deficiencies, unless it is clear from the face 8 of the complaint that the deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. Cato v. United 9 States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 10 Review under Rule 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a question of law. Chappel v. 11 Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2000). Dismissal for failure to state a claim 12 is proper only if it is clear that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of the 13 claim that would entitle him or her to relief. Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 14 1999) (citation omitted). In making this determination, the court takes as true all 15 allegations of material fact stated in the complaint, and the court construes them in the 16 light most favorable to the plaintiff. Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 17 1996). Allegations of a pro se complainant are held to less stringent standards than formal 18 pleadings drafted by lawyers. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). While the standard 19 under Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must provide 20 more than mere labels and conclusions. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 21 (2007). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient. Id. 22 Additionally, a reviewing court should “begin by identifying pleadings [allegations] 23 that, because they are no more than mere conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption 24 of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “While legal conclusions can provide 25 the framework of a complaint, they must be supported with factual allegations.” Id. “When 26 there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then 27 determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. “Determining 28 whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that 1 requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. 2 Finally, all or part of a complaint filed by an incarcerated person may therefore be 3 dismissed sua sponte if that person’s claims lack an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 4 This includes claims based on legal conclusions that are untenable (e.g., claims against 5 defendants who are immune from suit or claims of infringement of a legal interest which 6 clearly does not exist), as well as claims based on fanciful factual allegations (e.g., 7 fantastic or delusional scenarios). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327–28 (1989). See 8 also McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). 9 II. SCREENING OF COMPLAINT 10 In the complaint, Plaintiff sues multiple defendants for events that took place while 11 Plaintiff was incarcerated at High Desert State Prison (“HDSP”). (ECF No. 1-1 at 1). 12 Plaintiff sues Defendants NDOC Director James Dzurenda, Warden Brian Williams Sr., 13 Romeo Aranas, and John/Jane Does. (Id. at 2-5). Plaintiff alleges three counts and 14 seeks monetary damages. (Id. at 8, 11). 15 The complaint alleges the following: Plaintiff’s big toenails on both feet were 16 growing in the wrong direction toward and into the next toe causing severe pain. (Id. at 17 5). Plaintiff’s toenails were really thick which made cutting and trimming the toenails 18 impossible. (Id.) The only way to fix the problem was to remove the toenails. (Id.) 19 However, the medical department refused “any and all treatment of the problem.” (Id.) 20 Plaintiff waited 20 months for treatment and pain medication. (Id. at 7). Medical 21 personnel only gave Plaintiff two band aids to prevent his toenails from digging into the 22 neighboring toes. (Id.) The band aids did not help. (Id.) Defendants denied Plaintiff 23 treatment either in the medical department or through the grievance process.

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Partridge v. Dzurenda, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/partridge-v-dzurenda-nvd-2020.