Parsons v. State

Alabama Court of Appeals

Parsons v. State

104 So. 656, 104 So. 556, 20 Ala. App. 615, 1925 Ala. App. LEXIS 122

CourtAlabama Court of Appeals

DecidedMay 19, 1925

Docket6 Div. 670.

StatusPublished

Cited by5 cases

This text of 104 So. 656 (Parsons v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Alabama Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Parsons v. State, 104 So. 656, 104 So. 556, 20 Ala. App. 615, 1925 Ala. App. LEXIS 122 (Ala. Ct. App. 1925).

Pincite

Opinion

RICE, J.

The defendant was convicted of the offense of distilling, etc., and appeals.

The evidence, in its strongest aspects for the state, was to the effect that “some liquor and a still were found about 300 yards from what is described as the ‘Gobde Franklin place or house’; that it was not known who lived there; that some rubber shoes, a sack of rice, four empty sugar sacks, some letters addressed to Bill Hougue, a bill to Taylor Parsons (the defendant), marked paid, from 1-Iuey Grain Company, Bessemer, Ala., for four sacks of sugar were' found in the house; that the still was about a 400-gallon copper still, full of beer (at the time); that in the house was, also a wool shirt with charcoal in it, that smelled of whisky; that the still was not in operation; that it was not *616 in any inclosure, but in the open woods; that there was a plain path leading from the house to the still; that in it were tracks made with rubber shoes; that defendant in the spring of the year in which the above things were found agreed with Goode Franklin, the owner of the house in question to rent the place for the year, but that he was never seen there.”

The defendant denied any ownership • of, knowledge of, or connection' with, the still or liquor.

Upon testimony substantially as above, and no stronger, the defendant was adjudged guilty of a felony. Manifestly the conviction cannot stand. It was not shown that defendant was ever at or anywhere about the still, or that he had even taken charge of, or been to, or stayed at, the house in question, or that he was connected in any way with the offense charged. It is unnecessary for us to pass upon the exceptions reserved to the admission of testimony- — a number of which exceptions appear to have merit — for the reason that in the view we take of the case the defendant was entitled to have given at his request the general affirmative charge. This court has many times held that mere suspicion, surmise, and conjecture will not be sufficient upon which to deprive one of his liberty, merely because that one may be charged with a violation of some phase of our very salutory prohibition laws.

For the refusal to give the general affirmative charge in his behalf, duly requested by the defendant, the case is reversed and the cause remanded. Ballentine v. State, 19 Ala. App. 261, 96 So. 732.

Reversed and remanded.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

RICE, J.

The defendant was convicted of the offense of distilling, etc., and appeals.

The evidence, in its strongest aspects for the state, was to the effect that “some liquor and a still were found about 300 yards from what is described as the ‘Gobde Franklin place or house’; that it was not known who lived there; that some rubber shoes, a sack of rice, four empty sugar sacks, some letters addressed to Bill Hougue, a bill to Taylor Parsons (the defendant), marked paid, from 1-Iuey Grain Company, Bessemer, Ala., for four sacks of sugar were' found in the house; that the still was about a 400-gallon copper still, full of beer (at the time); that in the house was, also a wool shirt with charcoal in it, that smelled of whisky; that the still was not in operation; that it was not *616 in any inclosure, but in the open woods; that there was a plain path leading from the house to the still; that in it were tracks made with rubber shoes; that defendant in the spring of the year in which the above things were found agreed with Goode Franklin, the owner of the house in question to rent the place for the year, but that he was never seen there.”

The defendant denied any ownership • of, knowledge of, or connection' with, the still or liquor.

Upon testimony substantially as above, and no stronger, the defendant was adjudged guilty of a felony. Manifestly the conviction cannot stand. It was not shown that defendant was ever at or anywhere about the still, or that he had even taken charge of, or been to, or stayed at, the house in question, or that he was connected in any way with the offense charged. It is unnecessary for us to pass upon the exceptions reserved to the admission of testimony- — a number of which exceptions appear to have merit — for the reason that in the view we take of the case the defendant was entitled to have given at his request the general affirmative charge. This court has many times held that mere suspicion, surmise, and conjecture will not be sufficient upon which to deprive one of his liberty, merely because that one may be charged with a violation of some phase of our very salutory prohibition laws.

For the refusal to give the general affirmative charge in his behalf, duly requested by the defendant, the case is reversed and the cause remanded. Ballentine v. State, 19 Ala. App. 261, 96 So. 732.

Reversed and remanded.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

104 So. 656, 104 So. 556, 20 Ala. App. 615, 1925 Ala. App. LEXIS 122, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/parsons-v-state-alactapp-1925.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack