Parr v. Ford Motor Co.

28 Pa. D. & C.5th 314
CourtPennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County
DecidedMarch 1, 2013
DocketNo. 2893, No. 2793 EDA 2012
StatusPublished

This text of 28 Pa. D. & C.5th 314 (Parr v. Ford Motor Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Parr v. Ford Motor Co., 28 Pa. D. & C.5th 314 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013).

Opinion

PANEPINTO, J.,

Plaintiffs/appellants appeal this court’s order of August 30,2012, which denied plaintiffs motion for post-trial relief and entered judgment in favor of defendants and against plaintiffs.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This crashworthiness action arises out of a two car motor vehicle accident that occurred on July 21, 2009. Plaintiffs were occupants of a 2001 Ford Excursion vehicle that was struck by another vehicle causing it to strike a guardrail and subsequently roll over down a steep embankment. At the time of the accident, Joseph Parr was operating the subject vehicle and his wife, April Parr and daughter, Samantha Parr were occupants of the vehicle. Both April Parr and Samantha Parr were injured. April Parr sustained the more serious injury, namely, a spinal cord injury which resulted in quadriplegia.

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants alleging, inter alia, that the roof and restraint system of the 2001 Ford Excursion were defectively designed. More specifically, plaintiffs contended that plaintiff, April Parr’s spinal injuries resulted from a roof crush. Of significance is the fact that following the accident, the subject vehicle was destroyed, prior to any expert being able to examine or inspect the vehicle.

Trial began in this matter on March 3, 2012 and concluded on March 23, 2012 with a jury verdict in favor [317]*317óf defendants, finding that plaintiffs failed to prove that defendants were liable under both strict products liability and negligence theories. Plaintiffs timely filed post-trial motions for a new trial, which were denied by this court pursuant to an order dated August 30,2012. On September 10,2012, plaintiffs appealed the order of this court denying their post-trial motions. On September 19,2012 this court entered an order pursuant to PA R.C.P. 1925(b) requiring plaintiffs to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. Plaintiffs timely filed their 1925(b) statement and this opinion follows.

ALLEGATIONS OF ERROR

Plaintiffs’ Rule 1925(b) statement raises the following four (4) issues on appeal:

1. The trial court committed an error of law and/ or abused its discretion when it denied plaintiffs’/ appellants’ motion in limine No. 1 to preclude defendants/appellees from presenting evidence of their “diving,” “torso augmentation,” theory, which was discredited and superseded by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)’s Final Rule dated May 12, 2009.
2. The trial court committed an error of law and/ or abused its discretion when it granted defendants’/ appellees’ motion in limine No. 3 to preclude references to NHTSA standards and rulemaking documents dated 2001 to present, on the basis that the subject vehicle was originally manufactured and sold in 2011 (sic).
3. The trial court committed an error of law and/ [318]*318or abused its discretion when it granted defendants’/ appellees’ motion in limine No. 9 and altogether precluded plaintiffs/appellants from offering statistical evidence prepared by NHTSA, The Insurance Institute for Highway safety (IIHS), the fatal accident reporting system, 10and/or (sic) the national automotive sampling system as to rollover fatalities involving the subject vehicle and comparable vehicles on the basis that plaintiffs/appellees (sic) were unable to prove that the statistics derived from other rollover accidents that were virtually identical to the one in the instant accident.
4. The trial court committed an error of law and/ or abused its discretion when it denied plaintiffs’/ appellants’ motion in limine to preclude defendants/ appellees from (a) presenting — and consequently filling the record with— evidence that the subject vehicle was not preserved; and (b) seeking a spoliation charge when the defendants/appellees suffered no prejudice resulting from the vehicle’s destruction.

DISCUSSION

Appellants first argue that this court erred in denying their motion in limine no. 1 which sought to preclude appellees from introducing at trial any evidence of their ‘diving’ or torso augmentation theory. Appellants also had an opportunity to argue their motion in limine no.l before this court prior to trial. This pre-trial motion no. 1 had contended that appellant, April Parr’s quadriplegic injuries had to have been caused by a roof crush and not by ‘diving.’Appellees had argued that April Parr’s injuries [319]*319resulted from ‘torso augmentation’ or ‘diving’ which occurred when April Parr’s torso, loading her neck as her head, which was against the roof of the vehicle due to centrifugal force generated in the rollover accident, at the moment the roof struck the ground. Appellees contented that automobile roofs do not significantly deform or crush in rollover accidents until after the occupants have already ‘dived’ into the roofs and incurred their injuries. Appellants contended that the National Highway Safety Administration’s (NHTSA) engineers and statisticians had discredited appellees’ ‘diving’ theory as to the cause of April Parr’s injuries.

Accordingly, appellants contended at trial that this trial court should give deference to NHSTA as an administrative body and therefore preclude appellees from introducing at trial any evidence of ‘diving’ to support their defense of this product liability causes of action brought against them by appellees. However, upon review of the documentation provided to the court to support their motion, notably, the 2009 amendment to the FMVSS (Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard) although suggestive of appellants’ argument, failed to convince this court that either of their arguments were meritorious. First, although the 2009 amendment did cite statistical studies which found a correlation between roof crush and injury in rollover accidents, appellants’ contention that the NHTSA amendment conclusively determined that a causal relationship existed between roof crush and head and neck injury in rollover accidents, to the exclusion of torso augmentation, was not proven. Although a correlation was shown it did not provide, as appellants’

[320]*320were arguing, evidence showing that it was conclusive. As such, this court determined that appellants’ contention was without merit and denied their pre-trial motion which sought to preclude appellees from presenting evidence that ‘diving’ or torso augmentation caused plaintiff, April Parr’s injuries. Both appellees and appellants presented extensive expert testimony during trial on the subject of ‘roof crush’ vs. ‘diving’ as a cause of appellant, April Parr’s injuries. In the end, the jury concluded that Ms. Parr’s injuries resulted from ‘diving’ not ‘roof crush’ and found for the appellees.

Appellants next argue that this court erred in granting appellee’s motion in limine no. 3 which sought to preclude any references during trial to NHTSA standards and rulemaking documents dated 2001 to the present, on the basis that the subject vehicle was originally manufactured and sold in 2001. Both parties had an opportunity to argue this motion in limine before this court prior to trial. Pennsylvania law requires that a plaintiff prove that an allegedly defective vehicle was defective at the time of manufacture. Duchess v. Langston Corporation, 769 A.2d 1131, 1142 (Pa. 2001).

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Related

Hutchinson v. Penske Truck Leasing Co.
876 A.2d 978 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2005)
Duchess v. Langston Corp.
769 A.2d 1131 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 2001)

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Bluebook (online)
28 Pa. D. & C.5th 314, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/parr-v-ford-motor-co-pactcomplphilad-2013.