Parnau v. Industrial Commission of Arizona

351 P.2d 643, 87 Ariz. 361, 1960 Ariz. LEXIS 169
CourtArizona Supreme Court
DecidedMay 4, 1960
Docket6834
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 351 P.2d 643 (Parnau v. Industrial Commission of Arizona) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Arizona Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Parnau v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 351 P.2d 643, 87 Ariz. 361, 1960 Ariz. LEXIS 169 (Ark. 1960).

Opinion

JOHNSON, Justice.

Petitioner, Eva L. Parnau, sustained a compensable injury in an industrial accident on February 10, 1948. Applicant was operated upon and then seen in consultation by the Medical Advisory Board in March of 1950, as a result of which it was determined that she had sustained a 20 per cent general physical functional disability attributable to her injury. On the basis of a further consultation in December of 1950, which found her condition to be stationary requiring no further treatment, the Commission' rendered its final award compensating petitioner for a 25 per cent loss of earning capacity.

Thereafter, petitioner initiated a series of applications to reopen on the basis of a new, additional or previously undiscovered disability, each of which was denied by the Commission on the ground she had failed to present evidence of such undiscovered disability. Finally, on May 22, 1958, petitioner filed her last petition and application for reopening of the award. In support thereof, there was filed a report by Dr. Aidan A. Raney, an orthopedic surgeon of Los Angeles, California.

This petition to reopen was denied, and a petition for rehearing was filed. Formal hearing was held September 29, 1958, at which time medical testimony was taken. On an investigative basis, the Commission then ordered petitioner examined in group consultation on October 17, 1958 by a neurologist, Dr. William B. Helme; two orthopedic surgeons, James Lytton-Smith and W. A. Bishop, Jr.; a psychiatrist, Dr. William B. McGrath and the Commission’s medical advisor, Dr. James R. Moore. A report consisting of medical findings and opinions was made, and formal hearing again was held on December 10, 1958, at which time the testimony of Doctors Bishop, Lytton-Smith, Moore and McGrath was recorded.

The Commission thereupon entered its, decision affirming its previous findings and. award. That final award is the subject of the present certiorari action.

*363 At the time of petitioner’s injury, § 56-957(c) and (d), A.C.A.1939 was in effect, and not the amending statute A.R.S. § 23-1044, subd. F. We have held that the 1953 Amendment, affecting vested rights, is substantive legislation and can not be accorded retroactive application. Gallo v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 83 Ariz. 392, 322 P.2d 372. Consequently, the burden lies with petitioner, Hunter v. Wm. Peper Construction Co., 46 Ariz. 465, 52 P.2d 472, to establish that there exists a new and additional disability which was unknown and not considered at the time of the original award. Jastrzebski v. Wasielewski, 82 Ariz. 92, 308 P.2d 937; Harambasic v. Barrett & Hilp & Macco Corp., 58 Ariz. 319, 119 P.2d 932. If petitioner fails to sustain its burden, she is not entitled to a reopening of the award.

It is well settled in this jurisdiction that this Court will not upset the findings of the Commission where there is a conflict in the competent evidence, upon which it based its findings, which is such that reasonable men might differ as to the fact. Jastrzebski v. Wasielewski, supra. Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that unless the result of an industrial accident is one which clearly is apparent to ordinary laymen, such as the loss of limb or an external lesion, the question as to physical condition of . an injured employee after an accident and the causal relation of the accident to such condition usually can be answered only by expert medical testimony. Caekos v. Stanley Fruit Co., 55 Ariz. 72, 98 P.2d 471.

The Commission finding that is the subj ect of the instant matter is this:

That applicant does not have any new, additional or previously undiscovered disability attributable to this injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment on February 10, 1948.

The precise issue is whether this finding reasonably is supported by competent evidence.

From the report of the group consultation- of October 17, 1958, we quote:

“X-Rays: The x-rays were reviewed and compared with the previous radio-graphs taken before the case was closed in 1950. These show definite increase in proliferative and degenerative changes, particularly about C-5 and C-6. The changes are of a character which would be anticipated following the surgery which was performed.
“Comments: From a review of the record and the history and physical examination as recorded above, it is our opinion that there is no evidence of new and additional disability attributable to the injury sustained in the accident of February 10, 1948 as compared *364 to the condition as recorded at the time she was last seen in consultation on December 14, 1950.
“The minor differences in the physical findings as recorded at previous consultations and at this time, are not indicative of progressive pathology and do not represent objective evidence of increased disability. The x-ray changes which have been noted in the cervical spine are those which might reasonably be expected to occur over such a period of time and following surgical intervention as would occur in this case.
“There are objective evidence of disábility which could be logically attributable to that injury which have previously been estimated as equivalent to a 20% general physical functional disability.”

It is petitioner’s contention that she can no longer work in her usual occupation of a meat wrapper because of a change in her employability attributable to the industrial injury of 1948. In support of this contention applicant relies upon the proliferative and degenerative changes evidenced by the x-rays. Dr. James Lytton-Smith testified:

“Q. Were there any medical findings, Doctor, over and above the medical findings reported on the December, 1950 examination? A. Yes, there were some changes, radiographically; physically, we didn’t find, any appreciable amount, but there were some changes radiographically.
“Q. Now you are speaking of X-ray changes? A. Yes.
“Q. And X-ray changes with respect to the cervical spine? A. Yes.
“Q. Were those X-ray changes over the entire cervical spine or not? A. No, they were pretty much localized through the area of surgery.
“Q.- Which^was C-5, 6, and 7? A; Yes, in that region.
“Q. Do you have an opinion, Doctor, as to the cause of those changes? A.

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Bluebook (online)
351 P.2d 643, 87 Ariz. 361, 1960 Ariz. LEXIS 169, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/parnau-v-industrial-commission-of-arizona-ariz-1960.