Parminne Pitamber v. Lakeram Shivbaran

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: May 21, 2025
• Docket: 3D2024-0198
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed May 21, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D24-0198 Lower Tribunal No. 19-27508 ________________

Parminne Pitamber, Appellant,

vs.

Lakeram Shivbaran, Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Spencer Multack, Judge.

Buckner, Shifrin, Etter, Dugan & Bradfute, P.A. and Emily M. Bradfute, for appellant.

Sandy T. Fox, P.A., Sandy T. Fox, and Sara E. Ross, for appellee.

Before LOGUE C.J., and MILLER, and LOBREE, JJ.

MILLER, J. Appellant, the former wife, appeals from a final judgment of dissolution.

On appeal, she contends the trial court erred in denying her petition for

relocation and distributing the marital residence, in toto, to appellee, the

former husband. We summarily affirm the comprehensive and well-

reasoned portion of the judgment denying relocation because the trial court’s

evaluation of the governing statutory factors is supported by competent,

substantial evidence of record. See § 61.13001(7), Fla. Stat. (2023);

§ 61.13(3), Fla. Stat. (2023); see also Chalmers v. Chalmers, 259 So. 3d

878, 879 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (holding “the circuit court properly applied the

relocation statute as a matter of law” where the “final judgment set forth its

detailed findings of fact as to each factor used to determine the best interests

of the child” under sections 61.13(3) and 61.13001(7), the court “did not

make any presumption in favor of or against the former [spouse]’s request

for relocation[,]” and “competent substantial evidence support[ed]

the . . . findings of fact”). However, we are constrained to reverse that aspect

of the judgment denying equitable distribution of the marital home because

the ruling amounts to an impermissible sanction levied on the former wife for

previously contesting the validity of the marriage to no avail. See

§ 61.075(6)(a)(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2023) (“‘Marital assets and liabilities’

include . . . [t]he enhancement in value and appreciation of nonmarital

2 assets resulting from the efforts of either party during the marriage or from

the contribution to or expenditure thereon of marital funds or other forms of

marital assets, or both.”); Kaaa v. Kaaa, 58 So. 3d 867, 872–73 (Fla. 2010)

(“In sum, when a marital home constitutes nonmarital real property, but is

encumbered by a mortgage that marital funds service, the value of the

passive, market-driven appreciation of the property that accrues during the

course of the marriage is a marital asset subject to equitable distribution

under section 61.075[(6)(a)(1)(b)] . . . .”); § 61.075(6)(a)(1)(c)(I)–(V), Fla.

Stat. (establishing statutory formula for determining marital share of passive

appreciation of nonmarital property during marriage); Leitman v. Boone, 439

So. 2d 318, 322 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (“In judicial proceedings, a party simply

is not estopped from asserting a later inconsistent position . . . unless the

party’s initial position was successfully maintained.”) (emphasis in original

omitted).

Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded.