Parks v. United States

141 Ct. Cl. 415, 1958 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 84, 1958 WL 7372
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJanuary 15, 1958
DocketNo. 49894
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 141 Ct. Cl. 415 (Parks v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Parks v. United States, 141 Ct. Cl. 415, 1958 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 84, 1958 WL 7372 (cc 1958).

Opinion

MaddeN, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The original plaintiff in this case died during the pendency of the suit, and his executor has been substituted as plaintiff. However, in this opinion, the word plaintiff will refer to the original plaintiff.

The plaintiff was the general manager, the highest executive officer of the Alaska Railroad, an agency of the United States, from August 1, 1928 to January 6, 1946, except for a period of less than a month in 1943. In his suit he claimed overtime compensation under section 23 of the Act of March 28,1934,48 Stat. 522, 5 U. S. C. 673c, which is quoted in finding 3. There has been extensive litigation in this court with regard to the coverage of this statute. The first case was Townsley v. United States, 101 C. Cls. 237, affirmed, United States v. Townsley, 323 U. S. 557.

In cases involving employees of the Alaska Railroad, this court has held that the statute applied to nonoperating employees, Poggas v. United States, 118 C. Cls. 385, operating employees, Samples v. United States, 135 C. Cls. 548 (July 12, 1956), and administrative and clerical employees, Samples v. United States, 135 C. Cls. 945. The instant question is whether the general manager of the railroad is, along with all the other employees, covered by section 23.

The Government urges that he is not, and offers several reasons. It says that he was not a member of “the several trades and occupations”, as that expression is used in the statute. The word “occupation” is, of course, broad enough to include almost any employment. Most wage board employees are mechanical workers to whom the word trade is naturally applicable, but, as we have seen, we have applied the word “occupation” to the clerical workers of the Alaska [417]*417Railroad. It would seem that we have interpreted the word “occupation”, in its context, as covering all Federal employment not covered by the Classification Acts or by statutes directly fixing salaries.

The Government says that the plaintiff’s salary as general manager was not set by a “wage 'board (s) or other wage-fixing authority (ies) ”, again quoting section 23. The plaintiff’s salary was set by the same authority that set the pay rates for all other employees of the Alaska Railroad, the Secretary of the Interior. It was no doubt set by the Secretary at a figure which would obtain and retain the services of a competent general manager, in view of current salaries for such positions in private enterprises. Administrators charged with the responsibility for setting wages and salaries use various methods. See Abbott v. United States, 138 C. Cls. 459. The fact that the plaintiff’s salary remained the same while the wages and salaries of other employees of the railroads were twice increased is of no significance. The wage-fixing procedures do not require that the wages of all employees be increased if those of any are increased.

The Government urges that, because the plaintiff as general manager had no one to keep his time and his overtime, the overtime provision of the statute could not in practice be applied to him. The 1934 Act was not, in fact, applied to any employees of the railroad, and they obtained their rights under it only by litigation, as shown above. During the period prior to the enactment of the War Overtime Pay Act of 1943, 57 Stat. 75, there was no point in keeping records of overtime work on the railroad, because the Government’s position was that overtime was not compensable. It has been difficult in the cases of many of the employees to reach a satisfactory conclusion as to the amount of their overtime. Because it was not the fault of the employees that records were not kept, we have not penalized them for lack of definite record proof.

The plaintiff testified that he worked 48 hours a week as a minimum during the period in question. He spoke of being up late at night when there were snow-slides and other emergencies, and of the impossibility of keeping the problems of the chief executive officer of a railroad within the [418]*418bounds of a fixed number of hours. He was in Washington, D, C. for budget hearings and other purposes, on one occasion for a period of some six months. He was not cross-examined in any detail with regard to his general statements about his long hours. However, during all of the period in question up to February 9,1942, all office workers of the railroad were on a 89-hour week basis; hence the office in which the plaintiff worked was officially open only for that number of hours. During the periods spent by the plaintiff in Washington, he would have been making his headquarters in offices which were officially open only 89 hours per week.

The plaintiff’s testimony was given many years after the period in question. It may well be that his recollection of long hours and frequent emergencies related more to the period of the war than to the period from 1934 to the beginning of the war. On the whole, we do not feel justified in finding as a fact that the plaintiff worked, on the average, more than 44 hours a week during the period in question.

. The plaintiff.is entitled to recover, and judgment will be entered to that effect.- The amount of recovery will be determined in further proceedings pursuant to Rule 38 (c).

It is so ordered. -

Whitaker, Judge; LittletoN, Judge; and Jones, Chief Judge, concur. Laramore, Judge, took no part in the consideration and decision of this case.

FINDINGS 0E FACT

The court, having considered the evidence, the report of Commissioner Richard H. Akers, and'the briefs and arguments of counsel, makes findings of fact as follows:

1. O. F. Ohlson, in whose name the petition in this proceeding was filed and who will hereinafter sometimes be referred to as the “decedent”, died June 6,1956, and on December 21,1956, George A. Parks, Executor of the Last Will and Testament and sole heir of O. F. Ohlson, was substituted as the plaintiff.

2. The decedent was continuously employed by The Alaska Railroad, an agency of the United States, from August 1, [419]*4191928, through January 6, 1946, except that the records of the railroad show that he resigned on July 24, 1943, and was reappointed on August 12, 1943. During the entire period of his service he was the general manager of the railroad.

3. This action was instituted to recover overtime compensation under section 23 of the act of March 28, 1934 (48 Stat. 522, 5 U. S. C. 673c), which reads as follows:

The weekly compensation, minus any general percentage reduction which may be prescribed by Act of Congress, for the several trades and occupations, which is set by wage boards or other wage-fixing authorities, shall be re-established and maintained at rates not lower than necessary to restore the full weekly earnings of such employees in accordance with the full-time weekly earnings under the respective wage schedules in effect on June 1,1932: Provided,

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Related

Eugene C. Sauer v. The United States
354 F.2d 302 (Court of Claims, 1965)
Gaines v. United States
158 Ct. Cl. 497 (Court of Claims, 1962)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
141 Ct. Cl. 415, 1958 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 84, 1958 WL 7372, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/parks-v-united-states-cc-1958.