Parks v. Piedmont Tech. Center

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 12, 1996
Docket95-2463
StatusUnpublished

This text of Parks v. Piedmont Tech. Center (Parks v. Piedmont Tech. Center) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Parks v. Piedmont Tech. Center, (4th Cir. 1996).

Opinion

Filed: February 12, 1996

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 95-2463 (CA-94-1416-6-21AK)

Seyvelle Parks,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

Piedmont Technical Center,

Defendant - Appellee.

O R D E R

The Court amends its opinion filed January 31, 1996, as

follows: On page 3, second full paragraph, line 3 -- the spacing in the

words "in the" is corrected.

For the Court - By Direction

/s/ Bert M. Montague

Clerk UNPUBLISHED

SEYVELLE PARKS, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 95-2463

PIEDMONT TECHNICAL COLLEGE, Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Greenville. William B. Traxler, Jr., District Judge. (CA-94-1416-6-21AK)

Submitted: January 16, 1996

Decided: January 31, 1996

Before WIDENER, MURNAGHAN, and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Seyvelle Parks, Appellant Pro Se. Thomas Allen Bright, Anna Maria Conner, HAYNSWORTH, BALDWIN, JOHNSON & GREAVES, P.A., Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c). OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Seyvelle Parks appeals from the district court's orders granting summary judgment against him on his action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (West 1994), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (West 1994), and breach of contract. Find- ing no error, we affirm.

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Foster v. American Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 168 (4th Cir. 1994). Parks primarily contends that Piedmont Technical College, his former employer, discriminated against him by dismissing him from his position as a program director. However, the district court cor- rectly determined that Piedmont is immune from § 1981 and breach of contract liability under the Eleventh Amendment. Absent waiver or consent, Moreno v. University of Maryland, 645 F.2d 217, 220 (4th Cir. 1981), aff'd, 458 U.S. 1 (1982), the Eleventh Amendment bars suit by private parties to recover money damages from the state or its alter egos acting in their official capacities. Huang v. Board of Governors, 902 F.2d 1134, 1138 (1990). The bar is equally applicable to pendent state law claims. Id. (citing Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984)). Piedmont is an alter ego of the state of South Carolina, as any judgment against it would be satisfied with state funds. See Hess v. Port Authority Trans- Hudson Corp., ___ U.S. ___, 63 U.S.L.W. 4009, 4014 (U.S. Nov. 14, 1994) (No. 93-1197); Bockes v. Fields, 999 F.2d 788, 790 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. #6D6D 6D#, 62 U.S.L.W. 3486, 62 U.S.L.W. 3491 (U.S. Jan. 24, 1994) (No. 93-818). Because the state has not waived Eleventh Amendment immunity, Piedmont is immune from § 1981 and breach of contract liability.

Further, the district court properly granted summary judgment on Parks's Title VII claim because he failed to show that Piedmont inten- tionally discriminated against him. An employer can rebut a claim- ant's Title VII prima facie case by presenting a non-discriminatory reason for taking its challenged action. Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 227, 230-31 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 892 (1981). The claimant may still succeed, though, if he presents evidence that the employer's

2 proffered reason is merely a "pretext" for intentional discrimination. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981). The claimant must show both that the employer's proffered reason is false and that the employer intended to discriminate against him by taking the challenged action. Jiminez v. Mary Washington College, 57 F.3d 369, 378 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 64 U.S.L.W. 3311, and 64 U.S.L.W. 3316 (U.S. Oct. 30, 1995) (No. 95- 396) (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, ___ U.S. ___, 61 U.S.L.W. 4782 (U.S. June 25, 1993) (No. 92-602)).

Parks's claim fails because he did not show that Piedmont inten- tionally discriminated against him. Piedmont presented evidence that Parks's dismissal was motivated by his unsatisfactory performance. Parks then merely rebutted this claim by arguing that his performance was satisfactory; he failed to present any evidence that Piedmont intentionally discriminated against him.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's orders. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are ade- quately presented in the material before the court and argument would not aid the decision process.

AFFIRMED

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