Parks v. Hughes

82 So. 202, 145 La. 221, 1919 La. LEXIS 1706
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedMay 5, 1919
DocketNo. 23165
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 82 So. 202 (Parks v. Hughes) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Parks v. Hughes, 82 So. 202, 145 La. 221, 1919 La. LEXIS 1706 (La. 1919).

Opinions

DAWKINS, J.

This is a suit by the receivers of the Interstate Oil, Gas & Development Company to enjoin executory proceedings in the matter of Morris J. Samuels and others against the said company, and to annul the mortgage and bonds upon which the said process issued. Plaintiffs allege that the said mortgage and bonds were fraudulently issued, and were without consideration to the knowledge of the plaintiffs in writ. Then follows a detailed recital of the history of the company and its affairs. They further alleged that certain individuals, assuming to act for the company, though never having been elected in fact or in law had pretended to authorize and execute said mortgage and bonds; that, in truth and in fact, said bonds and mortgage had been drawn up and signed by said individuals, pretending to act as officers of said company as aforesaid at different times and places, out of the presence of the witnesses and notary, and that same were not authentic; that C. L. Darrah, a stockholder, director, held manager, and treasurer of the company, had obtained from one Geo. W. Hurdle a lease upon a certain 80 acres of land near that of the said company for the price of $200, which was paid through said officer and agent; that title to said land was taken in the name of said Darrah, and that subsequently, through fraud and collusion with [223]*223other officers,, agents, and directors of the company, Darrah attempted to sell the said property to the company for a price of $8,000; that at said time the company was “almost insolvent,” due to the fraud and mismanagement of the said Darrah and its general manager, R. M. Chisholm, together with other agents and officers thereof, who had paid themselves exorbitant salaries and fees, without any corresponding benefit to the company, and who had sold its stock at an enormous discount, paying large commissions and fees thereon, in violation of law and the charter rights of the stockholders; that in the fraudulent scheme by which Darrah acquired and attempted to sell to the company the aforesaid land it was understood with his coconspirators that he should receive $4,000 in cash, and the balance in the first mortgage gold bonds of the company, but that instead he was given and received $8,000 of said bonds; and that said bonds and mortgage were null and void for the reason that the said Darrah was acting for the company in the purchase of said property, and could not enrich himself at its expense through said fraudulent schemes on the part of himself and the other officers and agents of the company. The receivers further allege that after said fraudulent transaction was discovered by the .stockholders, the said Darrah and others pretended to make a retrocession of the said bonds to the said company; but, in truth and in fact, instead of returning the said $8,000, worth of bonds as promised, he returned stock of the company, and later negotiated said bonds to the plaintiffs in writ, who were legally charged with, and who in fact had, full knowledge of all of the matters and things complained of. They further allege that the said bonds were not negotiable under the laws of this state, and that the said plaintiffs in writ were merely the agents and instrumentalities through which the said Darrah, Chisholm, and others were attempting to acquire all of the property and assets of the company to the serious injury and detriment of the other stockholders.

In the alternative, the receivers further allege that, if the bonds and mortgage should be held to be valid, the suit to foreclose thereon was premature, in that only the coupons maturing January 1, 1917, had become due, and that, under the terms of the mortgage, neither bonds nor coupons were to become exigible until said coupons were past due as much as a year; that said officers and individuals, knowing that receivers had been appointed, acting in collusion with plaintiffs in writ, withdrew all of the funds of the company from bank just before said appointment, and paid to themselves fees and salaries, leaving no funds with which to pay said coupons, and with the understanding on the part of plaintiffs that they should foreclose, hoping thereby to “freeze out” the other stockholders and to reorganize the company for their own benefit, as they had privately announced. They allege further in the alternative that the seizure was excessive, because the bonds do not mature until 1922; that, i,f it should be found that plaintiffs are entitled to foreclose, the process should be confined to the naked realty, for the reason that the movables were not covered by the mortgage or subject to seizure.

•They prayed for judgment appropriate to the allegations of their petition.

Defendants first filed an exception of no cause of action, which was overruled, and they answered, denying the allegations of the petition, except as to the seizure. They further averred that they were the owners and holders of the said bonds, for a valuable consideration before maturity, and that they were in every way valid and due; that, if it should be found that they were not due on [225]*225their faces, then the same were due because “said company has become insolvent and a forced cession of its property has been made by said company, and receivers have been appointed to take charge of the property,” and for the further reason that “all of the property, rights, and credits of said company had been sequestered in the suit of Hickman Crawford Drilling Co. v. Interstate Oil, Gas. & Development Co. (No. 21974),” and, because of the fact that the property and assets of the company were becoming worthless, it was necessary to foreclose in order to secure payment of said indebtedness.

Defendants prayed that the injunction be dissolved, and for $1,000 as damages for attorney’s fees.

On February 25, 1918, a plea of estoppel was filed, presumably in the clerk’s office, for we find no mention thereof in the minutes of that date, in which it is set out that—

“Inasmuch as the receivers herein are suing as representatives of the Interstate Oil, Gas & Development Company, a corporation, and are seeking to exercise rights belonging to said corporation, * * * they are now estopped to attack the acts of said corporation performed by it in the exercise of its control and management of its affairs. * * * ”.

After a trial on the merits, the lower court sustained the plea of estoppel, and the plaintiffs have appealed.

Opinion.

The Interstate Oil, Gas & Development Company was organized in 1912, with a capital stock of $60,000, and shortly thereafter acquired from R. M. Chisholm and W. L. Wright certain small tracts of land in the oil fields of Caddo parish for the price and sum of $24,000, of which $10,000 was paid in cash, and for the balance they received stock in the company amounting to $14,000. Thereafter Wright sold another small tract to the company for $10,000, $7,000 of which was paid cash, and the remainder, $3,000, was also represented by stock in the company. The balance of the stock was sold, mostly in small lots or blocks, to various persons in Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, and elsewhere. L. S. Boudreaux became president, Horace Rutherford, vice president, M. H. Morrill, secretary, Chas. H. Darrah, treasurer and field manager, and R. M. Chisholm, general manager. Subsequently the capital was raised to $100,000, and later it was increased to $200,000.

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Bluebook (online)
82 So. 202, 145 La. 221, 1919 La. LEXIS 1706, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/parks-v-hughes-la-1919.