Parkleigh Fashions, Inc. v. Porter

157 F.2d 599, 1946 U.S. App. LEXIS 2756
CourtEmergency Court of Appeals
DecidedOctober 22, 1946
DocketNo. 309
StatusPublished

This text of 157 F.2d 599 (Parkleigh Fashions, Inc. v. Porter) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Emergency Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Parkleigh Fashions, Inc. v. Porter, 157 F.2d 599, 1946 U.S. App. LEXIS 2756 (eca 1946).

Opinion

McAllister, judge.

This case is concerned with Revised Maximum Price Regulation 287,1 and arises out of the denial by the Administrator of a petition for a retroactive order permitting complainant to add a selling price line to its Spring Pricing Chart.

[600]*600Complainant, a manufacturer of women’s apparel, filed an application in February 1945, under Section 14(b) of the above named regulation, asking for permission to include a group of suits priced at $22.75 in the .selling price lines as shown by its Spring Pricing Chart. Pricing charts, selling price lines, and the price line provisions under which sellers are authorized to sell garments, are all defined and set forth in Maximum Price Regulation 287,2' and Revised Maximum Price Regulation 287, already mentioned; and have been heretofore discussed in various cases by this court. See Mevorah v. Bowles, Em.App., 1945, 151 F.2d 766. It may here be observed, however, that prices for women’s and misses’ coats and suits, and for all other women’s, misses’, and children’s outer apparel are regulated by the revised maximum price regulation above mentioned.

In accordance with the regulation, manufacturers of the above garments are required to file a Spring Pricing Chart, and may also file a Fall Pricing Chart. In the. chart, the different kinds of garments are, classified in categories, and the prices are listed at which such garments were delivered during the spring base period of March 1942, or the fall base period — from July to November 1942. A manufacturer cannot make a sale 'during any spring or fall season at a price higher than the highest price for any category set forth in the chart for such seasons. The highest prices at which garments in each category were delivered during the base period, are the “ceiling prices” for all deliveries during the respective subsequent seasons.

Complainant filed a Spring Pricing Chart in 1943, showing certain categories and prices. One of these was “Category No. 7” for suits. The Spring Pricing Chart recited that the highest selling price for a spring suit in that category — or the “selling price line” therefor, was $16.75; the Fall Pricing Chart listed the price for a fall suit in “Category No. 7,” as $22.75.

In February 1945, complainant discovered that it had made a mistake in its Spring Pricing Chart, and that it should have included as a listed selling price therein in Category No. 7, spring suits at $22.-75 — which happened also to be the same price which it had listed for suits in Category No. 7 of its Fall Pricing Chart. Accordingly, on February 10, 1945, complainant filed with the New York Regional Office of Price Administration, a petition to amend its Spring Pricing Chart by adding thereto the selling price line of $22.75 for spring suits in Category No. 7.

Approximately six months later, the Regional Office denied this application on the ground that the garments, delivered by complainant in March 1942, were not “suits,” within the meaning of the regulation, but, instead, coats and skirts. Complainant thereafter, on August 6, 1945, filed a protest with the Office of Price Administration, and' after the elapse of another six months, on February 1, 1946, the Administrator reversed the order of denial of the Regional Office, and held that the garments which complainant sought to include by amendment in its Spring Pricing Chart as suits in Category No. 7, were, in fact suits within the meaning of that category, and not coats and skirts, and should properly be listed1 thereunder. He also found that such suits were actually delivered by complainant during the base period’ at a price of $22.75, and, accordingly, issued an order authorizing compláinant to amend its Spring Pricing Chart by adding thereto a selling price line, in Category No. 7, of $22.75 for suits. In other words, the Administrator found in favor of complainant on all the contested, allegations, and overruled the action of the Regional Office.

However, complainant had asked that the order authorizing the addition to its Spring Pricing Chart of suits in Category No. 7, at $22.75, be given effect retroactively from the time that complainant had filed its petition to add the category in question to its pricing chart. This, the Administrator denied, and ten days after the filing of his order and decision, an action for treble damages, in accordance with the price control statute, was commenced against complainant for sales at the price finally authorized — which complainant had made be[601]*601tween February 14, 1945 and July 1, 1945 (the spring period immediately subsequent to the filing of the application to amend the pricing chart).

Complainant argues that the Administrator should have made his order permitting the addition of the price line, retroactive, and, also that the provision of the regulation which prohibits sales in accordance with an amended pricing chart until acknowledgment and authorization are received by the seller from the Price Administrator, is arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law.

The Administrator held that the language of Section 14 of the regulation reveals the Administrator’s purpose to restrict relief accorded thereunder to prospective relief, and that Section 14(a) “forbids the use of a corrected spring price chart until ‘correction thereunder has been authorized, and until the manufacturer has received an acknowledgment from the Office of Price Administration of the receipt of the corrected pricing chart.’ ” 3

Complainant seeks relief on the ground that the Price Administrator could have granted retrospective relief; that his interpretation of the regulation was arbitrary, capricious, and incorrect; that, if the interpretation of the Administrator was correct, then the provisions of Section 14 (a) and (b) of the regulation which prohibit use of the Amended Pricing Chart, until acknowledgment and authorization are received by a petitioner, are arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law.

We have no doubt that in proper cases, the Administrator may grant retrospective relief. In Thomas Paper Stock Company v. Bowles, Em.App., 1945, 148 F.2d 831, 841, this court said that while a protest [602]*602proceeding must be primarily directed toward securing prospective relief against the provision of the regulation or order alleged to be invalid by its modification or rescission, “the protestant may ask to have that relief made retroactive, and the Administrator may grant his request. If upon such a request the Administrator should refuse to give retroactive relief even though giving relief for the future his action would be a partial denial of the protest which would open the way for the filing of a complaint under Section 204(a) upon which we would be empowered to grant retroactive relief by way of a declaratory judgment. Accordingly in this class of cases retroactive relief may be obtained from the Administrator upon a proper showing in a protest proceeding or, if he denies it, such relief may be obtained from this court in a proceeding under Section 204(a).”

See also Dur-Lite Pencil Co., 1 OPA Op. and Dec. 196, where, in a case in which a protestant sought an upward adjustment in price, the Administrator declared that “most exceptional circumstances” constituted the basis for retroactive relief. See also Universal Sewer Pipe Corp., 4 OPA Op. and Dec.

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Related

Thomas Paper Stock Co. v. Bowles
148 F.2d 831 (Emergency Court of Appeals, 1945)
Mevorah v. Bowles
151 F.2d 766 (Emergency Court of Appeals, 1945)

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Bluebook (online)
157 F.2d 599, 1946 U.S. App. LEXIS 2756, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/parkleigh-fashions-inc-v-porter-eca-1946.