Parkison v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co.

57 P.2d 1216, 56 Idaho 610, 1936 Ida. LEXIS 76
CourtIdaho Supreme Court
DecidedApril 29, 1936
DocketNo. 6310.
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 57 P.2d 1216 (Parkison v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Idaho Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Parkison v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 57 P.2d 1216, 56 Idaho 610, 1936 Ida. LEXIS 76 (Idaho 1936).

Opinions

MORGAN, J.

May 13, 1932, William T. Parkison, employed by Anaconda Copper Mining Company, hereinafter called the company, as a chemist at its mine at Conda, made an analysis of a sample of ore from the mine. In doing so he placed the ore in sulphuric acid and applied heat to it by means of an electric plate, under a hood connected with a ventilator, in his employer’s laboratory. While the sample was heating he went into a room adjoining the laboratory *612 where he remained about fifteen minutes talking to his assistant. He then opened the door into the laboratory room, which had filled with sulphuric acid gas. Immediately after Parkison entered the room his assistant saw him coming out on his hands and knees, coughing violently. The assistant helped him to his feet and into the open air. This occurred between three and four o’clock in the afternoon. Parkison did not appear to have suffered any serious injury from the gas and went home about four o’clock. He worked at his regular employment during a part of May 14, and the record is not clear as to whether he quit during the day because he was not feeling well or whether he had finished the performance of his duties. The work at which he was employed was discontinued on that day and he did no more work for the company thereafter. June 21, 1933, Parkison died, and his widow, appellant herein, filed a claim with the industrial accident board against the company and State Insurance Fund, its surety, for an award of compensation provided for by I. C. A. 43-1101, a section of the workmen’s compensation law. Hearing was had and resulted in an order by the board denying compensation. Appeal to the district court resulted in judgment affirming , the order and the case is here on appeal from the judgment.

In September, 1930, Parkison, while employed by the company, in its laboratory, was severely injured by an explosion of nitric-hydrochloric acid. He made claim for compensation which was allowed and was settled by agreement between the parties. The agreement was approved by the industrial accident board and compensation for that injury is not involved in this ease.

The only material conflict in the evidence consists of difference of opinion of expert witnesses as to whether Parkison’s contact with sulphuric acid gas on May 13, 1932, caused his death. Bach party litigant produced two physicians as witnesses. One of those called on behalf of appellant testified he treated Parkison for his injury of 1930, but did not treat him for that of May 13, 1932; that he commenced treating him again in March, 1933, and his condition was such as a man would be suffering from who had inhaled quantities *613 of sulphuric acid gas; that he saw the patient, from time to time, until he died. He further testified:

“Q. From your experience as a physician and surgeon and your number of years practice, as you have stated, what is your opinion as to whether this man died from the effects of breathing sulphuric acid fumes into his lungs or not?
“A. It could be all right.”

On cross-examination:

“Q. Doctor, do you mean to say that you know, that you want to state as a physician and surgeon that it is your opinion that this man died because he had inhaled some gas on May 13, 1932'?
“A. Not-necessarily. I know he died from the condition of his lungs, and if he had an injury in 1932 it would aggravate it and probably could cause it.
“Q. Could cause it?
“A. Yes.
‘ ‘ Q. That is about as close as you could say, doctor ?
“A. That is all I could say.”

Evidence of that character is insufficient to prove death was due to the accidental injury relied on by appellant as a basis of claim for compensation. (Larson v. Ohio Match Co., 19 Ida. 511, 289 Pac. 992.)

June 3, 1932, Parkison filed claim for compensation for his injury alleged to have been incurred by contact with gas on May 13, of that year. In his claim he stated the injury consisted of “corrosion of membranes in nose and throat.” Upon that claim he was paid compensation for disability during a period of ten weeks and three days. The other doctor called as a witness by appellant made the attending physician’s report in support of Parkison’s claim. Therein the following questions and answers appear:

“1. Date of injury? 5/13/32. Date of first treatment? Same.
“3. Give an accurate description of the nature and extent of the injury? Acid burn of the lungs and upper air passages also of the face.
“8. Describe the treatment fully? Rest, morph, for pain, inhalations of medicated vapors.”

That physician testified on direct examination:

*614 “A. If I recall rightly, I took care of Mr. Parkison for the second accident, but I saw him in consultation with Dr. TigerV and he called at the office several times, but I don’t believe I took care of Mr. Parkison in the first accident.....
“Q. Did you make any examination immediately after May 13, 1932, immediately after this second accident?
“A. Yes, he was under my care.
“Q. Now, with respect to this first examination that you made after that second accident, what did you find there with reference to his lungs, if anything?
“A. He scarcely had any lung tissues left, practically none. Eight from the start he seemingly didn’t use his lungs to breathe. He used the accessory muscles, these here (point-, ing). Instead of expanding his chest outwards like this (illustrating) he did this way (illustrating). He would use his shoulder, the accessory muscles, in breathing.
“Q. Did you notice any change in reference to that method of breathing from the first time you saw him or not?
“A. Oh, yes, he never breathed that way before. He breathed practically natural before.”
He testified on cross-examination:
“Q. And you attributed his death a year and a month or a little over after the 13th of May, 1932, directly to the breathing of sulphuric acid on May 13, 1932?
“A. I do.
“Q. You don’t attribute it to the first accident at all?
“A. I think the first accident lowered this man’s vitality, lowered his lung capacity more than half, but he was getting along on a half a lung pretty well and probably could have lived quite a while on half a lung. A great many people in the world are living on probably less than half a lung, but now a man that is living on a half a lung or small amount of lung tissue is not able to go out and do physical hard work. ’ ’

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Bluebook (online)
57 P.2d 1216, 56 Idaho 610, 1936 Ida. LEXIS 76, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/parkison-v-anaconda-copper-mining-co-idaho-1936.