Parker v. Westover

144 F. Supp. 933, 50 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 453, 1956 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2879
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedJune 15, 1956
DocketNos. 13391, 13392
StatusPublished

This text of 144 F. Supp. 933 (Parker v. Westover) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Parker v. Westover, 144 F. Supp. 933, 50 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 453, 1956 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2879 (S.D. Cal. 1956).

Opinion

YANKWICH, Chief Judge.

The above entitled cause heretofore tried, argued and submitted is now decided as follows:

Judgment will be for the defendant, that the plaintiff take nothing by the complaint.

Costs to the defendant. Findings and judgment to be prepared by counsel for the defendant under local Rule 7.

Comment

This is another family partnership case in which plaintiff seeks to recover income taxes for the fiscal years ending October 31, 1945, 1946, 1947 and 1948. A case involving the tax for the fiscal year ending October 31, 1944, decided by a jury against the taxpayer, was affirmed on appeal. Parker v. Westover, 9 Cir., 1950, 186 F.2d 49.

When the present case first came before me, on being informed that no new facts existed for the years under consideration, I sustained ‘without the taking of any testimony’ the plea of the Government that the judgment as to the year 1944 was res judicata. That ruling was reversed on appeal. Parker v. Westover, 9 Cir., 1955, 221 F.2d 603. The case has now been tried and the facts fully presented and argued. They appear in the Findings printed as Appendix A, at the end of this opinion.

There is a tendency in some Courts of Appeals to assume that because of the liberalization of the rule of partnerships contained in the 1951 Amendment to § 191 of the Internal Revenue Code, Internal Revenue Act of 1951, § 340(a), (b) and (c), 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 191, 3797(a) (2), questions relating to partnerships coming into existence before the effective date of that Amendment shall be treated by the same criteria which the Amendment set forth. Alexander v. Commissioner, 5 Cir., 1952,194 F.2d 921; Parker v. Westover, 9 Cir., 1955, 221 F.2d 603, 606-607. However, the Congress, itself, in enacting the more liberalized rule, stated specifically:

“The determination as to whether a person shall be recognized as a partner for income tax purposes for any taxable year beginning before January 1, 1951, shall be made as if this section had not been enacted and without inferences drawn from the fact that this section is not expressly made applicable with respect to taxable years beginning before January 1, 1951.” § 340(c), 26 U.S.C.A. § 191 note. (Emphasis added.)

So we are back to the general criteria laid down by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. [935]*935Culbertson, 1949, 337 U.S. 733, 742-743, 69 S.Ct. 1210, 1214, 93 L.Ed. 1659:

“The question is not whether the services or capital contributed by a partner are of sufficient importance to meet some objective standard supposedly established by the Tower case, but whether, considering all the facts — (1) the agreement, (2) the conduct of the parties in execution of its provisions, their statements, the testimony of disinterested persons, (3) the relationship of the parties, (4) their respective abilities and capital contributions, (5) the actual control of income and the purposes for which it is used, and (6) any other facts throwing light on their true intent — the parties in good faith and acting with a business purpose intended to join together in the present conduct of the enterprise. There is nothing new or particularly difficult about such a test. Triers of fact are constantly called upon to determine the intent with which a person acted.” (Numbering added).

As stated at the conclusion of the trial, the taxpayer in this case has shown fairness in dealing with the income allocated to the minor children in the partnership. On the whole, however, I am satisfied that if we apply the six criteria laid down in the Culbertson case, the conclusion must be that the partnership was not created to fulfill any legitimate business purpose, that the business continued to be controlled by the parents who created it, and that, despite compliance with state law and periodical reports of the father, as guardian, the partnership, cannot, for tax purposes, be considered as entered into in good faith. See, Schlobohm v. United States, D.C.1952, 105 F.Supp. 593; Helvering v. Clifford, 1950, 309 U.S. 331, 60 S.Ct. 554, 84 L.Ed. 788; Toor v. Westover, 9 Cir., 1953, 200 F.2d 713; Snyder v. Westover, 9 Cir., 1954, 217 F.2d 928, 935.1

Hence the ruling above made.

Appendix A

Findings and Judgment

The above-entitled cases were consolidated for trial and came on regularly for hearing before the Court without the intervention of the jury on May 1, 1956, and trial was concluded on May 3, 1956, the Honorable Leon Yankwich, Chief Judge, presiding. Plaintiffs were represented by their counsel, Musick, Peeler and Garrett through Melvin D. Wilson and John P. Pollack and the defendants were represented by their counsel, Laughlin E. Waters, United States Attorney for the Southern District of California, Edward R. McHale, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Tax Division, Robert H. Wyshak, Assistant United States Attorney, and Sidney J. Machtinger, Attorney, Internal Revenue Service. The Court having heard and considered all of the evidence and having read and considered the briefs submitted by each side, makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

Findings of Fact

I

Plaintiffs Elgin R. Parker and Flo Parker are husband and wife and are residents of the State of California, [936]*936County of Los Angeles, within the jurisdiction of this Court. Plaintiffs in these actions seek refunds of income taxes paid for the calendar years 1945, 1946, 1947 and 1948, in the total amount of $282,-164.96.

II

Plaintiffs timely filed claims for refund of the taxes sought to be recovered herein and timely filed suits for refund after rejection of such claims on behalf of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

III

Since the late nineteen thirties, plaintiff Elgin R. Parker had been engaged in a business known as Southern Heater Company. This business consisted of the manufacturing and selling of gas water heaters. Commencing in November, 1942 and until October 31, 1943, this business was operated as a partnership by the plaintiffs with each of them owning a one-half interest therein.

IV

Plaintiff Flo Parker rendered no services whatsoever to this partnei'ship. Starting with little capital, plaintiff Elgin R. Parker had increased the income of the Southern Heater Company from the date of its inception in the late nineteen thirties until October 31, 1943 so that for the fiscal year ended October 31, 1943 the Southern Heater Company showed a net profit of $193,000. Plaintiffs on November 1, 1943 had four children, Flo Diane Parker, Patricia Lee Parker, Roland Tibbets Parker and Arthur Elgin- Parker, who then were 14, 11, 6 and 3 years old, respectively.

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Related

Helvering v. Clifford
309 U.S. 331 (Supreme Court, 1940)
Commissioner v. Culbertson
337 U.S. 733 (Supreme Court, 1949)
Parker v. Westover
186 F.2d 49 (Ninth Circuit, 1950)
Alexander v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
194 F.2d 921 (Fifth Circuit, 1952)
Toor v. Westover. Toor v. Westover
200 F.2d 713 (Ninth Circuit, 1953)
Parker v. Westover
221 F.2d 603 (Ninth Circuit, 1955)
Schlobohm v. United States
105 F. Supp. 593 (S.D. California, 1952)

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144 F. Supp. 933, 50 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 453, 1956 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2879, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/parker-v-westover-casd-1956.