Parker v. O'Malley (CONSENT)

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Alabama
DecidedJuly 18, 2024
Docket2:24-cv-00007
StatusUnknown

This text of Parker v. O'Malley (CONSENT) (Parker v. O'Malley (CONSENT)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Parker v. O'Malley (CONSENT), (M.D. Ala. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA NORTHERN DIVISION TAJA PARKER, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2:24-cv-007-CWB ) MARTIN J. O’MALLEY, ) Commissioner of Social Security, ) ) Defendant. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER I. Introduction and Administrative Proceedings Taja Parker (“Plaintiff”) filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act and an application for Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act on July 29, 2021—alleging disability onset as of May 28, 2021 due to diabetes and neuropathy. (Tr. 88, 147-48, 157-58).1 The claim was denied at the initial level on March 30, 2022 and again after reconsideration on September 13, 2022. (Tr. 88, 147, 155-57, 165-67, 173-75, 186-87). Plaintiff then requested de novo review by an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (Tr. 88, 234, 247). The ALJ subsequently heard the case on April 25, 2023 (Tr. 88, 119-46), at which time testimony was given by Plaintiff (Tr. 122-40) and by a vocational expert (Tr. 141-45). The ALJ took the matter under advisement and issued a written decision on June 6, 2023 that found Plaintiff not disabled. (Tr. 88-113). The ALJ’s written decision contained the following enumerated findings: 1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through June 30, 2023.

1 References to pages in the transcript are denoted by the abbreviation “Tr.” 2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 28, 2021, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et seq.).

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: insulin dependent diabetes mellitus, hypertension, neuropathy, anemia, depression, anxiety, somatoform disorder, and substance abuse disorder (marijuana)(not material) (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a) except she can frequently push/pull with the upper and lower extremities bilaterally, but never climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds or work at unprotected heights or with hazardous machinery, nor can she engage in any job that requires commercial driving. She can frequently climb ramps and stairs, as well as occasionally balance, and she is limited to frequent stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling. She can frequently handle and finger on a bilateral basis. She should avoid concentrated exposure [to] extreme cold, extreme heat, wetness, and vibration. She can frequently interact and respond appropriately with supervisors and coworkers and can frequently do so with customers and members of the general public. She can respond appropriately to work pressures in the usual work setting and to changes in a routine work setting if gradually introduced. She can use judgment in simple work-related decisions. She can understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions.

6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565 and 416.965).

7. The claimant was born on May 25, 2000 (Ex. B2D) and was 21 years old, which is defined as a younger individual age 18-44, on the alleged disability onset date (20 CFR 404.1563 and 416.963).

8. The claimant has at least a high school education (Ex. B1E) (20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964).

9. Transferability of job skills is not an issue in this case because the claimant’s past relevant work is unskilled (20 CFR 404.1568 and 416.968).

10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform (20 CFR 404.1569, 404.1569a, 416.969, and 416.969a).

11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from May 28, 2021, through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)).

(Tr. 90, 91, 92, 96, 111, 112, 113). On November 3, 2023, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review (Tr. 1-6), thereby rendering the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. See, e.g., Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). Plaintiff now asks the court to reverse the final decision and remand the case for a new hearing and further consideration. (Doc. 10 at p. 12). As contemplated by 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties have consented to the exercise of full jurisdiction by a United States Magistrate Judge (Docs. 6 & 7), and the court finds the case ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) & 1383(c)(3) in that the court construes Plaintiff’s supporting brief (Doc. 10) as a motion for summary judgment and the Commissioner’s opposition brief (Doc. 11) as a competing motion for summary judgment. Upon consideration of the parties’ submissions, the relevant law, and the record as a whole, the court concludes that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is due to be denied, that the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment is due to be granted, and that the final decision is due to be affirmed. II. Standard of Review and Regulatory Framework The court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is a limited one. Assuming the proper legal standards were applied by the ALJ, the court is required to treat the ALJ’s findings of fact as conclusive so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997).

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Bluebook (online)
Parker v. O'Malley (CONSENT), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/parker-v-omalley-consent-almd-2024.