Parker v. City of San Diego

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: May 30, 2025
• Docket: 3:24-cv-00518
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ROBERT L. PARKER, Ph.D, Case No.: 3:24-cv-00518-JES-DDL

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO 13 v. DISMISS

14 CITY of SAN DIEGO et al., [ECF Nos. 23, 24] 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 Pending before the Court are the City of San Diego’s (“City”) and San Diego State 19 University Police Department (“SDSUPD”) officers’ (collectively, “Defendants”) Motions 20 to Dismiss Plaintiff Robert L. Parker’s (“Plaintiff”) Second Amended Complaint (“SAC,” 21 ECF No. 19). ECF No. 23 (“City Motion”); ECF No. 24 (“SDSUPD Motion”). Plaintiff 22 filed oppositions, and Defendants filed replies. ECF Nos. 25-28. On November 6, 2024, 23 the Court heard oral arguments. For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS both 24 Motions. 25 // 26 // 27 // 28 // 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 A. Procedural Background 3 On May 3, 2024, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint1 (“FAC”) alleging 4 constitutional violations for malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City, 5 SDSUPD, the Regents of California State University2 (“CSU Board”), SDSUPD Chief 6 Josh Mays (“Chief Mays”), SDSUPD Officers Jonathan Becerra (“Ofc. Becerra”), Carrie 7 Hogan (“Ofc. Hogan”), Norma Cruz (“Ofc. Cruz”), Paul McClain (“Ofc. McClain”), Traci 8 Steckler (“Ofc. Steckler”), Anthony Calvert (“Ofc. Calvert”), and Does 1-50. See ECF No. 9 10. Plaintiff also sought injunctive relief. Id. Defendants filed motions to dismiss the FAC, 10 and individual SDSUPD defendants also filed a motion for a more definite statement. ECF 11 Nos. 11, 12. On July 9, 2024, the Court: (1) granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice 12 for all federal constitutional claims against SDSUPD, CSU Board, and Chief Mays in his 13 official capacity; (2) granted the motion for a more definite statement for the first cause of 14 action against individual SDSUPD defendants; (3) denied injunctive relief without 15 prejudice; and (4) granted the City’s motion to dismiss without prejudice. ECF No. 18 16 (“Prior Order”). 17 On August 23, 2024, Plaintiff filed a SAC. ECF No. 19. On September 20, 2024, 18 Defendants moved to dismiss the SAC. ECF Nos. 23, 24. 19 B. Factual Background 20 On February 10, 2020, Plaintiff visited San Diego State University (“SDSU”) to 21 deliver a records request and an envelope to an SDSU employee at the Aztec Recreation 22 Center. SAC ¶ 8. Plaintiff contends that his presence on campus was brief, not disruptive, 23 and that “no person directed Plaintiff to leave campus.” Id. ¶ 9-10. On February 12, 2020, 24 Ofcs. Steckler and Calvert arrived at Plaintiff’s home and served him with a stay-away 25

26 1 On March 18, 2024, Plaintiff filed his original Complaint. ECF No. 1. 27 2 “Regents of California State University” does not exist, and Plaintiff intended to name “Board of 28 1 order under California Penal Code § 626.6 (“PC 626.6”), prohibiting him from returning 2 to SDSU for seven days. Id. ¶ 74; SDSUPD Mot. at 7. That day, Plaintiff emailed Chief 3 Mays stating, “I will defy your unlawful order.” SAC ¶ 75. Plaintiff alleges Chief Mays 4 then shared the email with SDSUPD officers and communicated that “Parker was to be 5 arrested if he came to campus.” Id. On February 18, 2020, Plaintiff entered SDSU and was 6 arrested by Ofcs. Cruz and McClain for violating the stay-away order. Id. ¶¶ 76, 78. On 7 June 19, 2020, the City formally charged Plaintiff with violating PC 626.6. Id. ¶ 97. 8 Plaintiff pled not guilty, and a trial date was set. Id. ¶¶ 100, 104. On March 17, 2022, 9 Plaintiff appeared for trial and the court granted the prosecutor’s request to dismiss the 10 charge. Id. ¶ 105. 11 C. Plaintiff’s Allegations 12 Generally, the SAC alleges the same constitutional violations as the FAC. See ECF 13 No. 19. SDSUPD and the CSU Board were removed as defendants, and the request for 14 injunctive relief was abandoned. Id. The City, individual SDSUPD defendants, and Doe 15 defendants remain. Id. Plaintiff alleges two causes of action: (1) Fourth and Fourteenth 16 Amendment § 1983 violations for malicious prosecution against SDSUPD officers being 17 sued in their individual capacities and Does 1-20 (collectively, “SDSUPD Defendants”), 18 and separately against Does 21-50, whom Plaintiff classifies as “Prosecutorial 19 Defendants;” and (2) Monell3 liability against the City. 20 II. LEGAL STANDARD 21 A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to 22 state a claim tests the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff’s claim. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 23 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). When ruling on the motion, the court must accept as true all well- 24 pleaded factual allegations in the complaint. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 25 555 (2007). The court need not accept as true legal conclusions cast as factual allegations. 26 27 28 1 Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 2 cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements” are insufficient to state a claim). 3 A complaint must “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 4 550 U.S. at 570. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must include non-conclusory 5 factual content. Id. at 555; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The facts and the reasonable inferences 6 drawn from those facts must show a plausible—not just a possible—claim for relief. 7 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556; Iqbal, 557 U.S. at 679; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 8 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The focus is on the complaint, as opposed to any new facts alleged 9 in, for example, the opposition to a defendant’s motion to dismiss. See Schneider v. 10 California Dep’t of Corrections, 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998), reversed and 11 remanded on other grounds as stated in 345 F.3d 716 (9th Cir. 2003). “Determining 12 whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] ... a context-specific task that 13 requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 14 557 U.S. at 679. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the defendant- 15 unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; 16 see also Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 17 The pleadings of a pro se plaintiff “must be held to less stringent standards than 18 formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) 19 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Although the pleadings are still evaluated 20 under Iqbal and Twombly, courts are obligated “to construe the pleadings liberally and to 21 afford the [pro se] petitioner the benefit of any doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks and 22 citation omitted). 23 When a court dismisses a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), it must then decide whether 24 to grant leave to amend. Federal Rule 15(a) provides that a district court should “freely 25 give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). A district court has 26 discretion to deny leave to amend when a proposed amendment would be futile. Chappel 27 v. Lab. Corp. of America, 232 F.3d 719, 725-26 (9th Cir. 2000). Dismissal without leave 28 to amend is appropriate only when the Court is satisfied that the deficiencies of the 1 complaint could not possibly be cured by amendment. Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 758 2 (9th Cir. 2003). In other words, if allowing a party to amend its pleading would be futile, 3 district courts properly decline to grant leave to amend. Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc. v. Sun 4 Microsys., Inc., 368 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 5 829, 843 (9th Cir. 1991)). 6 III. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 7 The City seeks judicial notice of three documents, each of which were attached to 8 the Declaration of Stacy J. Plotkin-Wolff (“Plotkin-Wolff Decl.”): (1) Exhibit 1, the 9 Complaint-Misdemeanor from Plaintiff’s Superior Court file dated June 19, 2020; (2) 10 Exhibit 2, the Notice to Appear from Plaintiff’s Superior Court file dated June 19, 2020; 11 and (3) Exhibit 3, ten Complaint-Misdemeanors filed in Superior Court between April 26, 12 2019, and June 3, 2020. ECF No. 24-2. Plaintiff objects to all exhibits. ECF No. 26 at 3-4. 13 Federal Rule of Evidence 201 allows a court to take judicial notice of documents 14 “whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). This includes 15 “tak[ing] judicial notice of matters of public record without converting a motion to dismiss 16 into a motion for summary judgment. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th 17 Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “But a court cannot take notice 18 of disputed facts contained in such public records.” Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 19 899 F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Lee, 250 F.3d at 689). 20 Plaintiff argues the accuracy of the City’s Exhibits is in dispute because the Superior 21 Court is “an arm of the City.” ECF No. 26 at 3. This is obviously inaccurate. The Superior 22 Court of California is an arm of the State of California, not the City.4 The accuracy of the 23 source cannot be questioned, and the documents the City requests to be noticed can be 24 accurately and readily determined. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the request for 25 judicial notice. 26 27 28 1 IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS 2 A. Plaintiff Fails to State a § 1983 Malicious Prosecution Claim 3 To state a § 1983 claim, Plaintiff must show (1) deprivation of a constitutional or 4 federal statutory right and (2) “the alleged violation was committed by a person acting 5 under the color of State law.” Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th 6 Cir. 2006). To state a malicious prosecution claim, Plaintiff must show Defendants 7 prosecuted him (1) with malice, (2) without probable cause, and (3) with the intent to deny 8 equal protection or another specific constitutional right. Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 9 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Plaintiff must also show “favorable 10 termination” of the criminal proceedings. Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 39 (2022). To 11 demonstrate favorable termination, “[P]laintiff need only show that his prosecution ended 12 without a conviction.”5 Id. “Malicious prosecution actions are not limited to suits against 13 prosecutors but may be brought . . . against other persons who have wrongfully caused the 14 charges to be filed.”6 Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1066 (citation omitted). 15 Despite construing Plaintiff’s SAC liberally, Hebbe, 627 F.3d at 342, it is beyond 16 doubt that Plaintiff cannot establish a lack of probable cause related to his prosecution for 17 violating PC 626.6. The relevant part of PC 626.6 states, “if the person willfully and 18 knowingly reenters upon the campus or facility within seven days after being directed to 19 leave, the person is guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .” The facts here, supra § I-B, are simple. 20 On February 12, 2020, Plaintiff was served with a PC 626.6 order prohibiting him from 21 entering SDSU for seven days. Plaintiff indicated a willfulness to ignore the order by 22 23 24 5 The March 17, 2022, dismissal of Plaintiff’s case demonstrates favorable termination. SAC ¶ 105. 25 6 SDSUPD Defendants incorrectly argue Plaintiff cannot recover against the non-arresting officers. 26 SDSUPD Mot. at 11; ECF No. 27 at 3. SDSUPD Defendants’ argument lacks legal authority and contradicts Ninth Circuit case law. Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1067 (Section 1983 claims may be brought against 27 “state or local officials who . . . knowingly provided misinformation to [the prosecutor] . . . or otherwise engaged in wrongful or bad faith conduct that was actively instrumental in causing the initiation of legal 28 1 emailing Chief Mays and stating, “I will defy your unlawful order.” On February 18, 2020, 2 six days later, Plaintiff knowingly entered SDSU and was arrested for violating the order. 3 Plaintiff incorrectly asserts probable cause was required for the stay-away order to 4 be issued. See SAC ¶¶ 87-90. Probable cause is the Fourth Amendment standard for an 5 arrest, whereas reasonableness is the standard under PC 626.6 (“. . . it reasonably appears 6 to the chief administrative officer . . .”). Plaintiff also incorrectly asserts SDSUPD extended 7 his campus prohibition from seven days to nine days. SAC ¶ 5. The seven-day prohibition 8 began on February 12, 2020, when Plaintiff was served with the stay-away order, not on 9 February 10, when Plaintiff’s actions at SDSU led to the order being issued. See PC 626.6. 10 Plaintiff’s allegations of why SDSUPD issued the order are immaterial here.7 There was 11 probable cause under PC 626.6 to arrest him when he “willfully and knowingly” reentered 12 SDSU within seven days. Plaintiff would have never been arrested, thus never prosecuted, 13 had he not chosen to violate the order. As such, Plaintiff fails to state a § 1983 claim for 14 malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment. 15 Plaintiff also alleges, albeit vaguely, malicious prosecution under the Fourteenth 16 Amendment. Plaintiff’s first, third, and fourth causes of action all allege “violation of 17 Plaintiff’s constitutional rights of due process under the Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth 18 Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.” SAC ¶¶ 95, 126, 135. These claims also fail because 19 “no substantive due process right exists under the Fourteenth Amendment to be free from 20 prosecution without probable cause.” Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1069 (citing Albright v. Oliver, 21 510 U.S. 266, 268, 271 (1994)). Further, Plaintiff does not state any non-conclusory facts 22 to allege violations of his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection. Thus, Plaintiff 23 fails to state a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution under the Fourteenth Amendment. 24 25 26 27 7 Plaintiff spends much of the SAC recounting irrelevant details stemming from a prior incident on March 4, 2019. Also, Plaintiff’s opposition is full of disrespectful and unnecessary ad hominem attacks on 28 1 Plaintiff fails to state a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution under either the 2 Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments against SDSUPD Defendants and Does 21-50.8 Further, 3 the Court does not believe Plaintiff can sufficiently cure the deficiencies of the SAC, 4 rendering amendment futile. Chappel, 232 F.3d at 725-26; Jackson, 353 F.3d at 758. 5 Therefore, Plaintiff’s first and fourth causes of action are DISMISSED with prejudice. 6 B. Plaintiff Fails to State a Monell Claim 7 In dismissing the FAC, the Court noted that Plaintiff’s Monell allegations were 8 conclusory, insufficient, and “must set forth some factual allegations that ‘plausibly 9 suggest an entitlement to relief’ against the City.” Prior Order at 11. Despite Plaintiff’s 10 modifications, the SAC still fails to state a Monell claim. 11 Under Monell, Plaintiff must prove: (1) he possessed and was deprived of a 12 constitutional right; (2) the City had a policy; (3) the policy amounted to deliberate 13 indifference to his constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the moving force behind the 14 constitutional deprivation. Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011). 15 Plaintiff can allege a policy in three ways: (1) the City acted based on an expressly adopted 16 official policy; (2) the City had a longstanding practice or custom; or (3) a City official 17 with “final policy-making authority” either committed the constitutional tort or ratified a 18 subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct. Gordon v. County of Orange, 6 F.4th 961, 973-74 19 (9th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 20 Plaintiff alleges “the City of San Diego had two long-standing policies9 in the filing 21 of misdemeanor complaints.” SAC ¶ 115. Policy A “allow[s] misdemeanor complaints to 22 be filed with no description of the charged criminal conduct particularized to the individual, 23 but rather only a recitation of the statute charged.” Id. Plaintiff asserts Policy A is 24

25 26 8 The Court declines to address SDSUPD Defendants’ alternative argument of qualified immunity and the City’s alternative arguments that Does 21-50 are entitled to prosecutorial or qualified immunity. 27 9 Plaintiff refers to these alleged policies as “Policy A” and “Policy B” but does not attach any official 28 1 deliberately indifferent to his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to fair notice and 2 due process. Id. at ¶ 121. Policy B “allow[s] misdemeanor complaints to be filed without 3 compliance with Cal. Penal Code § 740 [(“PC 740”)].”10 Id. at ¶ 115. Plaintiff asserts Policy 4 B allows unsigned misdemeanor criminal complaints and is deliberately indifferent to his 5 Fourth Amendment right to be charged only upon probable cause. Id. at ¶ 124. 6 Regarding Policy A, Plaintiff alleges the City’s criminal complaint filed against him 7 mostly restates PC 626.6 and does not meet Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment standards. 8 Id. at ¶¶ 111-12. First, Plaintiff incorrectly asserts the “complaint’s near-recitation of a 9 statute” is insufficient to satisfy the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of “a description of the 10 charges against him in sufficient detail to enable him to prepare his defense.” Id. (quoting 11 Gautt v. Lewis, 489 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th Cir. 2007)). To satisfy the Sixth and Fourteenth 12 Amendments, a criminal complaint must “state the elements of an offense charged with 13 sufficient clarity. . . .” Gautt, 489 F.3d at 1003-04 (internal quotation marks and citations 14 omitted). Further, “[a]n explicit citation to the precise statute at issue is best, but a brief 15 factual recitation in the [complaint] can also suffice.” Id. The City explicitly cited PC 626.6 16 when filing Plaintiff’s criminal complaint, thus satisfying the Sixth and Fourteenth 17 Amendments. See Plotkin-Wolff Decl., Ex. 1. 18 Regarding Policy B, Plaintiff alleges his criminal complaint “does not have a 19 signature,” violating PC 740. On its face, Plaintiff’s argument fails because the criminal 20 complaint was signed. See Plotkin-Wolff Decl., Ex. 1. To combat this inconvenient fact, 21 Plaintiff argues “a squiggle of ink unrecognizable as a signature, and no printed name” 22 does not qualify as a signature. SAC ¶ 117; see also ECF No. 26 at 3. This is incorrect. A 23 signature is “[a] person’s name or mark written by that person or at the person’s direction.” 24 Signature, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024). Legibility is not a requirement. 25 26 27 10 PC 740 states, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, all misdemeanors and infractions must be prosecuted by written complaint under oath subscribed by the complainant. Such complaint may be 28 1 ||More importantly, Plaintiff does not offer legal authority nor state non-conclusory facts 2 ||explaining how Policy B, alleged non-compliance with PC 740, constitutes deliberate 3 || indifference under the Fourth Amendment. 4 Even if Plaintiff could sufficiently allege the existence of Policy A and Policy B for 5 || Monell purposes, he cannot demonstrate how those alleged policies deprived him of a 6 || constitutional right. Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 900. As the Court previously explained, supra 7 ||$ IV-A, Plaintiff also cannot state a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution. By failing to 8 ||sufficiently allege any constitutional deprivation, Plaintiff fails to state a Monell claim 9 || against the City. The Court does not believe Plaintiff can cure these deficiencies, so further 10 ||amendment is futile. Therefore, Plaintiff's third cause of action is DISMISSED with 11 || prejudice. 12 Vv. CONCLUSION 13 After due consideration and for the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS 14 || Defendants’ motions to dismiss with prejudice. 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 7 Dated: May 30, 2025 “| ape SE comeaors 4, 18 Honorable James E. Sunmons Jr. 19 United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28