Parker Oil Co. v. Smith

Court of Appeals of North Carolina

Parker Oil Co. v. Smith

237 S.E.2d 882, 34 N.C. App. 324, 1977 N.C. App. LEXIS 1670

CourtCourt of Appeals of North Carolina

DecidedOctober 19, 1977

Docket763DC1024

StatusPublished

Cited by10 cases

This text of 237 S.E.2d 882 (Parker Oil Co. v. Smith) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Parker Oil Co. v. Smith, 237 S.E.2d 882, 34 N.C. App. 324, 1977 N.C. App. LEXIS 1670 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977).

Pincite

Opinion

ARNOLD, Judge.

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment against defendant Smith. However, that question is not before us. A motion for summary judgment is simply a pretrial motion. Denial of a motion for summary judg *325 ment does not determine the merits of the case. It merely means that the case proceeds to trial. Annot. 15 A.L.R. 3d 899 (1967).

Denial of a motion for summary judgment ordinarily does not affect a substantial right so that appeal may be taken from the interlocutory order. See, e.g. Stonestreet v. Motors, Inc., 18 N.C. App. 527, 197 S.E. 2d 579 (1973). In Motyka v. Nappier, 9 N.C. App. 579, 176 S.E. 2d 858 (1970), this Court properly dismissed an attempted appeal from the denial of a motion for summary judgment. However, dictum at p. 582 of Motyka (176 S.E. 2d at 859), that the moving party is free to preserve his exception to the denial of a motion for summary judgment for consideration on appeal from final judgment, should be disregarded.

In this case, no error is assigned to any part of the trial which resulted in a jury verdict and judgment against the appellant. Judgment is therefore

Affirmed.

Judges Parker and Martin concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

ARNOLD, Judge.

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment against defendant Smith. However, that question is not before us. A motion for summary judgment is simply a pretrial motion. Denial of a motion for summary judg *325 ment does not determine the merits of the case. It merely means that the case proceeds to trial. Annot. 15 A.L.R. 3d 899 (1967).

Denial of a motion for summary judgment ordinarily does not affect a substantial right so that appeal may be taken from the interlocutory order. See, e.g. Stonestreet v. Motors, Inc., 18 N.C. App. 527, 197 S.E. 2d 579 (1973). In Motyka v. Nappier, 9 N.C. App. 579, 176 S.E. 2d 858 (1970), this Court properly dismissed an attempted appeal from the denial of a motion for summary judgment. However, dictum at p. 582 of Motyka (176 S.E. 2d at 859), that the moving party is free to preserve his exception to the denial of a motion for summary judgment for consideration on appeal from final judgment, should be disregarded.

In this case, no error is assigned to any part of the trial which resulted in a jury verdict and judgment against the appellant. Judgment is therefore

Affirmed.

Judges Parker and Martin concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

237 S.E.2d 882, 34 N.C. App. 324, 1977 N.C. App. LEXIS 1670, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/parker-oil-co-v-smith-ncctapp-1977.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack