AFFIRM; Opinion issued November 7, 2012
In The (Luurt uf ipiit FjffIi Jiitrirt nf CXLii tt 1a11u No. 05-11-00779-CR
MICHAEL JOSEPH PARKER, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 3 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F10-52232-J
OPINION Before Justices Morris, Francis, and Murphy Opinion By Justice Morris
A jury convicted Michael Joseph Parker of murdering his girlfriend. In two points of error,
appellant complains that the trial court erred in submitting an improper charge to the jury and the
evidence against him is legally insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The deceased’s body was discovered in a motel room that she had been sharing with
appellant. She was found face-down on the motel room floor in a pool of blood. The motel manager
testified that, before the body was discovered, appellant behaved strangely when the manager went
to appellant’s room to collect his weekly rent. Approximately one day later, the manager Ibund the deceased’s body when he noticed appellant’s truck was not in the motel parking lot and went to clean
the room.
Appellant’s friend and drug dealer, Jared Kimmons, testified that appellant had called him
about visiting Kimmons at his apartment. Kimmons noticed appellant was ranting, making odd
noises, and sounding like he did not have control over himself. Appellant called Kimmons back and
told him he could not find Kiminons’s apartment. Kimmons attributed appellant’s odd behavior to
extreme intoxication, which Kimmons had observed in appellant before. Kimmons met with
appellant in a restaurant parking lot to drive him to his apartment. Appellant was wearing only boxer
shorts, in the middle of winter. F-Ic was behaving strangely.
At the apartment. appellant made noises like he was having a panic attack. lie told Kimmons
he needed a gun because the deceased’s husband was out of prison and the deceased was missing.
Then he said he needed Kimmons’s help getting rid of the deceased’s body. After he had slept for
about an hour, appellant woke up and started screaming at the top of his lungs that his life was over.
He told Kimmons that he had hit the deceased in the head. This concerned Kimmons because
appellant previously had hit the deceased in the head.
Appellant’s odd behavior escalated so much that Kimmons called 911. Appellant appeared
to be very intoxicated. He had ingested vodka and cocaine from Kimmons. Kimmons claimed he
told police officers who arrived for the 911 call what appellant had said about the deceased.
According to Kimmons. the officers did not take him seriously. The officers who responded to the
911 call, however, testified that Kimmons never said anything about a possible murder. Kimmons
testified that although he was currently injail, he had not received any kind of deal for his testimony.
The deceased’s body was discovered the day after appellant was taken to a psychiatric
hospital. Police then arrested appellant at the psychiatric hospital. After determining that appellant was coherent enough to be interviewed, an officer began questioning appellant. Appellant initially
told the officer he had no idea why he was being questioned. When the ollicer asked appellant the
name of his girlfriend, appellant named onl his wift. not the deceased. He later indicated that the
deceased’s husband was out of jail and that the deceased was scared of him. The deceaseds
husband, however, was still incarcerated at the time of the deceased’s murder. Appellant also told
the officer he had returned to the motel room and found the deceased’s beaten-up body. He never
confessed to murdering the deceased. In recorded phone calls appellant made fromjail, he indicated
that the deceased had punched him in the face while he was driving and that he had just “lost it.”
He claimed that the deceased had jumped from his truck. He stated that he had lost his mind and that
he could not believe he “did something like that.”
The deceased’s autopsy showed that she had suffered nine or more multiple blunt force
injuries to the head. There was some indication that she may have been strangled as well. The
deceased had several injuries to her hands, which the medical examiner testified were a “textbook
example” of evidence that she had attempted to defend herself. The medical examiner testified that
it would have been impossible for the deceased to sustain the injuries she exhibited by falling out
of or being pushed from a moving vehicle. He admitted that the deceased could have fallen out of
a vehicle moving at a slow rate of speed and then been assaulted later. He explained, however, that
simply falling out of a slow-moving vehicle would not have caused the deceased’s injuries.
The deceased was not intoxicated at the time of her death. According to the medical
examiner, the deceased probably suffered from her injuries for some time before she died, and it was
possible she would have survived had she been treated for the injuries in a hospital. The medical
examiner estimated that the deceased had died one to three days before the body was found. There
was dirt and gravel found embedded in the deceased’s right knee cap, which did not correspond with the fact that when the body was found, the lower part of the body was clothed.
Testing ol appellant’s truck revealed the deceased’s blood on the center and driver’s side
console. It appeared from the testing that someone had attempted to clean the truck’s console. The
deceased’s blood and appellant’s I)NA were also found on clothing that had been in appellant’s
truck. Presumptive blood testing showed a significant amount ofblood on the driver-side floorboard
and the presence of blood in the front passenger area. In addition, appellant’s DNA was found under
the deceased’s fingernails. No murder weapon was recovered, but the tire iron was missing from
appellant’s truck.
DISCUSSION
In his first point of error, appellant complains that the trial court erred by submitting a flawed
charge to thejury. He argues the charge should not have included a definition for “intentionally” that
included reference to “desire to engage in the conduct” or a definition for “knowingly” that included
reference to “with respect to the nature of his conduct or to the circumstances surrounding his
conduct.” He argues that such definitions were improper because murder is an offense for which the
mental state is limited to only the result of the conduct. The State concedes that these definitions
in the charge were erroneous but argues that appellant was not harmed by the error because the
application paragraph of the jury charge limited the applicable mental states to the result of the
offense — the deceased’s death.
Because appellant did not argue about any defects in the definitions of intentionally or
knowingly at trial, we may reverse for error in the definitions only if appellant was egregiously
harmed. See Ainzanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). To conduct an
egregious harm analysis, we consider the entire jury charge, the state of the evidence including any
contested issues and weight of the probative evidence, the argument of counsel, and any other relevant inlormation revealed by the record of the trial as a whole. Id.
1-lere.
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AFFIRM; Opinion issued November 7, 2012
In The (Luurt uf ipiit FjffIi Jiitrirt nf CXLii tt 1a11u No. 05-11-00779-CR
MICHAEL JOSEPH PARKER, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 3 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F10-52232-J
OPINION Before Justices Morris, Francis, and Murphy Opinion By Justice Morris
A jury convicted Michael Joseph Parker of murdering his girlfriend. In two points of error,
appellant complains that the trial court erred in submitting an improper charge to the jury and the
evidence against him is legally insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The deceased’s body was discovered in a motel room that she had been sharing with
appellant. She was found face-down on the motel room floor in a pool of blood. The motel manager
testified that, before the body was discovered, appellant behaved strangely when the manager went
to appellant’s room to collect his weekly rent. Approximately one day later, the manager Ibund the deceased’s body when he noticed appellant’s truck was not in the motel parking lot and went to clean
the room.
Appellant’s friend and drug dealer, Jared Kimmons, testified that appellant had called him
about visiting Kimmons at his apartment. Kimmons noticed appellant was ranting, making odd
noises, and sounding like he did not have control over himself. Appellant called Kimmons back and
told him he could not find Kiminons’s apartment. Kimmons attributed appellant’s odd behavior to
extreme intoxication, which Kimmons had observed in appellant before. Kimmons met with
appellant in a restaurant parking lot to drive him to his apartment. Appellant was wearing only boxer
shorts, in the middle of winter. F-Ic was behaving strangely.
At the apartment. appellant made noises like he was having a panic attack. lie told Kimmons
he needed a gun because the deceased’s husband was out of prison and the deceased was missing.
Then he said he needed Kimmons’s help getting rid of the deceased’s body. After he had slept for
about an hour, appellant woke up and started screaming at the top of his lungs that his life was over.
He told Kimmons that he had hit the deceased in the head. This concerned Kimmons because
appellant previously had hit the deceased in the head.
Appellant’s odd behavior escalated so much that Kimmons called 911. Appellant appeared
to be very intoxicated. He had ingested vodka and cocaine from Kimmons. Kimmons claimed he
told police officers who arrived for the 911 call what appellant had said about the deceased.
According to Kimmons. the officers did not take him seriously. The officers who responded to the
911 call, however, testified that Kimmons never said anything about a possible murder. Kimmons
testified that although he was currently injail, he had not received any kind of deal for his testimony.
The deceased’s body was discovered the day after appellant was taken to a psychiatric
hospital. Police then arrested appellant at the psychiatric hospital. After determining that appellant was coherent enough to be interviewed, an officer began questioning appellant. Appellant initially
told the officer he had no idea why he was being questioned. When the ollicer asked appellant the
name of his girlfriend, appellant named onl his wift. not the deceased. He later indicated that the
deceased’s husband was out of jail and that the deceased was scared of him. The deceaseds
husband, however, was still incarcerated at the time of the deceased’s murder. Appellant also told
the officer he had returned to the motel room and found the deceased’s beaten-up body. He never
confessed to murdering the deceased. In recorded phone calls appellant made fromjail, he indicated
that the deceased had punched him in the face while he was driving and that he had just “lost it.”
He claimed that the deceased had jumped from his truck. He stated that he had lost his mind and that
he could not believe he “did something like that.”
The deceased’s autopsy showed that she had suffered nine or more multiple blunt force
injuries to the head. There was some indication that she may have been strangled as well. The
deceased had several injuries to her hands, which the medical examiner testified were a “textbook
example” of evidence that she had attempted to defend herself. The medical examiner testified that
it would have been impossible for the deceased to sustain the injuries she exhibited by falling out
of or being pushed from a moving vehicle. He admitted that the deceased could have fallen out of
a vehicle moving at a slow rate of speed and then been assaulted later. He explained, however, that
simply falling out of a slow-moving vehicle would not have caused the deceased’s injuries.
The deceased was not intoxicated at the time of her death. According to the medical
examiner, the deceased probably suffered from her injuries for some time before she died, and it was
possible she would have survived had she been treated for the injuries in a hospital. The medical
examiner estimated that the deceased had died one to three days before the body was found. There
was dirt and gravel found embedded in the deceased’s right knee cap, which did not correspond with the fact that when the body was found, the lower part of the body was clothed.
Testing ol appellant’s truck revealed the deceased’s blood on the center and driver’s side
console. It appeared from the testing that someone had attempted to clean the truck’s console. The
deceased’s blood and appellant’s I)NA were also found on clothing that had been in appellant’s
truck. Presumptive blood testing showed a significant amount ofblood on the driver-side floorboard
and the presence of blood in the front passenger area. In addition, appellant’s DNA was found under
the deceased’s fingernails. No murder weapon was recovered, but the tire iron was missing from
appellant’s truck.
DISCUSSION
In his first point of error, appellant complains that the trial court erred by submitting a flawed
charge to thejury. He argues the charge should not have included a definition for “intentionally” that
included reference to “desire to engage in the conduct” or a definition for “knowingly” that included
reference to “with respect to the nature of his conduct or to the circumstances surrounding his
conduct.” He argues that such definitions were improper because murder is an offense for which the
mental state is limited to only the result of the conduct. The State concedes that these definitions
in the charge were erroneous but argues that appellant was not harmed by the error because the
application paragraph of the jury charge limited the applicable mental states to the result of the
offense — the deceased’s death.
Because appellant did not argue about any defects in the definitions of intentionally or
knowingly at trial, we may reverse for error in the definitions only if appellant was egregiously
harmed. See Ainzanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). To conduct an
egregious harm analysis, we consider the entire jury charge, the state of the evidence including any
contested issues and weight of the probative evidence, the argument of counsel, and any other relevant inlormation revealed by the record of the trial as a whole. Id.
1-lere. the application paragraph of the jury charge made clear that appellant could be thund
guilty only if the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant knowingly or intentionally
caused the deceased’s death, It is the application paragraph ofa jury charge, rather than the abstract
portion, that authorizes the jury to convict. (]renshaw v. State, No. PD-i 252-1 1, 2012 WL 4372284,
at *4 (Tex. Crim. App. Sep. 26, 2012). And we presume the jury understood and followed the
court’s charge. absent evidence to the contrary. See Id. Typically, where the application paragraph
correctly instructs thejury. any error in an abstract instruction is not egregious. See Med/na v. State.
7 S.W.3d 633. 640 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
The evidence in this case showed that the deceased’s death was caused by blunt force injuries
to her head. The defensive theories in the case were that the deceased had fallen out of appellant’s
truck or that appellant had found the deceased without causing her death or that she had hit him and
he had “lost it” hut had not intentionally or knowingly caused the death. None of these theories
allowed for a conviction whereby appellant intentionally or knowingly engaged in the conduct of
harming the deceased but did not knowingly or intentionally cause the death or where appellant was
aware of the circumstances surrounding his conduct hut did not intentionally or knowingly cause the
death. Jury argument by both sides in the case emphasized that the jury could convict appellant only
if it found that he intentionally or knowingly caused the deceased’s death. The record in this case
fails to show how appellant was harmed in any way by the trial courts failure to limit the definitions
of intentionally or knowingly to the result of the offense.
After reviewing the facts of appellant’s case under the egregious harm standard. we cannot
conclude appellant was harmed. We overrule his first point of error.
In his second point of error, appellant complains the evidence against him is legally insutTicient to support his murder conviction. He speciticallv argues the conviction was based
purely on speculation and circumstantial evidence. In reviewing a challenge to the legal
sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the evidence to determine whether any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements ofthe offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Vodochodskv v.
Stale, 158 S.W.3d 502. 509 (Tex. Crirn. App. 2005). We review all the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict and assume the trier of fact resolved conflicts in the testimony, weighed the
evidence, and drew reasonable inferences in a manner that supports the verdict. See Roilerson v.
Stale, 227 S.W.3d 718, 724 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence in appellant’s case shows the
deceased’s body was found in appellant’s motel room after appellant had been hospitalized for some
sort of mental health breakdown. Before his hospitalization, appellant had stated — among other
things — that he needed to dispose of the deceased’s body and that he had hit the deceased in the
head. The deceased’s blood was found in appellant’s truck and on clothing inside the truck.
Appellant’s DNA was found under the deceased’s fingernails, and there were defensive wounds on
the deceased’s hands. Appellant lied to police about the deceased’s incarcerated husband being out
of jail. And he admitted that the deceased had hit him and he had “lost it” and could not believe he
“did something like this.”
Circumstantial evidence can be as probative as direct evidence in establishing a defendant’s
guilt, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt. Hooper v State, 214
S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Here, the circumstantial evidence, combined with appellant’s
own admissions, is legally sufficient to support his conviction for murder. We overrule appellant’s
second point of error.
—6— We aftrm the trial courts judgment.
STICE
Do Not Publish TEx. R. App. P. 47 1 10779F.U05 rtiiirt uf ipiat Fift{! Oitrict uf xas at Jafta JUDGMENT MICHAEL JOSEPH PARKER. Appellant Appeal from the Criminal 1)istrict Court No. 3 of Dallas County. Texas. (Tr.Ct.No. Fl 0- No. 05-1 1-00779-CR V. 5232-J). Opinion delivered by Justice Morris, THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices Francis and Murphy participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered November 7, 2012.
.
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JOSE iTWMhRRlS ( _JHTICE