Parker, Jr., Richard H. v. Lancon, Donald M.

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: May 23, 2002
• Docket: 14-01-00367-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Affirmed and Opinion filed May 23, 2002

Affirmed and Opinion filed May 23, 2002.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-01-00367-CV

RICHARD H. PARKER, JR., Appellant

V.

DONALD M. LANCON, Appellee

On Appeal from the 151st District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 88-057436

O P I N I O N

This is an appeal from a postjudgment order appointing a receiver and master in chancery in a fraudulent transfer action.  Appellant, the judgment debtor below, contends the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because appellee did not have standing to pursue turnover relief.  Appellant also asserts that the underlying judgment has been satisfied and that this order resulted in a double recovery.  We find no error and affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

Appellant Richard H. Parker, Jr. challenges an order granting postjudgment relief in favor of appellee Donald M. Lancon to collect on a judgment nunc pro tunc signed on May 16, 1996 (the A1996 Judgment@).  Many years before, on December 12, 1988, Lancon obtained a judgment against Roy Robinson and others for more than $4.2 million in Cause No. 123,697, in the 56th Judicial District Court, Galveston County (Athe 1988 Galveston Judgment@).  Parker was the attorney for Robinson in that case.  After the verdict, but before entry of the judgment, Robinson transferred real property to Parker.  In an adversary proceeding related to Robinson=s bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court held the 1988 Galveston Judgment non-dischargeable.  Lancon and the Robinsons later settled.  Lancon signed a release of the 1988 Galveston Judgment on September 13, 1994.  However, thereafter, Lancon obtained the 1996 Judgment, which primarily gave Lancon three types of relief: (1) it allowed Lancon to execute on land fraudulently transferred to Parker by Robinson and his wife  shortly before entry of the 1988 Galveston Judgment; (2) it revived the 1988 Galveston Judgment; and (3) it awarded Lancon a money judgment for $350,000, representing the proceeds from the real property for the years it had been fraudulently in Parker=s possession.  The 1996 Judgment is final and subsisting.

Lancon sought postjudgment relief in his efforts to collect the 1996 Judgment.  The trial court granted his application for turnover relief, appointment of a receiver, and appointment of a master in chancery.  Parker appeals this order.  Lancon has not filed an appellate brief.

Issues Presented

Parker presents two issues: (1) whether Lancon lacks standing to pursue turnover relief; and (2) whether the trial court=s order grants Lancon a double recovery.

Standard of Review

Parker challenges the subjectCmatter jurisdiction of the trial court to issue its postjudgment order.  He argues that, because the underlying judgment was released and satisfied, Lancon lacks standing.  We determine whether the trial court lacked subjectCmatter jurisdiction under a de novo standard of review.  Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998).  Lack of subjectCmatter jurisdiction can be raised for the first time on direct appeal.  Texas Ass=n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445B46 (Tex. 1993).

Standing

We first consider Parker=s contention that Lancon does not have standing to pursue collection of the 1996 Judgment because he released the 1988 Galveston Judgment.  Standing is a prerequisite to  subjectCmatter jurisdiction, and  subjectCmatter jurisdiction is essential to a court=s power to hear a case.  Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 553B54 (Tex. 2000).  Standing implicates the trial court=s subjectCmatter jurisdiction because, under the Texas Constitution, a trial court only has the power to hear a case if an actual controversy exists.  See Tex. Ass=n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 472.  Once a court acquires subjectCmatter  jurisdiction, that jurisdiction embraces everything in the case, and every question that can be determined in the case.  Cedar Crest Funeral Home v. Lashley, 889 S.W.2d 325, 330B31 (Tex. App.CDallas 1993, no writ) (citations omitted). Conversely, if a court lacks subjectCmatter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the entire case.  Id. at 331. 

In challenging Lancon=s standing as a judgment creditor, Parker argues that, because Lancon released the 1988 Galveston Judgment, he has no standing to collect on the 1996 Judgment.  The facts in the appellate record belie this argument.  The1996 Judgment has never been released, nor has any evidence been brought forward to suggest it has been satisfied.  Moreover, under the plain language of the 1996 Judgment, the 1988 Galveston Judgment has been revived.  Lancon has standing to pursue postjudgment collection of the 1996 Judgment.  He was and is a judgment creditor under the 1996 Judgment.  Accordingly, we overrule Parker=s first issue.

Double Recovery

In his second issue, Parker argues that, when Lancon executed upon the fraudulently transferred property, he recovered more than $400,000.  As a result, Parker claims that the 1996 Judgment has been satisfied and that permitting the appointment of a receiver to marshal assets would give Lancon a double recovery.  This argument fails for several reasons.

First, Parker failed to present evidence of payment or satisfaction of the 1996 Judgment in the trial court.  We find no evidence in the record to indicate the 1996 Judgment has been satisfied.  Therefore, the trial court did not err in entering its postjudgment order.

Second, the plain language of the 1996 Judgment undercuts Parker=s double-recovery argument.  The judgment provides in pertinent part:

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the transfers of that certain real property, described in Exhibit AA@ attached hereto and any interest therein or attached thereto, from Roy B. Robinson to Richard Parker are and were void as fraudulent transfers.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that as of the date of the transfer of the real property described in Exhibit AA@ attached hereto, the real property was not homestead property of Roy B. Robinson and his wife, Kathleen L. Robinson, and that Donald M. Lancon may execute his judgment obtained against Roy B. Robinson in Cause No. 123,697, Donald M. Lancon v. Roy B. Robinson, et al; In the 56^th Judicial District Court, Galveston County, Texas against the property described in Exhibit AA@ attached hereto.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Donald M. Lancon have and recover from and against Richard Parker the sum of $350,000 as the value of the proceeds received by Richard Parker from the real property fraudulently transferred to him. 

In addition to the ability to execute on the fraudulently transferred property, Lancon received a judgment in personam for $350,000 against Parker.  Lancon was entitled to execute on the fraudulently transferred real property as well as collect an additional $350,000 from Parker, plus postjudgment interest and costs.  Lancon=s execution upon the real property in question did not result in a windfall or double recovery for Lancon.  Accordingly, we overrule Parker=s second issue.

Impermissible Collateral Attack

Parker=s arguments constitute collateral attacks on the 1996 Judgment.  AA collateral attack is an attempt to avoid the effect of a judgment in a proceeding brought for some other purpose.@  Kortebein v. American Mut. Life Ins. Co., 49 S.W. 3d 79, 88 (Tex. App.CAustin 2001, pet. denied) (citation omitted).  A collateral attack is impermissible if it is instituted to interpret a prior judgment entered by the same court or another court of coordinate jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Martin v. Dosohs I, Ltd., 2 S.W.3d 350, 352 (Tex. App.CSan Antonio 1999, pet. denied) (holding that, in Texas, a litigant may not use a declaratory judgment suit to interpret a judgment of the same or another court).  Parker may not challenge the validity of the 1996 Judgment in this postjudgment collection proceeding.  A direct appeal would have been the avenue to challenge the 1996 Judgment, and the time for that has long passed.

                                                                Conclusion

We overrule Parker=s first and second issues.  Lancon had standing to seek turnover relief, and the trial court had subjectCmatter jurisdiction to enter its order.  The 1996 Judgment has not been satisfied, and Lancon=s execution upon the real property in question did not result in a double recovery.   Accordingly, we affirm the trial court=s postjudgment order.

________________________________           

Kem Thompson Frost

Justice

Judgment rendered and Opinion filed May 23, 2002.

Panel consists of Chief Justice Brister and Justices Anderson and Frost.

Do Not Publish C Tex. R. App. P. 47.3(b).