Parker Anderson, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Brooklinen, Inc., et al.

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: December 24, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-02446
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 PARKER ANDERSON, individually and on Case No.: 25-cv-2446-RSH-KSC behalf of all others similarly situated, 12 ORDER DENYING MOTION TO Plaintiff, 13 REMAND v. 14 [ECF No. 5] BROOKLINEN, INC., et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 Pending before the Court is a motion to remand filed by plaintiff Parker Anderson. 19 ECF No. 5. As set forth below, the motion is denied. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 On November 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed this putative class action against defendant 22 Brooklinen, Inc., in the California Superior Court for the County of San Diego. ECF No. 23 1-2 (“Compl.”). The Complaint alleges as follows. Defendant markets and sells bed sheets, 24 linens, and other bedding products online through its website. Id. ¶ 2. At issue in this case 25 are products that Defendant’s website lists for sale at a price that is purportedly discounted 26 from a higher reference price—for example, a comforter listed for sale at “$199 $159.20,” 27 accompanied with the words “20% off everything”—where Defendant allegedly did not 28 actually sell that product at the higher reference price in the preceding three months. Id. ¶¶ 1 4, 21. California law provides that “[n]o price shall be advertised as a former price … 2 unless the alleged former price was the prevailing market price … within three months next 3 immediately preceding” the advertisement, or unless the date of the alleged former price is 4 clearly stated in the advertisement. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17501. Additionally, the 5 Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) prohibits false or misleading “former price 6 comparisons.” See 16 C.F.R. § 233.1. The Complaint describes Defendant as engaging in 7 a “false discount” scheme. Compl. ¶¶ 22, 23. 8 Plaintiff alleges that he bought two sheet sets from Defendant’s website that were 9 falsely advertised as being discounted from a higher reference price; that he was misled 10 into believing that the sheet sets had actually been offered at that higher reference price 11 within the preceding three months; and that he would not have purchased the products if 12 he had known that the products had not in fact been previously sold at the higher price. Id. 13 ¶¶ 25, 31–36. Plaintiff seeks to represent a putative class of “[a]ll persons residing in the 14 State of California who, during the applicable limitations period, purchased one or more 15 items from any website operated by Defendant, at a represented discount from a higher 16 reference price.” Id. ¶ 67. 17 The Complaint brings claims for: (1) violation of California’s Unfair Competition 18 Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq.; (2) California’s False Advertising Law, Cal. 19 Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17500 et seq.; and (3) California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act, 20 Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750 et seq. Id. ¶¶ 78–134. Plaintiff seeks, among other relief, restitution 21 from Defendant of all money obtained from Plaintiff and the class members as a result of 22 Defendant’s false and misleading advertising. Id. ¶¶ 97, 119. 23 Defendant asserts it was served with process on January 23, 2025. ECF No. 1 at 3.1 24 On May 30, 2025, Defendant filed a general denial and affirmative defenses in San Diego 25

26 27 1 The proof of service of summons, however, appears to indicate that Defendant was served on January 15, 2025, and that the proof of service was subsequently filed with the 28 1 Superior Court. ECF No. 1-4. 2 On September 17, 2025, Defendant filed its notice of removal. ECF No. 1. Defendant 3 asserts that this Court has original jurisdiction over this lawsuit under the Class Action 4 Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Id. at 4. 5 On October 17, 2025, Plaintiff filed his motion to remand. ECF No. 5. The motion 6 is fully briefed. See ECF Nos. 9 (opposition), 10 (reply). 7 II. LEGAL STANDARD 8 “The removal jurisdiction of the federal courts is derived entirely from the statutory 9 authorization of Congress.” Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th 10 Cir. 1979). Under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1441, “only state-court actions that originally could have 11 been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by the defendant.” Caterpillar, 12 Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); see 28 U. S. C. § 1441(a). “[R]emovability is 13 generally determined as of the time of the petition for removal[.]” Local Union 598, 14 Plumbers & Pipefitters Indus. Journeymen & Apprentices Training Fund v. J.A. Jones 15 Constr. Co., 846 F.2d 1213, 1215 (9th Cir. 1988). 16 CAFA “provides the federal district courts with ‘original jurisdiction’ to hear a ‘class 17 action’ if the class has more than 100 members, the parties are minimally diverse, and the 18 ‘matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000.’” Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. 19 Knowles, 568 U.S. 588, 592 (2013) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2), (5)(B)). “The burden 20 of establishing removal jurisdiction, even in CAFA cases, lies with the defendant seeking 21 removal.” Wash. State v. Chimei Innolux Corp., 659 F.3d 842, 847 (9th Cir. 2011). “[N]o 22 antiremoval presumption attends cases invoking CAFA.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating 23 Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014). 24 To satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement, “a removing party must initially 25 file a notice of removal that includes ‘a plausible allegation that the amount in controversy 26 exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.’” LaCross v. Knight Transp. Inc., 775 F.3d 1200, 1202 27 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 89). “[T]he defendant seeking removal 28 bears the burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount- 1 in-controversy requirement is satisfied.” Id. 2 “Generally, the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made 3 in good faith.” Lewis v. Verizon Communs., Inc., 627 F.3d 395, 399 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal 4 quotation marks omitted). “Similarly, when a defendant seeks federal-court adjudication, 5 the defendant’s amount-in-controversy allegation should be accepted when not contested 6 by the plaintiff or questioned by the court.” Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 87. However, “if 7 the plaintiff contests the defendant’s allegation ... both sides submit proof and the court 8 decides, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the amount-in-controversy 9 requirement has been satisfied.” Id. at 88. 10 “Because the Court evaluates a challenged amount-in-controversy estimate under 11 the preponderance of the evidence standard, the defendant need only establish ‘that the 12 potential damage could exceed the jurisdictional amount.’” Campbell v. Skywest Airlines, 13 Inc., No. 3:24-cv-2141 TWR (SBC), 2025 WL 720188, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2025) 14 (quoting Rea v. Michaels Stores Inc., 742 F.3d 1234, 1239 (9th Cir. 2014)). “The amount 15 in controversy is simply an estimate of the total amount in dispute, not a prospective 16 assessment of defendant’s liability.” Lewis, 627 F.3d at 400. 17 “While the defendant’s amount-in-controversy estimate must be grounded in the 18 plaintiff’s complaint, the parties’ additional evidence may include ‘affidavits or 19 declarations, or other summary-judgment-type evidence relevant to the amount-in- 20 controversy at the time of removal.’” Campbell v. SkyWest Airlines, Inc., No. 3:24-CV- 21 2141 TWR (SBC), 2025 WL 720188, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2025) (quoting Ibarra v. 22 Manheim Invs., Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2015)). 23 III. ANALYSIS 24 A. Amount in Controversy 25 Plaintiff’s motion to remand argues that Defendant has not satisfied the amount-in- 26 controversy requirement. ECF No. 5-1 at 8–10. Plaintiff asserts that “this Court’s 27 jurisdiction should not be premised by unsubstantiated say-so” contained in the notice of 28 removal, and that “[b]ecause Plaintiff contests that jurisdiction is proper, Defendant must 1 now substantiate its claim with actual data and demonstrate that CAFA’s amount in 2 controversy requirement is met.” Id. at 9. 3 In response, Defendant offers a declaration from its Chief Financial Officer, stating 4 that Defendant’s sales data demonstrates that products that were either shipped or billed to 5 a California address and sold at a discount from the list price during the class period 6 accounted for over 663,000 transactions with combined sales prices totaling over $150 7 million. ECF Nos. 9 at 11–12; 9-1 ¶¶ 7, 8. Plaintiff’s reply brief does not dispute that this 8 declaration is sufficient to establish an amount in controversy exceeding $5 million here. 9 The Court concludes that Defendant has met its burden to establish by a preponderance of 10 the evidence that the amount-in-controversy requirement is satisfied. See ECF No. 10. 11 Plaintiff’s motion also does not contest that the Complaint satisfies the other 12 requirements for jurisdiction under CAFA, namely, a class of more than 100 members, and 13 minimal diversity. The Court determines that these requirements are also met here. 14 B. Timeliness of Removal 15 Plaintiff also seeks to remand the case on the grounds that Defendant’s notice of 16 removal was untimely. ECF No. 5-1 at 5–8. “The mechanics and requirements for removal 17 are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1446.” Kuxhausen v. BMW Fin. Servs. NA Ltd. Liab. Co., 707 18 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2013). Under 18 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1), a notice of removal “shall 19 be filed within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of 20 a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or 21 proceeding is based ….” Additionally, “if the case stated by the initial pleading is not 22 removable, a notice of removal may be filed within 30 days after receipt by the defendant, 23 through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other 24 paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become 25 removable.” 18 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). 26 Plaintiff argues that “the thirty-day deadline to remove began on January 15, 2025, 27 when Defendant was served with Plaintiff’s Complaint, and Defendant was put on notice 28 by the Complaint that this case was removable under both CAFA and diversity 1 jurisdiction.” ECF No. 5-1 at 7. Plaintiff contends that the following allegations 2 collectively demonstrate, on the face of the Complaint, that the amount in controversy 3 requirement is met: “Defendant, through its website, has sold millions of units of 4 merchandise to customers in California and nationwide,” Compl. ¶ 19; “all or nearly all of 5 the reference higher prices on the website are false or misleading,” id. ¶ 7; “many, if not 6 all” of Defendant’s products are sold on its website, id. ¶ 43; and “Defendant has earned 7 millions of dollars selling products at misrepresented discounts that do not actually exist,” 8 id. ¶ 8. See generally ECF Nos. 5-1 at 6 (listing allegations in the Complaint that allegedly 9 establish removability); 10 at 4–5 (same). 10 Plaintiff’s argument that the Complaint is removable on its face is in tension with 11 Plaintiff’s separate argument, in the same motion, that the Complaint is not removable at 12 all. The Court agrees with Defendant that this action is removable, although not on the face 13 of the Complaint. The Complaint alleges that Defendant has sold millions of units of 14 merchandise on its website, including many or all of Defendant’s products; and that where 15 the website contains “reference higher prices,” all or nearly all of those prices are false or 16 misleading. But the Complaint does not set forth a basis for estimating that the amount of 17 harm suffered or that the restitution sought exceeds $5 million. The Complaint’s allegations 18 that Defendant has “millions” in unjustly received revenues, without more, does not meet 19 the threshold either. 20 Plaintiff argues, in the alternative, that the allegations in the Complaint, combined 21 with sales data outside the Complaint but within Defendant’s control, established the 22 removability of the Complaint and immediately upon service began the running of the 30- 23 day window for removal. However, this argument is precluded by the Ninth Circuit’s 24 decision in Roth v. CHA Hollywood Medical Center, L.P., 720 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2013). 25 Roth held that where an initial pleading is “indeterminate” as to removability—that is, 26 where “[i]t did not reveal on its face … that there was sufficient amount in controversy to 27 support jurisdiction under CAFA”—“a defendant does not have a duty of inquiry.” Id. at 28 1125. Roth stated that the removal statutes “permit a defendant to remove outside the two 1 thirty-day periods on the basis of its own information, provided that it has not run afoul of 2 either of the thirty-day deadlines,” id., and that “a defendant’s subjective knowledge cannot 3 convert a non-removable action into a removable one” for purposes of beginning the 30- 4 day time limits of Section 1446(b)(1) or (b)(3), id. at 1226. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit 5 recognized that “in some diversity cases, defendants will be able to take advantage” of the 6 indeterminacy of the complaint, and “may sometimes be able to delay filing a notice of 7 removal until it is strategically advantageous to do so.” Id. The Court of Appeals continued, 8 however: “Our best answer—and a likely sufficient answer—is that plaintiffs are in a 9 position to protect themselves. If plaintiffs think that the defendant might delay filing a 10 notice of removal until a strategically advantageous moment, they need only provide to the 11 defendant a document from which removability may be ascertained.” Id. The Court finds 12 unpersuasive Plaintiff’s efforts to distinguish Roth. 13 In a case decided months before Roth, the Ninth Circuit stated that the removal 14 statute “requires a defendant to apply a reasonable amount of intelligence in determining 15 removability.” Kuxhausen v. BMW Fin. Servs. NA LLC, 707 F.3d 1136, 1140 (quoting 16 Whitaker v. Am. Telecasting, Inc., 261 F.3d 196, 206 (2d Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit in 17 Kuxhausen gave, as an example of that duty, “[m]ultiplying figures clearly stated in a 18 complaint,” including multiplying the number of class members with the amount in 19 controversy for each class member. Id. at 1140. But the court added that the defendant “was 20 not obligated to supply information which [the Complaint] omitted.” Id. at 1141. The Ninth 21 Circuit reversed a district court’s determination that removal was untimely, where the 22 district court determined whether a complaint was removable by postulating an amount in 23 controversy for each class member: “Presumably, [the district court] thought that [$25,000 24 in controversy per class member] was a plausible-enough guess for a case involving 25 German luxury automobiles, perhaps doubly so since [the plaintiff’s] individual vehicle 26 contract was for more than twice that amount.” Id. The Ninth Circuit continued: 27 The fact remains, however, that we “don’t charge defendants with removability until they’ve received a paper that gives them enough 28 1 information to remove.” This principle helps avoid a “Catch-22” for defendants desirous of a federal forum. By leaving the window for removal open, it forces plaintiffs to assume the costs associated with 3 their own indeterminate pleadings. ... Thus, because nothing in [the A plaintiff's] complaint “indicate[d] that the amount demanded by each putative class member exceed[ed] $25,000” it fell short of triggering 5 the removal clock under Section 1446(b). 6 Id. (citations omitted). Although Plaintiff cites Kuxhausen in its remand motion, 7 Kuxhausen like Roth favors denial of this motion. Defendant was not, upon service of the 8 Complaint here—that was indeterminate as to removability—required to consult its sales 9 data and file its notice of removal within 30 days. Defendant’s removal was timely. 10 IV. CONCLUSION I For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion to remand [ECF No. 5] is DENIED. 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 Dated: December 24, 2025 ‘ 14 fekut ¢ Howe 15 Hon. Robert S. Huie 16 United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28