MEMORANDUM OPINION
EATON, Judge:
Before the court are the motion of plaintiff Parkdale International Ltd. (“Parkdale” or “plaintiff”) for a preliminary injunction pursuant to USCIT Rule 65(a) and the response to Parkdale’s motion of defendant the United States (“defendant”).
See
Pl.’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. (“Pl.’s Mot.”); Pl.’s Br. Supp. Mot. Prelim. Inj. (“Pl.’s Mem.”); Def.’s Resp. Pl.’s Mot. Inj. (“Def.’s Resp.”); Def.’s Suppl. Resp. Pl.’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. (“Def.’s Suppl. Resp.”). By its motion, Parkdale seeks to enjoin liquidation of its entries of certain corrosion-resistant carbon steel flat products (“CORE”) from Canada, entered on or after September 26, 2000. For the following reasons, the court finds that it has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(4) (2000)
and grants Parkdale’s motion for a preliminary injunction.
Background
Parkdale is an importer of CORE from Canada. Compl. ¶ 3. In the early 1990s, CORE was the subject of an antidumping investigation. As a result of that investigation, the United States Department of Commerce (“Commerce” or the “Department”) issued an antidump-ing duty order on CORE from Canada (the “Order”) in 1993.
See
Certain CORE and Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate From Canada, 58 Fed. Reg. 44,162 (Dep’t of Commerce Aug. 19, 1993) (an-tidumping duty order). The Order was later amended in 1995.
See
Certain CORE and Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate From Canada, 60 Fed. Reg. 49,582 (Dep’t of Commerce Sept. 26, 1995) (amended final determination).
On September 1, 1999, Commerce and the United States International Trade Commission (“ITC” or the “Commission”) commenced a “sunset review”
of the Order, and determined, respectively, that revocation of the Order was likely to lead to the continuation or recur
rence of dumping and material injury to an industry in the United States. Thus, Commerce published notice of the continuation of the Order in the Federal Register, which by its terms was effective as of December 15, 2000.
See
Continuation of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders on Certain Carbon Steel Prods, from Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom, 65 Fed. Reg. 78,469, 78,470 (Dep’t of Commerce Dec. 15, 2000) (notice).
Five years later, on November 1, 2005, Commerce and the ITC commenced the second sunset review of the Order.
See
Initiation of Five-year (“Sunset”) Revs., 70 Fed. Reg. 65,884 (Dep’t of Commerce Nov. 1, 2005) (notice). In the second sunset review, while Commerce determined that revocation of the Order would likely result in the continuation or recurrence of dumping, the ITC determined that revocation of the Order would not be likely to lead to the continuation or recurrence of material injury to a domestic industry within a reasonably foreseeable time.
See
Certain Carbon Steel Prods. From Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom, 72 Fed. Reg. 4529 (ITC Jan. 31, 2007) (final determination).
As a result, the Order was revoked.
See
19 C.F.R. § 351.218(a) (2006) (providing for revocation of an order based on a sunset review if either Commerce’s or the ITC’s determination is negative); Certain CORE from Australia, Canada, Japan, and France, 72 Fed. Reg. 7010 (Dep’t of Commerce Feb. 14, 2007) (notice of revocation) (“Revocation Notice”). In its Revocation Notice, Commerce stated that “[p]ursuant to [19 U.S.C. § 1675(d)(2)]
and 19 C.F.R. § 351.222(i)(2)(i), the effective date of revocation is December
15, 2005 (i.e., the fifth anniversary of the date of publication in the Federal Register of the notice of continuation of the [Order]).” Revocation Notice, 72 Fed. Reg. at 7011.
Parkdale then brought this action pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000).
Parkdale seeks judicial review of the effective date of the Revocation Notice and invokes the Court’s residual jurisdiction provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(4). Compl. ¶! 1, 2. Parkdale insists that the revocation of the Order should be effective as of September 26, 2000, i.e., the fifth anniversary of the September 26, 1995 amendment to the Order, not December 15, 2005, as Commerce found. Compl. ¶ 3; Pl.’s Mot. 6 n.l. By its motion, Parkdale argues that without a preliminary injunction in place during the pendency of this action its entries, that are covered in the complaint, will be subject to liquidation, which would render its underlying claim moot. Pl.’s Mot. 3. Defendant opposes Parkdale’s motion, arguing that the Court does not have jurisdiction to hear Parkdale’s underlying claim, and that, in any event, Parkdale has failed to establish that a preliminary injunction is warranted here. Def.’s Resp. 1.
Standard of Review
Parkdale bears the burden of establishing that a preliminary injunction is warranted in light of four factors: (1) the likelihood that Parkdale will succeed on the merits of its claim; (2) that Parkdale will suffer irreparable harm without therequested injunctive relief; (3) that the balance of hardships tips in Parkdale’s favor; and (4) that granting the requested relief would not be contrary to the public interest.
See FMC Corp. v. United States,
3 F.3d 424, 427 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing,
inter alia, Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States,
710 F.2d 806, 809 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). In determining whether the movant has carried its burden and satisfied the four-part test, “[n]o one factor, taken individually, is necessarily dispositive.”
Id.
Indeed, “[a]s a basic proposition, the matter lies largely within the sound discretion of the
[Court]Id.
(citations omitted).
Discussion
I. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
A. The Court Has Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(4)
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held that “[t]he question of jurisdiction closely affects the [movant]’s likelihood of
success on its motion for a preliminary injunction.”
U.S. Ass’n of Imps. of Textiles & Apparel v. United States Dep’t of Commerce,
413 F.3d 1344, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2005). In its complaint, Parkdale alleges that the Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(4) to hear its challenge to “Commerce’s implementation date of the revocation of the [Order], pursuant to the determination by the [ITC] that revocation of this antidumping duty order would not be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of material injury to the U.S. industry within a reasonably foreseeable time.” Compl. ¶ 1. Parkdale argues that providing notice that an order has been revoked is a “ministerial act,” not a reviewable determination under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (2000), and that therefore jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) is either not available, or is “manifestly inadequate.” Pl.’s Mem. 3-5. Parkdale insists the Court has jurisdiction to hear its claim under § 1581(i)(4) based on the reasoning set forth in
Canadian Wheat Board v. United States,
31 CIT _, 491 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (2007) (“CWB”). Pl.’s Mem. 4. As the Federal Circuit stated in
Miller & Co. v. United States,
824 F.2d 961, 963 (Fed. Cir. 1987), “[s]ection 1581(i) jurisdiction may not be invoked when jurisdiction under another subsection of § 1581 is or could have been available, unless the remedy provided under that other subsection would be manifestly inadequate.”
Id.
(citation omitted);
see also CWB,
31 CIT at _, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 1240. Thus, the court must address, as an initial matter, defendant’s contention that jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(4) is improper because, as defendant asserts,plaintiff could have brought a claim challenging the Revocation Notice under § 1581(c).
Defendant argues that Commerce’s decision to revoke the Order is a final determination reviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c). Defendant bases this argument on Commerce’s statement in the Revocation Notice that it was revoking the Order pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1675(d)(2). Because final determinations made under § 1675 are expressly referenced in 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iii), defendant contends that 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c), which grants this Court “exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced under [19 U.S.C. § 1516a],” was available to Parkdale as the proper basis of the Court’s jurisdiction.
See
28 U.S.C. § 1581(c);
see also
Def.’s Resp. 3-4; Def.’s Suppl. Resp. 4-6.
The court finds that the reasoning in
CWB
addresses the jurisdiction question presented here and, as in
CWB,
finds that the court has jurisdiction to hear Parkdale’s claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(4). In
CWB,
the ITC issued a negative material injury determination with respect to imports of Canadian hard red spring wheat after a North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) panel
remanded the ITC’s original, affirmative injury determina
tion. Accordingly, Commerce published a
Timken
notice
and a notice of revocation of the antidumping and countervailing duty orderí' on Canadian hard red spring wheat. ,
The notice of revocation indicated that Commerce would instmct Customs and Border Protection to liquidate, without duties, only those imports that entered the United States after the effective date of the
Timken
notice. Entries made prior to the effective date ofthe
Timken
notice would be liquidated at the then-prevailing rates under the antidumping and countervailing duty orders, even though the foundation of the orders had been removed. Plaintiff sought judicial review of Commerce’s legal conclusion that the
Timken
notice would have prospective effect only and sought an injunction to prevent the liquidation of entries entered prior to the date of the
Timken
notice.
See CWB,
31 CIT at _, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 1236-39.
The
CWB
Court held that Commerce’s conclusion that liquidation without duties would be prospective only, stated for the first time in the notice of revocation, was not a reviewable final determination within the meaning of 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(i):
Commerce’s arguments notwithstanding, the court finds that the Notice of Revocation is not a reviewable final determination under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a and, as a result, plaintiffhad no remedy available to it under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c). While the agency may have had internal discussions regarding the contents of the Notice of Revocation, its legal conclusion that the revocation of the orders should be prospective only, was reached without notice, public hearings or briefing by the parties and was outside of the reviewable determinations found in 19 U.S.C. § 1516a. In other words, the Notice of Revocation “was
not
made during any proceeding that would culminate in a determination for which judicial review is provided under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a and 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c).”
CWB,
31 CIT at _, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 1241-42 (quoting
Ceramica Regiomontana, S.A. v. United States,
5 CIT 23, 26, 557 F. Supp. 596, 600 (1983) (emphasis in original)). Thus, because the decision at issue was not a “final determination” subject to judicial review under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a, the Court found that 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) was not available as a basis for jurisdiction. As a result, the Court held that
jurisdiction was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(4) to hear the plaiitiff’s challenge to Commerce’s administration and enforcement of tie ITC’s negative injury determination.
Id.
at _, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 1243. That is, the Court had the authority to hear a challenge to Cbmmerce’s decision that liquidation of entries would be prospective only under § 158 l(i) because relief was not available under § 1581(c). As a result, it also had jurisdiction to issue an injunction whie the case was being heard.
Defendant attempts to distinguish this case from
CWB
on the ground that
CWB
addressed the meaning of “final determination” in the context of § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(i), not § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iii). For defendant, because the effective date of the revocation was set in the con;ext of a sunset review rather than following a finding that the Order was invalid
ab initio,
CWB is not valid precedent. Def.’s Resp. 8. The court is not persuaded by this argument. Both the antidumping/countervailing duty determination that was the subject of
CWB
and the sunset review at issue here are listed as reviewable by the Court pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1516a. While § 1516a references decisions made pursuant to § 1671d and § 1673d as well as sunset reviews, it does so in the context of providing for judicial review of “[flinal determinations” made pursuant to those sections.
See
19 U.S.C. §§ 1516a(a)(2)(B)(i) (providing for judicial review of “final affirmative determinations by [Commerce] and by the Commission under section 1671d or 1673d ... including any negative part of such a determination ...”) & (iii) (providing for judicial review of “[a] final determination ... by [Commerce] or the Commission under ... [19 U.S.C. § 1675]”).
Just as in
CWB,
however, the requirement that Commerce’s action be a “final determination” reviewable under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a is not satisfied here. As with the Commerce conclusion in
CWB
that liquidation, without duties, of the entries covered by the orders at issue there would be prospective only, Commerce’s conclusion here concerning the effective date of revocation was not a part of the ITC’s final negative injury determination. Rather, it was a conclusion made by Commerce after the final determination was issued.
See Norsk Hydro Can., Inc. v. United States,
472 F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (stating this Court must “look to the true nature of [an] action” in determining jurisdiction) (internal quotation marks & citation omitted). Thus, as in
CWB,
Commerce’s legal conclusion that the revocation of the Order would be effective as of December 15, 2005, “was reached without notice, public hearings or briefing by the parties and was outside of the reviewable determinations found in 19 U.S.C. § 1516a.”
CWB,
31 CIT at _, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 1242. In other words, the Revocation Notice “was
not
made during any proceeding that would culminate in a determination for which judicial review is provided under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a and 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c).”
Ceramica Regiomontana, S.A.,
5 CIT at 26, 557 F. Supp. at 600 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the court concludes that
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) was not available to Parkdale to challenge the Revocation Notice.
The court further concludes that jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(4) is available to Parkdale. Again,
CWB
is instructive. In
CWB,
the Court analyzed
Consolidated Bearings Co. v. United States,
348 F.3d 997 (Fed. Cir. 2003), and
Shinyei Corp. of America v. United States,
355 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2004), where the Federal Circuit held that § 1581(i) provided the jurisdictional basis for review of Commerce’s liquidation instructions.
See CWB,
31 CIT at _, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 1242-43. As the
CWB
Court explained:
In
Consolidated Bearings,
an importer challenged Commerce’s liquidation instructions to Customs, seeking to compel the application of the antidumping duty rates from the Department’s final determination to its merchandise. The Federal Circuit confirmed jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) after finding that “Consolidated [did] not object to the final results. Rather Consolidated [sought] application of those final results to its entries . . . .” The Federal Circuit based its finding on its conclusion that plaintiff’s “case involve [d] a challenge to [Commerce’s] 1998 instructions, which is not an action defined under [19 U.S.C. § 1516a].” The Federal Circuit further found that “[b]ecause Consolidated [was] not challenging the final results, [28 U.S.C. § 1581(c)] is not and could not have been a source of jurisdiction for this case.” Finally, after concluding that jurisdiction did not lie pursuant to § 1581(c), the Federal Circuit found the case “squarely within the provisions of subsection (i).” Specifically, the Federal Circuit observed that “Commerce’s liquidation instructions direct Customs to implement the final results of administrative reviews. Consequently, an action challenging Commerce’s liquidation instructions is not a challenge to the final results, but a challenge to the ‘administration and enforcement’ of those final results.”
Id.
at _, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 1242-43 (quoting
Consol. Bearings Co.,
348 F.3d at 1002; alterations in original). The
CWB
Court continued:
Likewise, the Federal Circuit found in
Shinyei Corp. of America v. United States,
355 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2004), that Commerce’s liquidation instructions were reviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1681GX4):
As we have recently held, a challenge to Commerce instructions on the ground that they do not correctly implement the published, amended administrative review results, “is not an action defined under [19 U.S.C. § 1516a] of the Tariff Act.” [19 U.S.C. § 1516a] is limited on its face
to the judicial review of “determinations” in countervailing duty and antidumping duty proceedings.
Id.
at _, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 1243 (quoting
Shinyei Corp. of Am., 355
F.3d at 1309; alterations in original). Upon concluding its review of the
Consolidated Bearings
and
Shinyei
cases, the
CWB
Court reasoned that “if a legal conclusion; found in liquidation instructions based on Commerce’s own final determination, is reviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), then a legal conclusion found in the Notice of Revocation resulting from an ITC final determination is too.”
Id.
at _, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 1243.
As with the challenges to agency actions in
Consolidated Bearings, Shinyei
and
CWB,
Parkdale’s challenge to the Revocation Notice is a challenge to the “administration and enforcement” of the ITC’s final negative injury determination in a sunset review, namely, the effective date of revocation of the Order, not to the ITC’s final determination. Indeed, “as the prevailing party, [Parkdale] had no dispute with the ITC’s final negative determination that resulted in the [Revocation Notice].”
CWB,
31 CIT at _, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 1242. The court therefore finds that Commerce’s conclusion that the revocation shall be effective as of the fifth anniversary of the publication of notice of continuation of the Order, rather than the fifth anniversary of publication of the original Order, is reviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(0(4).
B. Parkdale Has Sufficiently Demonstrated a Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Having found jurisdiction in this case, the court next turns to whether Parkdale has sufficiently demonstrated that it is likely to succeed on the merits of its claim. The standard that a party seeking a preliminary injunction must satisfy to establish a likelihood of success on the merits remains unsettled by the Federal Circuit; however, several competing standards have been articulated: (1) whether the movant has raised “serious, substantial, difficult, and doubtful” questions regarding the merits; (2) “[whether] the likelihood of success and harm-related prongs are viewed as a continuum in which the required showing of harm varies inversely with the required showing of meritoriousness”; and (3) “[whether] the movant [has demonstrated] at least a fair chance of success on the merits .. . .”
U.S. Ass’n of Imps. of Textiles & Apparel,
413 F.3d at 1347 (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court recently observed,
Corns Staal BV v. United States,
31 CIT _, _, 493 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1283 n.10 (2007) (citing
Ugine & Alz Belg. v. United States,
452 F.3d 1289, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006);
Mikohn Gaming Corp. v. Acres Gaming, Inc.,
165 F.3d 891, 895 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). In any event, it is clear that the court must, at minimum, weigh Parkdale’s arguments in favor of its position against those raised in opposition by defendant.
See U.S. Ass’n of Imps. of Textiles & Apparel,
413 F.3d at 1347 (“[T]he movant’s evidence and arguments must actually be weighed against those of the non-movant to determine whether the movant’s likelihood of success meets the applicable standard, whatever that standard may be.”) (citations & footnote omitted).
The [Federal Circuit] appears to have accepted a sliding scale approach regarding the standard for likelihood of success on the merits: the greater the potential harm to the movant if the court denies injunctive relief, the lesser the burden on the movant to make the required showing of likelihood of success on the merits.
To understand the parties’ arguments, a recitation of the relevant statutes and regulations is necessary. Title 19 U.S.C. § 1675 covers administrative reviews, including sunset reviews. In the case of a review of a transition order, like the Order here,
special rules apply.
See
19 U.S.C. § 1675(c)(6). These rules provide a schedule for the initiation and completion of administrative reviews, including sunset reviews, subsequent reviews and the revocation of transition orders:
(A) Schedule for reviews of transition orders
(i) Initiation
[Commerce] shall begin its review of transition orders in the 42d calendar month after the date such orders are issued. A review of all transition orders shall be initiated not later than the 5th anniversary after the date such orders are issued.
(ii) Completion
A review of a transition order shall be completed not later than 18 months after the date such review is initiated. Reviews of all transition orders shall be completed not later than 18 months after the 5th anniversary of the date such orders are issued.
(iii) Subsequent reviews
The time limits set forth in clauses (i) and (ii) shall be applied to all subsequent 5-year reviews of transition orders by substituting “date of the determination to continue such orders” for “date such orders are issued”.
(iv) Revocation and termination
No transition order may be revoked under this subsection before the date that is 5 years after the date the WTO Agreement enters into force with respect to the United States.
19 U.S.C. § 1675(c)(6)(A). Revocation of an order, regardless of whether it is a transition order, is governed by 19 U.S.C. § 1675(d)(2), and shall occur when either Commerce or the ITC makes a negative determination. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.218(a). Here, because the ITC made a negative injury determination in the second sunset review, the Order was revoked.
Subsection 351.222(i) of Commerce’s regulations set out the rules and procedures that Commerce must follow in revoking an order based on a sunset review. With respect to the effective date of revocation, Commerce’s regulations provide:
(i)
In general.
Except as provided in paragraph (i)(2)(ii) of this section, where [Commerce] revokes an order . . . , pursuant to . . . [19 U.S.C. § 1675(d)(2)] (see paragraph (i)(l) of this section), the revocation. . . will be effective on the fifth anniversary of the date of publication in the Federal Register of the order .... This paragraph also applies to subsequent sunset reviews of transition orders (see paragraph (i)(2)(ii) of this section and [19 U.S.C. § 1676(c)(6)(A)(m)]).
(ii)
Transition orders.
Where the Secretary revokes a transition order (defined in [19 U.S.C. § 1675(c)(6)]) pursuant to . . . [19 U.S.C. § 1675(d)(2)] (see paragraph (i)(l) ofthis section), the revocation . . . will be effective on January 1, 2000. This paragraph does not apply to subsequent sunset reviews of transition orders (see [19 U.S.C. § 1675(c)(6)(A)(iii)]).
19 C.F.R. § 351.222(i)(2)(i) & (ii).
It is Parkdale’s position that 19 C.F.R. § 351.222(i)(2)(i) unambiguously requires that revocation of the Order shall be effective on the fifth anniversary of the
original Order,
which Parkdale asserts is January 1, 2000, or at the latest September 26, 2000, and not on the “fifth anniversary of the date of publication in the Federal Register of the
notice of continuation of the [Order],”
i.e., December 15, 2005, as Commerce concluded. Revocation Notice, 72 Fed. Reg. at 7011 (emphasis added). Parkdale argues:
Commerce’s interpretation, that the effective date is five years after publication of
continuation of
the antidumping duty order, is squarely contradicted by the regulation itself. As if the phrase “the revocation... will be effective on the fifth anniversary of the date of publication in the Federal Register of the order” is not clear enough, the next sentence of the [19 C.F.R. § 351.222(i)(2)(ii)] drives the pointhome. The next sentence says that
“[t]his paragraph also applies
to subsequent sunset reviews of transition orders.” This sentence leaves no mistake but that the drafters of the regulation meant for the five years to be counted from the date of the antidumping duty order itself, even if the revocation was pursuant to a subsequent review of a transition order.
Pl.’s Mem. 11 (emphasis in original; internal citation omitted). Thus, Parkdale contends that the plain language of the regulation demonstrates that it is likely to succeed on the merits of its claim.
For its part, defendant argues that “the statutory and regulatory scheme, as well as Commerce’s consistent past practice,
demonstrate that revocation of a transition order-pursuant to a second or later sunset review-is effective from the fifth anniversary of the preceding sunset-review notice continuing the order.” Def.’s Resp. 10 (footnote omitted). Specifically, defendant contends:
[B]ecause 19 C.F.R. § 351.222(i)(2)(i) references 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c)(6)(A)(iii), Commerce’s revocations of transition orders, pursuant to second or later sunset reviews, such as that which is the subject of Parkdale’s claim here, are effective from the fifth anniversary of the preceding sunset-review notice continuing the order. . . . [P]ursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c)(6) (A)(iii), the statute substitutes the “ ‘date of the determination to continue such orders’ for ‘date such orders are issued’ ” in the conduct of subsequent sunset reviews. That is, when revoking transition orders in which there have been subsequent reviews, Commerce revokes not from “the fifth anniversary of the date of publication in the Federal Register of the order,” but from the fifth anniversary of the date of the determination to continue the order. This is the only possible interpretation that gives meaning to the reference to 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c)(6)(A)(iii) in the revocation provision.
Def.’s Resp. 11 (citations omitted).
The court finds that Parkdale’s argument is sufficient to satisfy this factor of the test for injunctive relief. At issue is the meaning of
subsection 351.222(i)(2)(i). The parties construe this subsection differently. The court finds that Parkdale has raised a substantial question regarding the merits of its claim and has demonstrated “at least a fair chance of success on the merits . . .
U.S. Ass’n of Imps. of Textiles & Apparel,
413 F.3d at 1347 (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, as discussed in Part II,
infra,
the potential harm to the movant if the court were to deny injunctive relief is indisputable. Therefore, based on the Federal Circuit’s “sliding scale” approach, Parkdale’s “burden ... to make the required showing of likelihood of success on the merits” is lessened.
Corns Staal BV,
31 CIT at _, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 1283 n.10. The court therefore finds the likelihood of success on the merits factor tips in favor of Parkdale.
II. Irreparable Harm
Federal Circuit case law favors the granting of a preliminary injunction where it is clear that irreparable harm would result absent the injunction.
See Ugine & Alz Belg.,
452 F.3d at 1293 (citing,
inter alia, Corus Group PLC v. Bush,
26 CIT 937, 942, 217 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1353-54 (2002), where the Court stated, “In reviewing the factors, the court employs a ‘sliding scale.’ Consequently, the factors do not necessarily carry equal weight. The crucial factor is irreparable injury.”). There can be little doubt that Parkdale would suffer irreparable harm if liquidation of the entries entered on or after September 26, 2000, were not enjoined and were it to prevail on the merits.
CWB,
31 CIT at _, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 1246 (“It has long been established that liquidation renders without meaning a movant’s ‘statutory right to obtain judicial review’ with respect to the liquidated entries and, thus, that the ‘consequences of liquidation do constitute irreparable injury.’”) (quoting
Zenith,
710 F.2d at 810). Indeed, the parties do not dispute this point. Thus, the court finds this factor favors granting a preliminary injunction in this case.
III. Balance of Hardships
“In evaluating whether to grant a motion for injunctive relief, the court must ‘determine which party will suffer the greatest adverse effects as a result of the grant or denial of the preliminary injunction.’ ”
Nat’l Fisheries Inst., Inc. v. United States Bureau of Customs & Border Protection,
30 CIT _, _, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1329 (2006) (quoting
Ugine-Savoie Imphy v. United States,
24 CIT 1246, 1250, 121 F. Supp. 2d 684, 688 (2000)). Parkdale contends that the hardship it would suffer if a preliminary injunction were not granted, i.e., the possibility of its claims being rendered moot by liquidation of its entries, is comparably much greater than any inconvenience defendant might suffer by continuing to suspend liquidation pending the court’s decision on the merits.
See
Pl.’s Mot. 7. The defendant, which has plaintiff’s deposits in its possession, does not
seriously contend that this is not the case. The court thus finds this factor tips in favor of granting Parkdale’s motion.
IV. Public Interest
“[T]he public interest is served by ensuring that [Commerce] complies with the law, and interprets and applies [the] international trade statutes uniformly and fairly.”
Ugine-Savoie Imphy,
24 CIT at 1252, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 690 (internal quotation marks & citations omitted; third alteration in original). Parkdale’s complaint raises an important question concerning whether Commerce complied with the law when it concluded that the effective date of the Revocation Notice was the fifth anniversary of the publication of notice of the continuation of the Order, rather than of the original Order. Thus, the public’s interest in ensuring that duties are assessed in accordance with law favors granting Parkdale’s motion.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that it has jurisdiction to hear Parkdale’s claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(4). In addition, the court finds that Parkdale has demonstrated its entitlement to in-junctive relief. Therefore, it is hereby
ORDERED that Parkdale’s motion for a preliminary injunction is granted; and it is further
ORDERED that the parties consult and jointly submit to the court the form of the preliminary injunction on or before November 9, 2007. The parties’ submission shall be made to Casey Ann Cheevers, Case Manager, United States Court of International Trade, One Federal Plaza, New York, New York, 10278.