Park v. Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: July 1, 2020
• Docket: 3:20-cv-00242
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 13 TIMOTHY JUNYOUNG PARK, Case No. 20-cv-00242-BAS-MSB

14 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 15 v. REMAND (ECF No. 5)

16 JAGUAR LAND ROVER NORTH

AMERICA, LLC, 17 Defendant. 18

19 Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Timothy Junyoung Park’s Motion to Remand 20 this action to state court. (ECF No. 5.) On February 7, 2020, Defendant Jaguar Land Rover 21 North America, LLC (“JLRNA”) removed this matter to federal court based on diversity 22 jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff contests removal arguing that this case fails to meet 23 the minimum amount in controversy to satisfy diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 24 § 1332. (Mot. to Remand 1:26–28.) 25 The Court finds this Motion suitable for determination on the papers submitted and 26 without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Civ. L. R. 7.1(d)(1). For the following 27 reasons, the Court finds removal was appropriate and DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to 28 Remand. 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 On January 6, 2020, Plaintiff commenced this lawsuit in San Diego Superior Court 3 asserting claims under California’s Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“Song-Beverly 4 Act”), specifically California Civil Code sections 1793 and 1794. (Compl., Notice of 5 Removal Ex. A, ECF No. 1-3.) Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges he purchased a used Certified 6 Pre-Owned 2016 Jaguar F-Type (“Vehicle”) with a total purchase price of $68,268.16 on 7 or about July 2, 2019. (Id. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff further alleges the Vehicle “contained or 8 developed various defects” constituting a breach of Defendant’s implied warranty 9 accompanying the Vehicle. (Id. ¶ 6.) Additionally, Plaintiff alleges Defendant willfully 10 failed to comply with its obligations under the Vehicle’s express warranty. (Id. ¶ 21.) In 11 his Complaint, Plaintiff did not include a specific dollar amount for damages, but alleges 12 he is seeking restitution, civil penalties, consequential and incidental damages, reasonable 13 attorney’s fees, and prejudgment interest. (Id. at 6–7.) Plaintiff is domiciled in California, 14 and JLRNA is a limited liability company that “is a wholly owned subsidiary of Jaguar 15 Land Rover Holdings Limited.” (Notice of Removal ¶¶ 11, 13, ECF No. 1.) “Jaguar Land 16 Rover Holdings Limited is a citizen of England with its principal place of business located 17 in Coventry, England.” (Id. ¶ 14.) 18 On February 7, 2020, JLRNA filed its Notice of Removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 19 1332, 1441(a), and 1446. (Id. at 1.) On March 23, 2020, Plaintiff filed a motion to remand 20 the action to state court. (Mot. to Remand 1.) 21 II. LEGAL STANDARD 22 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. 23 Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “They possess only that power authorized by 24 Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Id. (citations 25 omitted). “[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the 26 United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the 27 defendants, to the district court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 28 1 In order to invoke a district court’s diversity jurisdiction, a party must demonstrate 2 there is complete diversity of citizenship between the parties and that the amount in 3 controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. See 28 4 U.S.C. § 1332; see also Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996). “The burden of 5 establishing federal jurisdiction is on the party invoking federal jurisdiction.” United States 6 v. Marks, 530 F.3d 799, 810 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. 7 Estate of Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 1106–07 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[I]n a case that has been 8 removed from state court to federal court . . . on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, the 9 proponent of federal jurisdiction—typically the defendant in the substantive dispute—has 10 the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that removal is proper.”). 11 III. ANALYSIS 12 The requirement at issue here is the amount in controversy, as JLRNA has 13 adequately alleged complete diversity. (Notice of Removal ¶¶ 11–14.) See also 28 U.S.C. 14 § 1332(a); Johnson v. Columbia Props. Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006). 15 To assert the amount in controversy in the removal notice, a “short and plain” 16 statement need not contain evidentiary submissions and must include only “a plausible 17 allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Dart 18 Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 84, 89 (2014). If the plaintiff 19 challenges the defendant’s asserted amount in controversy, both sides submit proof and the 20 court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds 21 the jurisdictional threshold. Id. at 88 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2)(b)); see also 22 Schneider v. Ford Motor Co., 756 F. App’x 699, 700–01 (9th Cir. 2018) (“The 23 preponderance of the evidence standard applies only after ‘the plaintiff contests, or the 24 court questions, the defendant’s allegation’ and ‘both sides submit proof.’”); Guglielmino 25 v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that when a complaint 26 “is unclear and does not specify ‘a total amount in controversy,’ the proper burden of proof 27 . . . is proof by a preponderance of the evidence”). 28 1 Further, if the existence of diversity jurisdiction depends on the amount in 2 controversy, “[t]he district court may consider whether it is ‘facially apparent’ from the 3 complaint that the jurisdictional amount is in controversy.” Singer v. State Farm Mut. 4 Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 5 F.3d 1326, 1335–36 (5th Cir. 1995)). If not, a court may consider facts in the removal 6 notice, and it may “require parties to submit summary-judgment-type evidence relevant to 7 the amount in controversy at the time of removal.” Id. 8 The amount in controversy is “not a prospective assessment of [a] defendant’s 9 liability.” Lewis v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 627 F.3d 395, 400 (9th Cir. 2010). Rather, it 10 is the “amount at stake in the underlying litigation.” Theis Research, Inc. v. Brown & Bain, 11 400 F.3d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 2005). In assessing the amount in controversy, a court must 12 “assume that the allegations of the complaint are true and assume that a jury will return a 13 verdict for the plaintiff on all claims made in the complaint.” Campbell v. Vitran Exp., 14 Inc., 471 F. App’x 646, 648 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Kenneth Rothschild Tr. v. Morgan 15 Stanley Dean Witter, 199 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1001 (C.D. Cal. 2002)). “In that sense, the 16 amount in controversy reflects the maximum recovery the plaintiff could reasonably 17 recover.” Arias v. Residence Inn by Marriott, 936 F.3d 920, 927 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing 18 Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413, 417 (9th Cir. 2018)). 19 As stated above, Plaintiff is seeking restitution, consequential and incidental 20 damages, civil penalties, and attorney’s fees. (Compl. 6–7.) Restitution and incidental 21 damages under the Song-Beverly Act include official fees associated with the sale of the 22 vehicle (e.g. sales tax, license fees, and registration fees) and reasonable expenses incident 23 to the vehicle problem (e.g. reasonable repair, towing, and rental car costs). Cal. Civ. Code 24 § 1793.2(d)(2)(B). Plaintiff does not allege the amount sought with respect to these 25 damages and notes, more generally, that his Complaint is silent as to the amount in 26 controversy. (Mot. to Remand 2:15.) Therefore, in accordance with Dart Cherokee, the 27 Court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy asserted 28 by Defendant exceeds the jurisdictional threshold. See 574 U.S. at 88. 1 A. Amount in Controversy Assessment 2 Defendant alleges that Plaintiff is seeking more than $204,804.48 in monetary 3 damages and civil penalties, not including compensatory damages or attorney’s fees. 4 (Notice of Removal ¶ 17.) Defendant further alleges that since the Song-Beverly Act 5 authorizes an award of attorney’s fees, such fees may be included in the amount in 6 controversy. (Id.) Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand argues that this case fails to meet the 7 amount in controversy requirement because attorney’s fees and civil penalties should not 8 be included in the jurisdictional amount. (Mot. to Remand 6–10.) 9 When actual and punitive damages are recoverable under a complaint’s allegations, 10 each must be considered in determining the amount in controversy. Bell v. Preferred Life 11 Assurance Soc’y of Montgomery, 320 U.S. 238, 240 (1943). Courts include civil penalties 12 under the Song-Beverly Act in the amount in controversy, acknowledging that these 13 penalties are sufficiently akin to punitive damages. E.g., Brady v. Mercedes-Benz USA, 14 Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1009 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (finding that civil penalties under § 15 1794(c) are similar to punitive damages such that they “are properly included in the amount 16 in controversy” (citing Suman v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. App. 4th 1309, 1317 (1995))); 17 see also Chabner v. United Omaha Life Ins. Co., 225 F.3d 1042, 1046 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000) 18 (noting that treble damages authorized by state statute could have been taken into account 19 when determining the amount in controversy); cf. Romo v. FFG Ins. Co., 397 F. Supp. 2d 20 1237, 1240 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (holding civil penalties available under the Song-Beverly Act 21 could be considered in determining whether consumer satisfied amount in controversy 22 requirement under Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act for federal question jurisdiction). 23 Therefore, the Court considers Plaintiff’s claim for civil penalties when assessing whether 24 the amount in controversy is met in this case. 25 Here, Plaintiff alleges Defendant willfully failed to comply with its obligations under 26 the Vehicle’s express warranty. (Compl. ¶ 21.) Thus, Plaintiff seeks civil penalties under 27 California Civil Code section 1794, which states that if the buyer establishes that the failure 28 to comply was willful, the judgment may include a civil penalty of up to two times the 1 amount of actual damages. Plaintiff’s alleged actual damages include restitution for the 2 entire purchase price of the Vehicle pursuant to California Civil Code section 1794(b)(1). 3 (Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff allegedly purchased a used Certified Pre-Owned 2016 Jaguar F-Type 4 with a total purchase price of $68,268.16. (Id. ¶ 4.) It follows then that should Plaintiff 5 prevail, exclusive of incidental damages and restitution, a civil penalty of up to 6 $136,536.32—two times his actual damages of $68,268.16—may be included in the 7 judgment. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(e)(1). The civil penalty claim for twice the actual 8 damages alone implicates well over the difference of $6,731.84 between the claim for 9 restitution based on the cost of the Vehicle—$68,268.16—and the jurisdictional 10 threshold—$75,000. Taking together Plaintiff’s claim for at least $68,268.16 in actual 11 damages and $136,536.32 in civil penalties, the Court accepts Defendant’s calculation that 12 Plaintiff is seeking actual damages and penalties in excess of $204,804.48, therefore 13 exceeding the threshold jurisdictional amount.1 14 Further, Plaintiff alleges that he is entitled to the full “civil penalty of two times 15 Plaintiff’s actual damages,” and not up to that amount. (Compl. ¶ 21.) Therefore, 16 Plaintiff’s own allegations support the conclusion that the maximum amount of civil 17 18 1 Moreover, Plaintiff’s potential damages are even higher than $68,268.16. As mentioned, 19 Plaintiff’s actual damages may include not only restitution based on the Vehicle’s price, but also incidental damages. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(2)(B). In addition, Plaintiff states in his Complaint that he 20 believes that, “at the present time, the Vehicle’s value is de minimis.” (Compl. ¶ 10.) Hence, Plaintiff 21 alternatively seeks the remedies set forth in California Civil Code section 1794(b)(2), including the diminution in value of the Vehicle resulting from its defects. (Id.) This section provides that “[w]here 22 the buyer has accepted the goods, Sections 2714 and 2715 of the Commercial Code shall apply, and the measure of damages shall include the cost of repairs necessary to make the goods conform.” Cal. Civ. 23 Code § 1794(b)(2). “[A]s the conjunctive language in Civil Code section 1794 indicates, the statute itself provides an 24 additional measure of damages beyond replacement or reimbursement and permits, at the option of the 25 buyer, the Commercial Code measure of damages which includes ‘the cost of repairs necessary to make the goods conform.’” Krotin v. Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc., 38 Cal. App. 4th 294, 302 (1995) (citations 26 omitted); see also Cal. Com. Code § 2714 (“The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value they 27 would have had if they had been as warranted.”). Therefore, given that Plaintiff alleges the Vehicle he purchased for $68,268.16 is almost worthless, his actual damages would also be substantial under this 28 1 penalties is properly included in the amount in controversy determination. More broadly, 2 the Court also is persuaded by comparable decisions that consider the maximum amount 3 of civil penalties because that is what has been placed into controversy. E.g., Verastegui 4 v. Ford Motor Co., No. 19-cv-04806-BLF, 2020 WL 598516, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 5 2020); see also Theis Research, Inc., 400 F.3d at 662; cf. Saulic v. Symantec Corp., No. 6 SA CV 07-610 AHS (PLAx), 2007 WL 5074883, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 26, 2007) (“Courts 7 as a matter of law, calculate the amount in controversy based upon the maximum amount 8 of civil penalties available to [the] plaintiff.”). 9 Overall, the Court is convinced by a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiff’s 10 claim for damages, attorney’s fees, and civil penalties meets the jurisdictional threshold.2 11 B. Plaintiff’s Contentions 12 Although Plaintiff’s allegations indicate that the amount in controversy exceeds 13 $75,000, he offers several more nuanced arguments for why the jurisdictional threshold 14 has not been met and remand is otherwise appropriate. To avoid any doubt, the Court will 15 address these arguments below. 16 1. Restitution Offset 17 Plaintiff contends that JLRNA failed to consider the potential offset in the amount 18 of restitution for the Vehicle’s purchase price. (Mot. to Remand 6:1–3.) The restitution 19 2 The Court is unpersuaded by Plaintiff’s argument that attorney’s fees should not be considered 20 part of the amount in controversy in a lemon law case. (Mot. to Remand 8:22–23 (citing Suber v. Chrysler 21 Corp., 104 F.3d 578, 588 n.12 (3rd Cir. 1997)).) The Ninth Circuit and many California district courts have indicated that the amount in controversy may include attorney’s fees in Song-Beverly Act cases. See 22 Gonzales v. CarMax Auto Superstores, LLC, 840 F.3d 644, 648–49 (9th Cir. 2016); Schneider, 756 F. App’x at 701 n.4; see also, e.g., Garcia v. FCA U.S. LLC, No. 1:16-cv-00730-DAD-BAM, 2016 WL 23 4445337, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2016) (“An award of attorney’s fees may be considered in tabulating the amount in controversy.” (citing Galt G/S v. JSS Scandinavia, 142 F.3d 1150, 1155–56 (9th Cir. 24 1998))). 25 Plaintiff further contends that future attorney’s fees should not be counted toward the amount in controversy. (Mot. to Remand 9:13–14.) But the Ninth Circuit has held that “a court must include future 26 attorneys’ fees recoverable by statute or contract when assessing whether the amount-in-controversy requirement is met.” Fritsch v. Swift Transp. Co. of Ariz., 899 F.3d 785, 793 (9th Cir. 2018). Here, 27 nothing in the record estimates the total amount of attorney’s fees at issue. (See Swanson Decl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 5.) The Court need not estimate the fees, however, because the Court’s analysis above already 28 1 awardable under California Civil Code section 1793.2(d)(2)(B) must be reduced by the 2 amount directly attributable to Plaintiff’s use of the vehicle prior to the first repair or 3 attempted repair. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(2)(C). This reduction is determined 4 based on the number of miles traveled by the Vehicle before Plaintiff first returned it for 5 repair. See id. Plaintiff is correct that this use offset may reduce the amount in controversy. 6 See Schneider, 756 F. App’x at 701 n.3 (noting that the district court appropriately 7 considered the use offset to determine the amount in controversy). 8 Here, however, Plaintiff alleges that he purchased the Vehicle on or about July 2, 9 2019; meaning, Plaintiff’s use of the vehicle was for less than a year. (Compl. ¶ 4.) And 10 because the restitution offset is based on the number of miles traveled by the Vehicle prior 11 to the first attempted repair, it is reasonable to assume that any offset here would not be 12 large enough to lower the cumulative amount of damages and penalties to at or under 13 $75,000. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2(a)(2)(C); cf. D’Amico v. Ford Motor Co., No. CV 14 20-2985-CJC (JCx), 2020 WL 2614610, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 21, 2020) (noting that 15 plaintiff drove her vehicle for three years, making it possible that she drove the car for 16 many miles before she took it in for repair). Moreover, Plaintiff’s restitution offset 17 argument does not address the alternative measure of damages he invokes under California 18 Civil Code section 1794(b)(2). See Krotin, 38 Cal. App. 4th at 302 (“[T]he statute itself 19 provides an additional measure of damages beyond replacement or reimbursement[.]”); see 20 also supra note 1. Hence, the Court is unmoved by Plaintiff’s argument that JLRNA’s 21 failure to consider the restitution offset means the amount in controversy requirement is 22 not met. 23 2. Burden to Show Alleged Civil Penalties 24 Even if civil penalties may be included in the amount in controversy, Plaintiff argues 25 JLRNA does not meet its burden to demonstrate that penalties should be included in this 26 case. (See Mot. to Remand 2:15–22.) Plaintiff further urges the Court to follow Eberle, a 27 case filed against JLRNA by Plaintiff’s counsel. Eberle v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am., 28 LLC, No. 2:18-cv-06650VAP-PLA, 2018 WL 4674598, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2018). 1 The Eberle court and several courts in this district have noted in Song-Beverly Act cases 2 that the removing party must make some effort to justify the assumption that civil penalties 3 will be awarded in order for the penalties to be included in the amount in controversy. Id.; 4 see also Zawaideh v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. 17-cv-2151-W-KSC, 2018 WL 1805103, 5 at *2–3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2018) (evaluating two district court decisions to conclude there 6 was an inadequate showing that penalties would be awarded when assessing the amount in 7 controversy where actual damages at issue were $14,470). These cases indicate that 8 removing parties should justify the assumption of civil penalties by pointing to allegations 9 in the complaint and providing judgments from similar cases regarding the likely amount 10 of penalties. See Herko v. FCA U.S. LLC, No. 19-cv-2057-JLS-WVG, 2019 WL 5587140, 11 at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2019) (citing Zawaideh to find defendant failed to show some 12 justification that civil penalties would be appropriate and where the total sale price of the 13 vehicle was $54,393.84); Castillo v. FCA U.S. LLC, No. 19-cv-151-CAB-MDD, 2019 WL 14 6607006, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2019) (citing Herko and Zawaideh to find similarly where 15 actual damages contended by defendant were $26,131.31).3 16 The Ninth Circuit, however, has held that a “defendant’s showing on the amount in 17 controversy may rely on reasonable assumptions.” Arias, 936 F.3d at 922; Ibarra v. 18 Manheim Invs., Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197–99 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[E]vidence may be direct 19 or circumstantial. In either event, a damages assessment may require a chain of reasoning 20 that includes assumptions.”). Further, assumptions made part of the defendant’s chain of 21 22 23 24

25 3 Relatedly, other courts in this district have also concluded that civil penalties are more inherently included in the amount in controversy. See Ferrer v. FCA U.S. LLC, No. 17-cv-0530-AJB-BGS, 2017 26 WL 2875692, at *3 (S.D. Cal. July 6, 2017) (including civil penalties under the Song-Beverly Act in calculating the amount in controversy where actual damages at issue were $27,810.29); see also Locher 27 v. Thor Motor Coach, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-01804-GPC-MDD, 2017 WL 6016114, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2017) (noting that courts calculate the amount in controversy based upon the maximum amount of civil 28 1 reasoning do not need to be proven; they instead must only have “some reasonable ground 2 underlying them.” Arias, 936 F.3d at 927 (quoting Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1199).4 3 Here, Defendant’s assumption that the amount in controversy includes the maximum 4 amount of civil penalties is reasonable. Initially, this assumption is founded on the 5 allegations of the Complaint. See id. at 925 (“An assumption may be reasonable if it is 6 founded on the allegations of the complaint.”). As stated above, JLRNA points to 7 Plaintiff’s allegation that he “is entitled to a civil penalty of two times Plaintiff’s actual 8 damages” under California Civil Code section 1794. (Compl. ¶¶ 5, 21.) Plaintiff also 9 alleges he notified Defendant of the Vehicle’s defects; “[h]owever, the representative failed 10 to repair the Vehicle, breaching the terms of the written warranty . . . .” (Id. ¶ 18.) Thus, 11 Plaintiff alleges JLRNA’s failure to comply with the warranty was willful because 12 “Defendant and its representatives were aware of their obligation to repair the Vehicle 13 under the express warranty, but they intentionally declined to fulfill that obligation.” (Id. 14 ¶ 21.) See also Jensen v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 35 Cal. App. 4th 112, 136 (1995) (noting 15 that in determining willfulness, the jury can consider factors including whether the 16 manufacturer knew the vehicle had not been repaired and whether the manufacturer had a 17 written policy on Song-Beverly’s requirement to repair or replace a vehicle). 18 In addition, JLRNA points to cases, such as Brady, 243 F. Supp. 2d 1004, as an 19 example where civil penalties under the Song-Beverly Act were contemplated in the 20 amount in controversy. (Opp’n 3, ECF No. 7.) Further, nothing in the record—including 21 Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand—contradicts Plaintiff’s allegations and indicates that the 22 maximum amount of civil penalties should not be part of “the maximum recovery” Plaintiff 23 “could reasonably recover.” See Arias, 936 F.3d at 927. Finally, Eberle and other 24 25 4 See Lewis, 627 F.3d at 400 (“To establish the jurisdictional amount . . . Defendant here need 26 only “bear the burden to show that its estimated amount in controversy relie[s] on reasonable assumptions.”); see also, e.g., Cortez Martinez v. Ford Motor Co., No. 18-cv-01607-LJO-JLT, 2019 WL 27 1988398, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 6, 2019); cf. Tremper v. FCA U.S. LLC, No. 20-cv-00828-HSG, 2020 WL 2991585, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 4, 2020) (finding defendant’s assumption unreasonable in a Class Action 28 1 decisions Plaintiff cites are distinguishable because they involved vehicles purchased for 2 prices significantly less than the Vehicle here, which cost $68,268.16. See, e.g., 2018 WL 3 4674598, at *2 (noting the vehicle was purchased for $48,284.39). By comparison, this 4 case is not a close call because the possibility that Plaintiff may recover even a relatively 5 small civil penalty pushes the amount in controversy over the jurisdictional threshold. See 6 supra Part III.A. 7 Accordingly, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that JLRNA fails to demonstrate 8 that the maximum potential civil penalties may be included in the amount in controversy 9 calculation. Because JLRNA has adequately shown that these penalties are part of the “the 10 amount at stake” in the litigation, they are properly considered as part of the “the amount 11 in controversy for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.” See Theis Research, Inc., 400 F.3d 12 at 662; see also Arias, 936 F.3d at 927. 13 3. Comity 14 Lastly, Plaintiff contends that comity principles weigh in favor of remand. (Mot. to 15 Remand 10:21.) The constitutionality of removal is well-settled law. Tennessee v. Davis, 16 100 U.S. 257, 258 (1879). When the defendant seeks to remove on the basis of diversity 17 or a federal question, the removal will stand if either ground is well taken. Great N. Ry. 18 Co. v. Galbreath Cattle Co., 271 U.S. 99, 101 (1926). Therefore, the Court rejects 19 Plaintiff’s argument that comity principles weigh in favor of remand. See BNSF Ry. Co. 20 v. O’Dea, 572 F.3d 785, 793 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (Fisher, J., concurring) (“[T]he diversity 21 statute, unlike the supplemental jurisdiction statute, does not afford district courts the 22 discretion to decline jurisdiction over state law claims. District courts sitting in diversity 23 therefore lack the option of refusing state law claims out of consideration for ‘judicial 24 economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.’” (citation omitted) (quoting City of Chicago 25 v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156 (1997))). 26 IV. CONCLUSION 27 For the foregoing reasons, JLRNA has shown by a preponderance of the evidence 28 that the jurisdictional amount in controversy here has been met, therefore satisfying the 1 || contested requirement for diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Thus, Defendant 2 properly removed this action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The Court 3 || consequently DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (ECF No. 5). 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 /\ 6 || DATED: July 1, 2020 as dg (Hiphan 7 United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 _19.-