Park v. Comm'r

2012 T.C. Memo. 279, 104 T.C.M. 393, 2012 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 281
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedOctober 2, 2012
DocketDocket No. 21552-10
StatusUnpublished

This text of 2012 T.C. Memo. 279 (Park v. Comm'r) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Park v. Comm'r, 2012 T.C. Memo. 279, 104 T.C.M. 393, 2012 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 281 (tax 2012).

Opinion

JONG D. PARK, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Park v. Comm'r
Docket No. 21552-10
United States Tax Court
T.C. Memo 2012-279; 2012 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 281; 104 T.C.M. (CCH) 393;
October 2, 2012, Filed
*281

Decision will be entered for respondent.

Jong D. Park, Pro se.
Shannon F. Edelstone, Michael A. Skeen, Thomas R. Mackinson, and Melissa C. Quale, for respondent.
HALPERN, Judge.

HALPERN
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION

HALPERN, Judge: Respondent determined a deficiency in petitioner's Federal income tax for 2006 of $4,774 and an addition to tax for failure to timely file of $1,194. After a concession by petitioner, the items remaining for decision *280 are whether petitioner (1) may deduct claimed miscellaneous itemized expenses totaling $14,709 and (2) is liable for the addition to tax.

Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for 2006, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. All dollar amounts have been rounded to the nearest dollar.

Petitioner bears the burden of proof. SeeRule 142(a). 1

FINDINGS OF FACT

Petitioner *282 resided in Santa Clara, California, at the time he filed the petition.

During 2006, petitioner was employed as a verification engineer by CPU Technology, Inc. (CPU). Consequently, petitioner's primary responsibilities included writing computer code and conducting tests to verify that a piece of equipment functioned as it was designed to. CPU did not require petitioner to travel as part of his job.

In March 2006, petitioner purchased a van that he used in his daily commute to work at CPU; in the van, he transported tools and equipment he thought *281 necessary for (and which he actually did use in) his work at CPU. CPU provided tools and equipment for petitioner to use in carrying out his job and did not require him to supply his own. CPU did not reimburse petitioner for the cost of the van or for his commuting costs.

Because of an extension of time to file, petitioner's 2006 Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, was due no later than October 15, 2007. Petitioner signed his 2006 Form 1040 on November 24, 2007. Respondent's records indicate that he received petitioner's 2006 Form 1040 on April 29, 2008. On that return, petitioner claimed itemized deductions of $5,224 and $11,853 for *283 unreimbursed vehicle mileage expenses and for depreciation of his van, respectively. Respondent examined the return, and, among other things, disallowed both deductions.

OPINIONI. DeductionsA. Introduction

Petitioner commuted to work during at least part of 2006 in a van that he purchased for that purpose during March 2006. On his 2006 Form 1040, he deducted both the cost of the van (by way of accelerated depreciation) and mileage (using the standard business mileage rate) for commuting to CPU. Respondent *282 argues that he can claim neither, since neither is a business expense nor, for either, did petitioner adequately substantiate his expenditure. In any event, respondent adds, he cannot claim both. Petitioner argues that he needed to transport his equipment and tools to work, he was not aware of the substantiation requirements, and he now (after trial) has evidence of the price of the van.

We need go no further than petitioner's lack of substantiation to sustain respondent's disallowance of petitioner's claimed deductions.

B. Failure To Substantiate Van Expense

Petitioner claims the $11,853 cost of the van to be a deductible business expense. We need not determine whether the cost qualifies *284 as a business expense because, even if we were to find that it does, petitioner's failure to substantiate the expense is a sufficient ground to sustain respondent's disallowance of petitioner's deduction.

Section 179 provides an election to expense certain depreciable business property. Nevertheless, when called upon by the Commissioner, a taxpayer must substantiate his expenses. E.g., Doudney v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-267, 2005 WL 3081647, at *3. With respect to certain deductible expenses, section 274(d) imposes heightened substantiation requirements. Section 274(d) requires a taxpayer to substantiate "by adequate records or by sufficient evidence *283

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Related

Hoang v. Comm'r
2006 T.C. Memo. 47 (U.S. Tax Court, 2006)
HIGBEE v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
116 T.C. No. 28 (U.S. Tax Court, 2001)
Evans v. Commissioner
48 T.C. 704 (U.S. Tax Court, 1967)

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Bluebook (online)
2012 T.C. Memo. 279, 104 T.C.M. 393, 2012 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 281, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/park-v-commr-tax-2012.