Park B. Smith, Ltd. v. United Statese

25 Ct. Int'l Trade 506, 2001 CIT 63
CourtUnited States Court of International Trade
DecidedMay 29, 2001
DocketCourt 96-02-00344
StatusPublished

This text of 25 Ct. Int'l Trade 506 (Park B. Smith, Ltd. v. United Statese) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of International Trade primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Park B. Smith, Ltd. v. United Statese, 25 Ct. Int'l Trade 506, 2001 CIT 63 (cit 2001).

Opinion

Opinion

Goldberg, Senior Judge:

This matter is before the Court following trial de novo. It involves the proper classification of approximately sixty-three items typically considered holiday table linens in the textile trade. The case requires the Court to interpret the scope of the term “festive *507 articles” as it appears in heading 9505 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedules of the United States (“HTSUS”). Upon review of the evidence presented at trial, the Court finds in favor of the plaintiff in part, and in favor of the defendant in part. The Court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1994).

Background

Park B Smith, Ltd., (“PBS”) imports hand woven cotton textile merchandise from India and then resells the merchandise to retailers. The merchandise at issue here includes dhurries, placemats, napkins and table runners. Generally, these items are advertised and sold only to consumers prior to the particular holiday with which they are associated. The majority of the items were sold during the Christmas season.

The merchandise at issue was entered in 1994 and 1995. The United States Customs Service (“Customs”) classified the dhurries under subheading 5702.99.1010, HTSUS (dutiable at 7.7% or 7.6% ad valorem, depending on which year the entry was made); the placemats and table-runners under subheading 6302.51.40 HTSUS (dutiable at 5.5% or 5.4% ad valorem)-, and the napkins under subheading 6302.51.20 (dutiable at 5.5% or 5.4% ad valorem).

PBS claims that all of the merchandise at issue should have been classified as festive articles, and thus duty free, under subheading 9505 of the HTSUS.

Discussion

I. Standard of Review

Customs’s tariff classification decisions are presumed to be correct, and the importer has the burden of proving otherwise. See 28 U.S.C. § 2639(a)(l)(1994). To determine whether the importer has overcome this presumption, the Court must consider whether Customs’s classification is correct. This evaluation is conducted both independently and' in comparison with the importer’s proposed alternative. See Jarvis Clark Co. v. United States, 2 Fed. Cir. (T)70, 75, 733 F.2d 873, 878, reh’g denied, 2 Fed. Cir. (T) 97, 739 F.2d 628 (1984).

II. Customs’s Classification

At trial, Customs argued that the merchandise at issue was properly classified under subheadings 5702.99.1010, 6302.51.40, 6302.51.20, HTSUS. PBS argued that even if the merchandise was prima facie classifiable under the aforementioned subheadings, it was also prima facie classifiable under the festive articles provision of the HTSUS B heading 9505. PBS further claimed that SectionXI Note l(t), HTSUS, excludes all articles of chapter 95 from being classified under Section XI. See Midwest of Cannon Falls, Inc. v. United States, 20 CIT 123 (CIT, 1996), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 122 F.3d 1423, 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Section XI, HTSUS includes chapters 50-63. Thus, PBS argued, the merchandise was properly classifiable only under heading 9505.

*508 Both parties agree that the merchandise was prima facie classifiable under subheadings 5702.99.1010, 6302.51.40, and 6302.51.20, HTSUS. See Pl.’s Pretrial Mem. of Law, at 6; Def.’s Pretrial Mem. of Law, at 10-15. Thus, the questions before the Court are whether PBS has overcome Customs’s presumption of correctness and proven that the merchandise is also classifiable under heading 9505, and if so, whether Section XI Note l(t) operates to compel a classification under heading 9505, HTSUS.

III. Prima Facie Classification as “Festive Article” Under 9505, HTSUS.

At trial, Customs argued that the merchandise at issue was not prima facie classifiable as festive articles because the general scope and explanatory notes of Heading 9505 indicate that “Congress did not intend to extend the scope of this provision to include all manner of possibly festive articles, i.e., rugs, placemats, napkins, and table runners.” See Def.’s Pretrial Mem. of Law, at 17. Further, Customs claimed that the Federal Circuit’s opinion in Midwest should be constrained to three-dimensional objects, and thus not apply to any of the two-dimensional objects at issue here. 1

PBS, on the other hand, argued that the merchandise was prima facie classifiable as festive articles because, as the merchandise in Midwest, the merchandise at issue was designed, marketed and used by consumers in conjunction with festive occasions. See Midwest, 122 F.3d at 1429.

The meaning of a tariff term is a question of law. Brookside Veneers, Ltd. v. United States, 6 Fed. Cir. (T) 121, 124, 847 F.2d 786, 788, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 943 (1988). Courts interpret the tariff acts in order to carry out legislative intent. Nippon Kogaku (USA), Inc. v. United States, 69 CCPA 89, 92, 673 F.2d 380 (1982). The first source for determining legislative intent is the statutory language. United States v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 42 CCPA 144, 155 (1955). In ascertaining the plain meaning of a particular statutory term, the Court presumes that Congress frames tariff acts using the language of commerce. Nylos Trading Co. v. United States, 37 CCPA 71, 73 (1949). The Court also presumes that the commercial meaning of a tariff term coincides with its common meaning, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. United States v. C.J. Tower & Sons, 48 CCPA 87, 89 (1961). The Court may rely on its own understanding to determine the common meaning of a tariff term. See Brookside Veneers, 6 Fed. Cir. (T) at 125, 847 F.2d at 789.

Here, the Court relies on all of these factors, as well as the Federal Circuit’s direct guidance. See Midwest, 122 F.3d at 1429. As a threshold matter, Customs’s attempt to limit the Federal Circuit’s holding in Mid *509 west to only three dimensional object is without merit. Nothing in the Federal Circuit’s opinion even hints that such a distinction is warranted. See id. at 1423-29. Rather, in Midwest

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Related

Jarvis Clark Co. v. United States
733 F.2d 873 (Federal Circuit, 1984)
Jarvis Clark Co. v. United States
739 F.2d 628 (Federal Circuit, 1984)
Brookside Veneers, Ltd. v. The United States
847 F.2d 786 (Federal Circuit, 1988)
Nippon Kogaku (USA), Inc. v. United States
673 F.2d 380 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1982)

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25 Ct. Int'l Trade 506, 2001 CIT 63, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/park-b-smith-ltd-v-united-statese-cit-2001.