1 JS-6 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 PARGOL MORADTAJARI, an Case No. 8:24-cv-01740-JWH-ADSx individual, 12 Plaintiff, ORDER REGARDING 13 PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO v. REMAND [ECF No. 12] 14 MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC, a 15 Delaware Limited Liability Company, and 16 DOES 1-10, inclusive, 17 Defendants. 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 1 Before the Court is the motion of Plaintiff Pargol Moradtajari to remand this action to Orange County Superior Court.’ The Motion is fully briefed.” The Court concludes that this matter is appropriate for resolution without a 4|| hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15. For the reasons stated below, the 5|| Court GRANTS the instant Motion to remand. 6 I. BACKGROUND 7 Moradtajari originally filed her Complaint in state court in April 2024.* &|| Moradtajari asserts the following claims for relief against Defendant Mercedes- 9|| Benz USA, LLC: 10 e a California Song-Beverly Act express warranty claim; 11 e a California Song-Beverly Act implied warranty claim; 12 e California Song-Beverly Act § 1793.2(b) claim; 13 e federal Magnuson-Moss Act claim; and 14 e a California Consumer Legal Remedies Act claim.‘ Moradtajari caused Mercedes to be served with process on June 27, 2024.° || Mercedes removed the action to this Court on August 8, 2024,° invoking federal || question jurisdiction.’ In her instant Motion, Moradtajari argues that Mercedes 18 my P].’s Mot. to Remand Case to Orange Cnty. Sup. Ct. (the “Motion’’) 20|| [ECF No. 12]. * See Opp’n to the Motion (the “Opposition”) [ECF No. 13]; Reply in Supp. of the Motion [ECF No. 15]. 23] ° Def.’s Notice of Removal from Orange Cnty. Sup. Ct., Ex. A (the “Complaint”) [ECF No. 1-2]. 241 See generally Complaint. 5 Motion, Ex. 1 (the “Proof of Service”) [ECF No. 12-2]. || « See Def.’s Notice of Removal from Orange Cnty. Sup. Ct. (the “Removal 27|| Notice”) [ECF No. 1] . 7 See id. at Tf 13-18.
1 removed this case outside of the 30-day window established by 28 U.S.C. 2 § 1446(b).8 3 II. LEGAL STANDARD 4 A. Removal Clock 5 “The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within 6 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a 7 copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such 8 action or proceeding is based, or within 30 days after the service of summons 9 upon the defendant if such initial pleading has then been filed in court and is not 10 required to be served on the defendant, whichever period is shorter.” 28 U.S.C. 11 § 1446(b)(1). 12 “As with all other requirements for removal jurisdiction, the defendant 13 bears the burden of proving the timeliness of its removal and ‘[s]everal courts 14 have noted that the thirty-day time limit for petitioning for removal will be 15 strictly construed against a defendant.’” Kelly v. Chi. Bridge & Iron Co., 2017 16 WL 11633200, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2017) (quoting Roberson v. Orkin 17 Exterminating Co., 770 F. Supp. 1324, 1328 (N.D. Ind. 1991)). The removal 18 statute “identifies two thirty-day periods for removing a case.” Carvalho v. 19 Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 885 (9th Cir. 2010). “The first thirty- 20 day removal period is triggered if the case stated by the initial pleading is 21 removable on its face.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 22 “The second thirty-day removal period is triggered if the initial pleading does 23 not indicate that the case is removable, and the defendant receives a copy of an 24 amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which removability may 25 first be ascertained.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also 26 Wilson v. Target Corp., 2023 WL 6786200, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2023). 27 1 When the so-called 30-day removal clock begins to tick, the deadline that it 2 imposes “is a strictly applied rule of procedure and untimeliness is a ground for 3 remand so long as the timeliness defect has not been waived.” N. Ill. Gas Co. v. 4 Airco Indus. Gases, 676 F.2d 270, 273 (7th Cir. 1982). 5 B. Federal Question Jurisdiction 6 “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions 7 arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 8 U.S.C. § 1331. Typically, a party need not establish an amount in controversy to 9 invoke federal question jurisdiction. 10 C. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act 11 To invoke federal question jurisdiction by using the Magnuson-Moss 12 Warranty Act, however, “(1) each individual claim must be at least $25; and 13 (2) at least $50,000 (exclusive of interests and costs) must be at issue unless the 14 claim comes within the court’s supplemental jurisdiction.” The Wagstaffe 15 Group Practice Guide: Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial § 7.358.1 (2024) 16 (citing Ware v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 6 F.4th 726, 731, 733 (7th Cir. 2021)). 17 III. ANALYSIS 18 A. The Complaint Sufficiently Establishes the Amount in Controversy 19 As discussed above, Moradtajari asserts a Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act 20 claim.9 Specifically, Moradtajari alleges that “[o]n or about March 14, 2023, 21 Plaintiff leased a new 2023 Mercedes-Benz EQS450X, 4JGDM2DB4PA012097 22 (‘The Vehicle’) from Defendant, through its authorized agent. Plaintiff 23 tendered a down payment of $13,417.53 (Due at Signing) and is now obligated to 24 tender monthly payments of $1,249.88 for the duration of the 48-month term. 25 (‘lease’ or ‘Transaction’).”10 Thus, the amount in controversy exceeds 26
27 9 See Complaint ¶¶ 22-37. 1 $50,000: $1,249.88 per month times 48 months equals $59,994.24. Adding the 2 $13,417.53 down payment raises the total amount in controversy to $73,411.77. 3 Mercedes argues that “Paragraph 12 does not identify [the $73,411.77 4 figure]. As such, the entirety of Plaintiff’s argument is premised on MBUSA 5 performing mathematical calculations to determine the amount in controversy. 6 That is not the standard and that is not the law.”11 Mercedes is simply wrong. 7 The Ninth Circuit has explicitly rejected that argument: 8 BMW perceives two errors. First, it suggests that Harris [v. Bankers 9 Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689 (9th Cir.2005)] and Carvalho freed 10 defendants from the need to make this sort of mathematic 11 calculation. As we explain below, defendants need not make 12 extrapolations or engage in guesswork; yet the statute “requires a 13 defendant to apply a reasonable amount of intelligence in 14 ascertaining removability.” Whitaker v. Am. Telecasting, Inc., 261 15 F.3d 196, 206 (2d Cir. 2001). Multiplying figures clearly stated in a 16 complaint is an aspect of that duty. See, e.g., Carvalho, 629 F.3d at 17 884 (noting that the “amount in controversy was at least $12.5 18 million (i.e., $25,000 times 500 potential plaintiffs)”). 19 Kuxhausen v. BMW Fin. Servs. NA LLC, 707 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2013) 20 (footnote omitted).
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1 JS-6 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 PARGOL MORADTAJARI, an Case No. 8:24-cv-01740-JWH-ADSx individual, 12 Plaintiff, ORDER REGARDING 13 PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO v. REMAND [ECF No. 12] 14 MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC, a 15 Delaware Limited Liability Company, and 16 DOES 1-10, inclusive, 17 Defendants. 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 1 Before the Court is the motion of Plaintiff Pargol Moradtajari to remand this action to Orange County Superior Court.’ The Motion is fully briefed.” The Court concludes that this matter is appropriate for resolution without a 4|| hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15. For the reasons stated below, the 5|| Court GRANTS the instant Motion to remand. 6 I. BACKGROUND 7 Moradtajari originally filed her Complaint in state court in April 2024.* &|| Moradtajari asserts the following claims for relief against Defendant Mercedes- 9|| Benz USA, LLC: 10 e a California Song-Beverly Act express warranty claim; 11 e a California Song-Beverly Act implied warranty claim; 12 e California Song-Beverly Act § 1793.2(b) claim; 13 e federal Magnuson-Moss Act claim; and 14 e a California Consumer Legal Remedies Act claim.‘ Moradtajari caused Mercedes to be served with process on June 27, 2024.° || Mercedes removed the action to this Court on August 8, 2024,° invoking federal || question jurisdiction.’ In her instant Motion, Moradtajari argues that Mercedes 18 my P].’s Mot. to Remand Case to Orange Cnty. Sup. Ct. (the “Motion’’) 20|| [ECF No. 12]. * See Opp’n to the Motion (the “Opposition”) [ECF No. 13]; Reply in Supp. of the Motion [ECF No. 15]. 23] ° Def.’s Notice of Removal from Orange Cnty. Sup. Ct., Ex. A (the “Complaint”) [ECF No. 1-2]. 241 See generally Complaint. 5 Motion, Ex. 1 (the “Proof of Service”) [ECF No. 12-2]. || « See Def.’s Notice of Removal from Orange Cnty. Sup. Ct. (the “Removal 27|| Notice”) [ECF No. 1] . 7 See id. at Tf 13-18.
1 removed this case outside of the 30-day window established by 28 U.S.C. 2 § 1446(b).8 3 II. LEGAL STANDARD 4 A. Removal Clock 5 “The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within 6 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a 7 copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such 8 action or proceeding is based, or within 30 days after the service of summons 9 upon the defendant if such initial pleading has then been filed in court and is not 10 required to be served on the defendant, whichever period is shorter.” 28 U.S.C. 11 § 1446(b)(1). 12 “As with all other requirements for removal jurisdiction, the defendant 13 bears the burden of proving the timeliness of its removal and ‘[s]everal courts 14 have noted that the thirty-day time limit for petitioning for removal will be 15 strictly construed against a defendant.’” Kelly v. Chi. Bridge & Iron Co., 2017 16 WL 11633200, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2017) (quoting Roberson v. Orkin 17 Exterminating Co., 770 F. Supp. 1324, 1328 (N.D. Ind. 1991)). The removal 18 statute “identifies two thirty-day periods for removing a case.” Carvalho v. 19 Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 885 (9th Cir. 2010). “The first thirty- 20 day removal period is triggered if the case stated by the initial pleading is 21 removable on its face.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 22 “The second thirty-day removal period is triggered if the initial pleading does 23 not indicate that the case is removable, and the defendant receives a copy of an 24 amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which removability may 25 first be ascertained.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also 26 Wilson v. Target Corp., 2023 WL 6786200, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2023). 27 1 When the so-called 30-day removal clock begins to tick, the deadline that it 2 imposes “is a strictly applied rule of procedure and untimeliness is a ground for 3 remand so long as the timeliness defect has not been waived.” N. Ill. Gas Co. v. 4 Airco Indus. Gases, 676 F.2d 270, 273 (7th Cir. 1982). 5 B. Federal Question Jurisdiction 6 “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions 7 arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 8 U.S.C. § 1331. Typically, a party need not establish an amount in controversy to 9 invoke federal question jurisdiction. 10 C. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act 11 To invoke federal question jurisdiction by using the Magnuson-Moss 12 Warranty Act, however, “(1) each individual claim must be at least $25; and 13 (2) at least $50,000 (exclusive of interests and costs) must be at issue unless the 14 claim comes within the court’s supplemental jurisdiction.” The Wagstaffe 15 Group Practice Guide: Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial § 7.358.1 (2024) 16 (citing Ware v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 6 F.4th 726, 731, 733 (7th Cir. 2021)). 17 III. ANALYSIS 18 A. The Complaint Sufficiently Establishes the Amount in Controversy 19 As discussed above, Moradtajari asserts a Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act 20 claim.9 Specifically, Moradtajari alleges that “[o]n or about March 14, 2023, 21 Plaintiff leased a new 2023 Mercedes-Benz EQS450X, 4JGDM2DB4PA012097 22 (‘The Vehicle’) from Defendant, through its authorized agent. Plaintiff 23 tendered a down payment of $13,417.53 (Due at Signing) and is now obligated to 24 tender monthly payments of $1,249.88 for the duration of the 48-month term. 25 (‘lease’ or ‘Transaction’).”10 Thus, the amount in controversy exceeds 26
27 9 See Complaint ¶¶ 22-37. 1 $50,000: $1,249.88 per month times 48 months equals $59,994.24. Adding the 2 $13,417.53 down payment raises the total amount in controversy to $73,411.77. 3 Mercedes argues that “Paragraph 12 does not identify [the $73,411.77 4 figure]. As such, the entirety of Plaintiff’s argument is premised on MBUSA 5 performing mathematical calculations to determine the amount in controversy. 6 That is not the standard and that is not the law.”11 Mercedes is simply wrong. 7 The Ninth Circuit has explicitly rejected that argument: 8 BMW perceives two errors. First, it suggests that Harris [v. Bankers 9 Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689 (9th Cir.2005)] and Carvalho freed 10 defendants from the need to make this sort of mathematic 11 calculation. As we explain below, defendants need not make 12 extrapolations or engage in guesswork; yet the statute “requires a 13 defendant to apply a reasonable amount of intelligence in 14 ascertaining removability.” Whitaker v. Am. Telecasting, Inc., 261 15 F.3d 196, 206 (2d Cir. 2001). Multiplying figures clearly stated in a 16 complaint is an aspect of that duty. See, e.g., Carvalho, 629 F.3d at 17 884 (noting that the “amount in controversy was at least $12.5 18 million (i.e., $25,000 times 500 potential plaintiffs)”). 19 Kuxhausen v. BMW Fin. Servs. NA LLC, 707 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2013) 20 (footnote omitted). 21 Moradtajari’s Complaint contains all of the necessary information for 22 Mercedes to determine the amount in controversy in this case.12 Because that 23 sum exceeds $50,000, Mercedes could have removed the case immediately 24 upon its receipt of process. Mercedes did not need to wait for more explicit 25 figures. 26
27 11 Opposition 13:6-8 (footnote omitted). 1|| B. Mercedes Did Not Timely Remove This Case 2 On June 27, 2024, Moradtajari served the Complaint.’ Thus, the 30-day 3|| removal window ended on July 27, 2024. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). Almost two || weeks later—on August 8, 2024— Mercedes removed this case.“ “In creating a 5|| removal limitations period that now stands at 30 days, Congress recognized the 6|| delay in state and federal judicial administration that results from the unfettered 7|| use of removal.” Fed. Deposit Ins. vy. Norwood, 726 F. Supp. 1073, 1077 (S.D. 8|| Tex. 1989) (citing Powers v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co., 169 U.S. 92, 100 (1898)). 9|| The 30-day deadline ensures prompt removal, which maintains procedural || integrity. 11 IV. DISPOSITION 12 For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows: 13 1. Moradtajari’s instant Motion to remand [ECF No. 12] is 14|| GRANTED. 15 2. This case is REMANDED to Orange County Superior Court. 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 17 18|| Dated: December 2, 2024 VX, Wa — 19 {SNITED | DISTRICT JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27|| *° See Proof of Service. 28\| ™ See Removal Notice.