Parenting of L.M.A.R. & N.R.R.

• Court: Montana Supreme Court
• Decided: November 12, 2025
• Docket: DA 25-0305
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

11/12/2025

DA 25-0305 Case Number: DA 25-0305

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2025 MT 261N

IN RE THE PARENTING OF L.M.A.R. and N.R.R.,

JESSE B. REHBEIN,

Petitioner and Appellant,

and

DANIELLE C. BUCK,

Respondent and Appellant,

ANNETTE REHBEIN and DOUG REHBEIN,

Intervenors, Third-Party Parents, and Appellees.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, In and For the County of Flathead, Cause No. DR-18-281 Honorable Amy Eddy, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellants:

Jesse B. Rehbein, Danielle C. Buck, Self-Represented, Kalispell, Montana

For Appellees:

Emily von Jentzen, Kaufman Vidal Hileman Ellingson PC, Kalispell, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: October 1, 2025

Decided: November 12, 2025

Filed:

__________________________________________ Clerk Justice Laurie McKinnon delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating

Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not

serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this

Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana

Reports.

¶2 Jesse B. Rehbein (“Rehbein”) and Danielle C. Buck (“Buck”) (collectively, “the

Parents”) appeal from the April 2, 2025 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order

of the Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, adopting the second amended

parenting plan proposed by Annette and Doug Rehbein (collectively, “the Grandparents”).1

¶3 We affirm.

¶4 Many of the relevant facts were previously discussed in In re L.M.A.R. & N.R.R.,

2024 MT 148, 417 Mont. 212, 552 P.3d 678. Rehbein and Buck are the natural parents of

L.M.A.R. and N.R.R (collectively, “the Children”). In re L.M.A.R., ¶ 3. In 2018, the

Department of Child and Family Services (“the Department”) removed the children due to

several concerns, including Parents’ failure to address N.R.R.’s dental needs, N.R.R.’s lack

of education, L.M.A.R.’s testing positive for methamphetamines and THC, L.M.A.R.

1 The Parents made some filings jointly and some filings independently. We already observed “that both [Parents] have filed their pleadings jointly throughout this appeal with the parties’ names and signatures on each document” and instructed the Parents that they “may continue to file jointly and not separately[.]” In re Parenting of L.M.A.R. & N.R.R. (“In re L.M.A.R. II”), No. DA 25-0305, Order (Mont. June 17, 2025). Buck never filed her own briefs in this matter. Thus, we only address the arguments raised by the Parents in the briefs submitted prior to the submission of this case on briefs. In re L.M.A.R. II, No. DA 25-0305, Order (Mont. Oct 1, 2025). 2 being behind on wellness appointments, the Parents’ history of domestic violence and

substance abuse, and the Parents’ “lack of motivation and parenting skills to care for the

[C]hildren.” In re L.M.A.R., ¶ 3. The Department placed the Children with the

Grandparents in March 2018. In re L.M.A.R., ¶ 4. Rehbein and the Department agreed

that Rehbein would start therapy, facilitate N.R.R.’s participation in therapy, undergo drug

testing, take parenting classes, and address the medical, dental, and education needs of the

Children. In re L.M.A.R., ¶ 4. Buck maintained some contact with the Children but refused

to wear a drug patch or undergo treatment. In re L.M.A.R., ¶ 4.

¶5 In October 2018, the Grandparents petitioned for guardianship of the Children and

Rehbein voluntarily signed the consent documents agreeing to the guardianship. In re

L.M.A.R., ¶ 4. The Grandparents were appointed as guardians in February 2019. In re

L.M.A.R., ¶ 4. As guardians, the Grandparents allowed supervised visits between the

Children and the Parents, though these visits were limited while Rehbein was incarcerated

on unrelated offenses from April until December 2019. In re L.M.A.R., ¶ 5. When released,

Rehbein reunited with Buck and helped her achieve sobriety; visitation increased gradually

to include unsupervised overnight visits on weekends. In re L.M.A.R., ¶ 5.

¶6 In April 2022, the Parents moved to terminate the guardianship. The Grandparents

petitioned to intervene and requested the court grant them a third-party parental interest.

In re L.M.A.R., ¶ 6. Both parties stipulated to the appointment of a Guardian ad Litem

(“GAL”), who, upon completion of her investigation, delivered a report to the court

recommending the Grandparents be granted a parental interest, the Children continue

residing with the Grandparents, and that supervised visitation with the Parents continue.

3 In re L.M.A.R., ¶ 6. This Court affirmed the District Court’s grant of a third-party parental

interest to the Grandparents. In re L.M.A.R., ¶ 20. The District Court’s parenting plan

required the Parents remain sober from illicit drugs, not abuse alcohol or marijuana,

continue engaging in counseling, and ameliorate other safety concerns for the Children in

order to have unsupervised parenting time.

¶7 In the instant case, the Grandparents filed an Emergency Ex Parte Motion for

Interim Relief, Requesting Reappointment of the GAL and Amendment of Parenting Plan

to Suspend Visitation Pending GAL Investigation in the District Court on February 25,

2025, due to safety concerns shared by the Children with their therapists and because the

Parents had ceased engaging with counseling. The court issued an order suspending

contact between the Parents and Children the same day. On March 17, 2025, the District

Court held a contested hearing with both parties present. The Parents testified, as did the

Children’s therapists. The court also conducted an in-chambers interview of N.R.R.

¶8 A therapist who has treated L.M.A.R. since June 2022 testified about the necessity

of supervised visits between L.M.A.R. and the Parents. The therapist noted a resistance by

L.M.A.R. to attending therapy “not present before [L.M.A.R.] began spending more time

with [the Parents].” The therapist suggested it would be helpful for “a neutral third-party

supervisor to provide some objectivity.” L.M.A.R. shared safety concerns with her

therapist, specifically that Buck had punched holes in the walls during a visit because Buck

believed there were mice in the walls. The therapist diagnosed L.M.A.R. with Generalized

Anxiety Disorder.

4 ¶9 The court heard testimony from N.R.R.’s therapist, who diagnosed N.R.R. with

chronic Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”). Early in her treatment in June 2022,

when discussing her parents, N.R.R. would dissociate, curl up in a fetal position, and hum

to herself. N.R.R. reverted to this behavior after she began to spend weekends with her

Parents. N.R.R. would dig at her face during counseling sessions following these

weekends. The court found the Parents “have not been interested in supporting [N.R.R.’s]

counseling until right before the court hearing” and “appear to have been actively

interfering by telling [N.R.R.] she is not allowed to talk about them in counseling[.]”

N.R.R. instructed her therapist not to tell Buck about the content of the counseling sessions

because N.R.R. was “very nervous” that Buck was asking questions about what she had

disclosed in those sessions. N.R.R. preferred her therapist provide information about her

sessions only to the Grandparents. The court noted the therapist “further opined that

[N.R.R.] is attempting to make [the Parents] look good because she has been promised no

chores, unlimited electronic time, and [a] new skateboard if she comes to live with them.”

On February 19, 2025, the therapist, with N.R.R.’s permission, sent a letter to the

Grandparents recommending reappointment of a GAL and reinstatement of supervised

visits between the Parents and N.R.R. due to disclosures from N.R.R. that she feared for

her safety and the safety of L.M.A.R. The therapist maintained the confidentiality of other

disclosures at N.R.R.’s request because of N.R.R.’s concern for her safety.

¶10 Both therapists testified the Children appeared much more relaxed and calmer in

sessions after the court suspended visitation with the Parents.

5 ¶11 On April 1, 2025, the court conducted an in-chambers interview with N.R.R., over

the objection of the Parents. On the day of the scheduled in-chambers interview, N.R.R.

became upset by Rehbein’s presence in the courthouse parking lot. Rehbein made N.R.R.

“nervous.” During the interview, N.R.R. did not want to disclose any additional

information to the court. However, N.R.R. confirmed previous disclosures as reported by

her therapist, including that she distrusted her parents; she feared she would have to hide

from her parents in the woods; she feared their response when they talked to the

Department; she felt safer at her Grandparents’ house; she feared the relationship between

her and her Parents could become physically violent again; she had an awareness the

Parents were “bribing [her] with nice things after they do something abusive”; and she felt

“sick to [her] stomach thinking about going to [the Parents’] for the weekend.”

¶12 Despite the court having no physical safety concerns for the Children while in the

Parents’ home, it found the atmosphere created by the Parents was “not conducive to

raising N.R.R., who suffers from PTSD as a result of her prior relationship with them, and

L.M.A.R., who suffers from a generalized anxiety disorder for the same reasons.” The

court noted the anecdote shared by L.M.A.R. about Buck punching the walls as concerning

but not constituting current evidence of chemical dependency concerns. Additionally, the

court found Rehbein’s appearance at the courthouse prior to the interview, which violated

the standing order that Rehbein not have in-person contact with the Children, was very

distressing to N.R.R. N.R.R. expressed a desire to remain living with the Grandparents,

and to have only supervised visits with the Parents. Conversely, L.M.A.R. was too young

to have a specific preference. The court also found the Children had a positive relationship

6 with each other and their Grandparents; appeared “well-adjusted to home, school, and

community[;]” and were in “good physical health.” The court found the developmental

needs of the Children included continuity and stability of care, as well as physical and

psychological safety in the home, which the Grandparents provided. The court observed

that although the Children were fixated on their safety while in the Parents’ care, the

Parents had not made any attempts to alleviate those concerns.

¶13 Based on the foregoing, the District Court found there was a change in

circumstances which necessitated an amendment to the parenting plan. The court ordered

that the Children would remain in the primary residential care of the Grandparents, with

supervised visitations every other weekend with the Parents for as much time as could be

arranged with the provider. The court also ordered the Parents could have mid-week

supervised visits. If the Children chose to participate, the Parents could also have daily

telephone or video calls. The court declined to reappoint the GAL, due to the deterioration

in the relationship between the GAL and the Parents. However, the court held that should

the visit supervisor recommend unsupervised visitation, but the Grandparents disagree with

that recommendation, the Parents may move to amend the parenting plan.

¶14 On appeal, the Parents raise a myriad of issues, which we restate as follows:

(1) whether the District Court violated § 41-3-205, MCA, and their due process rights by

relying on sealed Department records when it granted a third-party parental interest to the

Grandparents; (2) whether the court’s judgment granting the Grandparents a third-party

parental interest is void; (3) whether the court improperly relied on the GAL; (4) whether

their due process rights were violated when the court did not respond to certain filings and

7 motions; (5) whether this Court erred by denying their motion to supplement the record;

(6) whether the Parents are entitled to en banc review and reassignment of justices on this

Court; and, finally, (7) whether the District Court abused its discretion in amending the

parenting plan.2

¶15 The Parents’ first three issues are easily disposed under the doctrine of the law of

the case. A prior decision of this Court resolving a particular issue between the same

parties in the same case is binding and cannot be relitigated. State v. Wooster, 2001 MT 4,

¶ 12, 304 Mont. 56, 16 P.3d 409. Here, this Court has previously considered the first three

issues in the Parents’ previous appeal of the judgment granting a third-party parental

interest to the Grandparents and affirmed. In re L.M.A.R., ¶¶ 16, 20; see also Rehbein v.

Eleventh Jud. Dist. Ct., No. OP 25-0170, Order (Mont. Mar. 18, 2025) (Order denying

Parents’ petition for supervisory control of the instant case because “[the Parents] have

appealed the District Court’s decision. Their voices have been heard, and it is evident they

do not agree with the appeal’s outcome. This Court declines to review this case again[.]”).

We will not now entertain the Parents’ attack on that judgment in this appeal.

¶16 The Parents argue that the District Court violated their due process rights when it

“abandoned its duty to provide a neutral, accessible forum” and when the court did not

respond to various motions and objections lodged by the Parents. However, “[t]he court is

not required to state findings or conclusions when ruling on a motion unless these rules

2 The Grandparents, in their response brief, ask this Court to designate the Parents vexatious litigants pursuant to M. R. App. P. 19(5), a designation unsuccessfully requested in the proceedings below. We likewise decline to declare the Parents vexatious litigants at this juncture. 8 provide otherwise.” M. R. Civ. P. 52. The rules do not otherwise require the court to

respond to the motions and filings at issue here. The Parents do not provide any relevant

or supporting authority for their due process claim. As we have repeatedly said, “we are

not obligated to develop arguments on behalf of parties to an appeal, nor are we to guess a

party’s precise position, or develop legal analysis that may lend support to his position.”

Estate of Harris v. Reilly, 2025 MT 126, ¶ 16, 422 Mont. 383, 570 P.3d 552 (quotation

omitted). This Court will not consider unsupported issues or arguments. Penado v. Hunter,

2024 MT 216, ¶ 20, 418 Mont. 167, 557 P.3d 434 (quotation omitted).

¶17 The Parents argue the Attorney General’s declining to address purported

constitutional issues in their appeal further prejudiced their due process rights and allowed

this Court to “usurp[] executive authority” of the Attorney General in violation of

separation of powers principles. Because we do not reach any constitutional issues in

deciding the instant case, we do not address these arguments.

¶18 We have already addressed the Parent’s request to supplement the record, both as

an initial matter and on their motion for reconsideration. In re L.M.A.R. II, No. DA 25-0305,

Order (Mont. June 17, 2025) (Order denying motion to supplement the record); In re

L.M.A.R. II, No. DA 25-0305, Order (Mont. July 15, 2025) (denying motion for

reconsideration of order denying supplementation). We decline to do so again here.

¶19 As for the Parents’ request for en banc review and reassignment of justices, we

likewise find this without merit. The Parents provide no authority in support of their

request for en banc review, and we decline to construct an argument for them now. The

authorities the Parents cite in support of their argument for reassignment are inapposite to

9 the facts and posture of the instant case. Moreover, no authority supports the Parents’

argument that they are entitled to a panel of justices who have not heard In re L.M.A.R. or

ruled on motions in the present appeal. Penado, ¶ 20; Estate of Harris, ¶ 16.

¶20 The remaining issue raised on appeal is whether the District Court abused its

discretion amending the parenting plan.

¶21 “District courts have broad discretion to make and modify parenting plans under the

applicable standards of §§ 40-4-212, -219, and -220, MCA, and this Court reviews

parenting plan determinations and modifications for a clear abuse of discretion.” In re

F.L.F.L.K., 2025 MT 41, ¶ 11, 421 Mont. 1, 564 P.3d 844 (citing In re Marriage of

Bessette, 2019 MT 35, ¶ 13, 394 Mont. 262, 434 P.3d 894). An abuse of discretion occurs

if it is based on clearly erroneous findings of fact, erroneous conclusions of law, or

otherwise is arbitrary, without conscientious judgment, or exceeds the bounds of reason

resulting in substantial injustice. In re Bessette, ¶ 13. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous

if not supported by substantial evidence, the court misapprehended the effect of the

evidence, or there is a definite and firm conviction that the lower court was mistaken

following review of the record. In re Bessette, ¶ 13.

¶22 In its discretion, a district court may modify a previously imposed parenting plan

only upon finding that (1) a change in the circumstances of the child exists based on facts

that have arisen since the prior plan or that were unknown to the court at the time of entry

of the prior plan, and (2) amendment or modification is necessary to serve the best interest

of the child based on consideration of the relevant criteria specified in §§ 40-4-212

and -219(1), MCA. In re Bessette, ¶ 16 (citing § 40-4-219(1), MCA).

10 ¶23 Here, the Children experienced a change in circumstances due to facts which had

arisen since the prior plan was instituted. Under the prior parenting plan, the Parents were

required to attend therapy. The present proceedings began when the Parents ceased

compliance with this requirement. Further, the Parents’ unsupervised time was conditioned

on ameliorating certain safety concerns. Based upon the testimony of the Children’s

therapists, as well as the court’s in-chambers interview with N.R.R., concerns regarding

the Children’s safety when spending unsupervised time with the Parents had developed

and were substantial. This is supported by the evidence that when Rehbein appeared at the

courthouse on the day of the in-chambers interview, in violation of the court’s order,

N.R.R. became very anxious and fearful. The District Court did not err in finding there

was a change of circumstances.

¶24 Having determined that the circumstances underlying the parenting plan had

changed, we consider whether amending the parenting plan was in the Children’s best

interest. Section 40-4-212, MCA, mandates the court determine the parenting plan in

accordance with the best interests of the Children. “The court shall consider all relevant

parenting factors[.]” Section 40-4-212(1), MCA.

¶25 Here, the District Court made the requisite findings under § 40-4-212, MCA, that

amending the parenting plan was in the best interests of the Children. Notably, the Parents

do not challenge these findings. Instead, they assert the court erroneously relied on sealed

Department records. This argument fails because no such records are referenced in the

order appealed. The Parents provide that a letter stating that the Department’s investigation

into a recent report was closed as unsubstantiated, which was conducted after the current

11 proceedings began, is evidence in their favor. No information concerning the substance of

that report was provided. Otherwise, the Parents presented no evidence rebutting the

testimony or challenging the credibility of the Children’s therapists, who, contrary to the

Parents’ argument now on appeal, had no obligation to be neutral. The therapists’ role was

to assist their clients—the Children—and, to that end, they raised safety concerns because

of information disclosed during therapy. These concerns were reinforced by N.R.R.’s

in-chambers interview. The District Court was in the best position to evaluate the best

interests of the child. In re Z.N.-M., ¶ 40, 2023 MT 202, 413 Mont. 502, 538 P.3d 21. It

is not this Court’s function to reweigh conflicting evidence or substitute its judgment

regarding the strength of the evidence for that of the district court. In re G.M.N., 2019 MT

18, ¶ 11, 394 Mont. 112, 433 P.3d 715 (citation omitted). The District Court’s factual

findings were not clearly erroneous. The District Court properly considered the best

interests of the Children in amending the parenting plan.

¶26 Having reviewed the record, we conclude the District Court did not abuse its

discretion in amending the parenting plan. A change in circumstance existed due to the

Parents’ noncompliance with the existing parenting plan and the amendment of the

parenting plan was in the best interests of the Children. The other issues raised by the

Parents here are similarly unsuccessful. Accordingly, the District Court is affirmed.

¶27 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our

Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the

Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of

applicable standards of review.

12 /S/ LAURIE McKINNON

We Concur:

/S/ CORY J. SWANSON /S/ BETH BAKER /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON /S/ JIM RICE