Case: 24-2140 Document: 226 Page: 1 Filed: 05/06/2025
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ______________________
EDMOND GEORGE PARENTEAU, WILLIAM HERCULES DAVIS, JR., REVETTE MARCELLA HARVEY, MARC DAVID WISHENGRAD, AMY MERCURY, Plaintiffs-Appellants
v.
UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee ______________________
2024-2140 ______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims in No. 1:24-cv-00736-KCD, Judge Kathryn C. Davis. ______________________
Decided: May 6, 2025 ______________________
EDMOND GEORGE PARENTEAU, I, Guilford, NY, pro se.
WILLIAM DAVIS, JR., Morehead, NC, pro se.
REVETTE MARCELLA HARVEY, Riverdale, GA, pro se.
MARC DAVID WISHENGRAD, New York, NY, pro se.
AMY MERCURY, Amherst, MA, pro se. Case: 24-2140 Document: 226 Page: 2 Filed: 05/06/2025
ALEXANDER BREWER, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash- ington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, CLAUDIA BURKE, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY. ______________________ PER CURIAM. Edmond G. Parenteau, William H. Davis, Jr., Revette M. Harvey, Marc D. Wishengrad, and Amy Mercury (col- lectively, “appellants”) filed complaints in the United States Court of Federal Claims (Claims Court) seeking in- junctive relief prohibiting state enforcement of traffic laws against them, as well as $6,000,000 in damages each. The Claims Court dismissed the complaints for lack of subject- matter jurisdiction. Memorandum Opinion and Order at 1, Parenteau v. United States, No. 24-736 (Fed. Cl. June 18, 2024), ECF No. 5 (Opinion). On appeal, we affirm. I On May 7, 2024, appellants filed complaints in the Claims Court alleging that they were unlawfully subjected to traffic enforcement in several states: New York, New Jersey, Georgia, North Carolina, and Massachusetts. 1 Complaint at 2, Parenteau v. United States, No. 24-736 (Fed. Cl. May 7, 2024), ECF No. 1 (Complaint); Govern- ment Supplemental Appendix (S. Appx.) 1–2. Referring to state departments of motor vehicles (DMVs), appellants re- quested an injunction against the United States and vari- ous “State[] Instrumentalit[ie]s such as DMV Departments” to prevent enforcement of “corporate DMV
1 The complaints contain “both joint and separate al- legations . . . for each [appellant].” Opinion, at 1 n.1. We cite primarily to Mr. Parenteau’s complaint, which is the “most inclusive of the five.” Id. at 5. Case: 24-2140 Document: 226 Page: 3 Filed: 05/06/2025
PARENTEAU v. US 3
statutes, codes[,] and regulations,” Complaint, at 2, as well as $6,000,000 in damages for each appellant, id. at 8. The complaints refer to occasions on which appellants were fined or arrested by state government officials in connec- tion with asserting their “right to freely travel without in- terference as one exempt from all DMV statutory [a]uthority and jurisdiction.” See, e.g., id. at 7–8. The Claims Court dismissed the complaints sua sponte for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on June 18, 2024, un- der Rule 12(h)(3) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims. Opinion, at 1; see also Judgment at 1, Parenteau v. United States, No. 24-736 (Fed. Cl. June 20, 2024), ECF No. 6. The Claims Court identified three bases for dismissing the complaints: (1) appellants’ claims did not involve actions of the United States, Opinion, at 4; (2) ap- pellants did not identify “a money-mandating source of law that could provide a basis for an award of damages,” id. at 5; and (3) appellants sought injunctive relief that was not “tied and subordinate to” a money judgment, id. at 6. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1)–(2). Appellants filed a timely appeal to this court, see 28 U.S.C. § 2522, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3). II This court reviews the Claims Court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Bannum, Inc. v. United States, 779 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015). We review the Claims Court’s determination of its own ju- risdiction in this case without deference because “the Claims Court based its ruling on the motion [to dismiss] entirely on unchallenged jurisdictional facts and did not adjudicate any challenges to jurisdictional allegations of fact.” Ravi v. United States, 104 F.4th 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (internal citations omitted); see also Taylor v. United States, 303 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Case: 24-2140 Document: 226 Page: 4 Filed: 05/06/2025
The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1)–(2), grants the Claims Court jurisdiction over claims “against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1); see Abbey v. United States, 745 F.3d 1363, 1368–69 (Fed. Cir. 2014). “[T]he Tucker Act constitutes a waiver of sovereign immun- ity with respect to those [specified] claims,” but “does not create substantive rights, which must be found in other sources of law, like statutes or contracts.” Ravi, 104 F.4th at 1363 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983); Maine Com- munity Health Options v. United States, 590 U.S. 296, 322 (2020)). Of the three bases for the Claims Court’s dismissal, ap- pellants do not challenge the third: i.e., they do not chal- lenge the dismissal of claims for injunctive relief. Appellants challenge only the Claims Court’s rationales that appellants’ claims did not involve actions of the United States and that appellants did not identify a money-man- dating source of law. See Parenteau Informal Br. at 1–7.2 We address those challenges in turn. A The Claims Court’s jurisdiction under the Tucker Act requires that claims be “against the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1); see United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 588 (1941) (“[I]f the relief sought is against others than the United States[,] the suit as to them must be
2 Citations are to Mr. Parenteau’s Corrected Open- ing Brief, ECF No. 161. The corresponding briefs of the other appellants are materially identical. See ECF Nos. 162–64, 167. Case: 24-2140 Document: 226 Page: 5 Filed: 05/06/2025
PARENTEAU v. US 5
ignored as beyond the jurisdiction of the court.”). To meet this requirement, there must be “substantive allegations” against the United States: It is insufficient, without more, that the plaintiff “literally name[] the United States as the sole defendant.” May Co., Inc. v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 414, 416 (1997); cf. Beauvais v. United States, No.
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Case: 24-2140 Document: 226 Page: 1 Filed: 05/06/2025
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ______________________
EDMOND GEORGE PARENTEAU, WILLIAM HERCULES DAVIS, JR., REVETTE MARCELLA HARVEY, MARC DAVID WISHENGRAD, AMY MERCURY, Plaintiffs-Appellants
v.
UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee ______________________
2024-2140 ______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims in No. 1:24-cv-00736-KCD, Judge Kathryn C. Davis. ______________________
Decided: May 6, 2025 ______________________
EDMOND GEORGE PARENTEAU, I, Guilford, NY, pro se.
WILLIAM DAVIS, JR., Morehead, NC, pro se.
REVETTE MARCELLA HARVEY, Riverdale, GA, pro se.
MARC DAVID WISHENGRAD, New York, NY, pro se.
AMY MERCURY, Amherst, MA, pro se. Case: 24-2140 Document: 226 Page: 2 Filed: 05/06/2025
ALEXANDER BREWER, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash- ington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, CLAUDIA BURKE, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY. ______________________ PER CURIAM. Edmond G. Parenteau, William H. Davis, Jr., Revette M. Harvey, Marc D. Wishengrad, and Amy Mercury (col- lectively, “appellants”) filed complaints in the United States Court of Federal Claims (Claims Court) seeking in- junctive relief prohibiting state enforcement of traffic laws against them, as well as $6,000,000 in damages each. The Claims Court dismissed the complaints for lack of subject- matter jurisdiction. Memorandum Opinion and Order at 1, Parenteau v. United States, No. 24-736 (Fed. Cl. June 18, 2024), ECF No. 5 (Opinion). On appeal, we affirm. I On May 7, 2024, appellants filed complaints in the Claims Court alleging that they were unlawfully subjected to traffic enforcement in several states: New York, New Jersey, Georgia, North Carolina, and Massachusetts. 1 Complaint at 2, Parenteau v. United States, No. 24-736 (Fed. Cl. May 7, 2024), ECF No. 1 (Complaint); Govern- ment Supplemental Appendix (S. Appx.) 1–2. Referring to state departments of motor vehicles (DMVs), appellants re- quested an injunction against the United States and vari- ous “State[] Instrumentalit[ie]s such as DMV Departments” to prevent enforcement of “corporate DMV
1 The complaints contain “both joint and separate al- legations . . . for each [appellant].” Opinion, at 1 n.1. We cite primarily to Mr. Parenteau’s complaint, which is the “most inclusive of the five.” Id. at 5. Case: 24-2140 Document: 226 Page: 3 Filed: 05/06/2025
PARENTEAU v. US 3
statutes, codes[,] and regulations,” Complaint, at 2, as well as $6,000,000 in damages for each appellant, id. at 8. The complaints refer to occasions on which appellants were fined or arrested by state government officials in connec- tion with asserting their “right to freely travel without in- terference as one exempt from all DMV statutory [a]uthority and jurisdiction.” See, e.g., id. at 7–8. The Claims Court dismissed the complaints sua sponte for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on June 18, 2024, un- der Rule 12(h)(3) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims. Opinion, at 1; see also Judgment at 1, Parenteau v. United States, No. 24-736 (Fed. Cl. June 20, 2024), ECF No. 6. The Claims Court identified three bases for dismissing the complaints: (1) appellants’ claims did not involve actions of the United States, Opinion, at 4; (2) ap- pellants did not identify “a money-mandating source of law that could provide a basis for an award of damages,” id. at 5; and (3) appellants sought injunctive relief that was not “tied and subordinate to” a money judgment, id. at 6. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1)–(2). Appellants filed a timely appeal to this court, see 28 U.S.C. § 2522, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3). II This court reviews the Claims Court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Bannum, Inc. v. United States, 779 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015). We review the Claims Court’s determination of its own ju- risdiction in this case without deference because “the Claims Court based its ruling on the motion [to dismiss] entirely on unchallenged jurisdictional facts and did not adjudicate any challenges to jurisdictional allegations of fact.” Ravi v. United States, 104 F.4th 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (internal citations omitted); see also Taylor v. United States, 303 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Case: 24-2140 Document: 226 Page: 4 Filed: 05/06/2025
The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1)–(2), grants the Claims Court jurisdiction over claims “against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1); see Abbey v. United States, 745 F.3d 1363, 1368–69 (Fed. Cir. 2014). “[T]he Tucker Act constitutes a waiver of sovereign immun- ity with respect to those [specified] claims,” but “does not create substantive rights, which must be found in other sources of law, like statutes or contracts.” Ravi, 104 F.4th at 1363 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983); Maine Com- munity Health Options v. United States, 590 U.S. 296, 322 (2020)). Of the three bases for the Claims Court’s dismissal, ap- pellants do not challenge the third: i.e., they do not chal- lenge the dismissal of claims for injunctive relief. Appellants challenge only the Claims Court’s rationales that appellants’ claims did not involve actions of the United States and that appellants did not identify a money-man- dating source of law. See Parenteau Informal Br. at 1–7.2 We address those challenges in turn. A The Claims Court’s jurisdiction under the Tucker Act requires that claims be “against the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1); see United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 588 (1941) (“[I]f the relief sought is against others than the United States[,] the suit as to them must be
2 Citations are to Mr. Parenteau’s Corrected Open- ing Brief, ECF No. 161. The corresponding briefs of the other appellants are materially identical. See ECF Nos. 162–64, 167. Case: 24-2140 Document: 226 Page: 5 Filed: 05/06/2025
PARENTEAU v. US 5
ignored as beyond the jurisdiction of the court.”). To meet this requirement, there must be “substantive allegations” against the United States: It is insufficient, without more, that the plaintiff “literally name[] the United States as the sole defendant.” May Co., Inc. v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 414, 416 (1997); cf. Beauvais v. United States, No. 24-1353, 2024 WL 2860170, at *1 (Fed. Cir. June 6, 2024) (nonprec- edential) (no subject-matter jurisdiction where complaint “list[ed] the United States” but allegations related only to other entities); Jaye v. United States, 781 F. Appx. 994, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (nonprecedential) (same); Doiban v. United States, 173 Fed. Cl. 527, 535–36 (2024) (collecting cases). Such allegations are essential for the claim of liability of the United States to be non-frivolous, a requirement for ju- risdiction. See Columbus Regional Hospital v. United States, 990 F.3d 1330, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (no jurisdiction over frivolous allegation within a Tucker Act category). Appellants argue that they “did in fact assert allega- tions against the United States,” Parenteau Informal Br. at 5, but the content of appellants’ complaints indicates that there are no “substantive allegations” against the United States. May, 38 Fed. Cl. at 416; see Brazos Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v. United States, 144 F.3d 784, 787 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[W]e customarily look to the substance of the pleadings rather than their form.”). The Claims Court correctly explained that “each [appellant’s] factual allega- tions concern . . . incident(s) where state entities or officials enforced traffic laws against him or her” and “d[id] not in- volve actions of the United States.” Opinion, at 4. There are no non-frivolous allegations that make the United States liable. B To come within the Claims Court’s jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, appellants’ claims must be founded in a “money-mandating source” of substantive law. See Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172–73 (Fed. Cir. 2005) Case: 24-2140 Document: 226 Page: 6 Filed: 05/06/2025
(“The Tucker Act itself does not create a substantive cause of action; in order to come within the jurisdictional reach and the waiver of the Tucker Act, a plaintiff must identify a separate source of substantive law that creates the right to money damages.” (citing Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 216)); 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). Appellants have not met this require- ment. Appellants argue that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution provides the requisite money-mandating source of substantive law. See Parenteau Informal Br. at 5. This argument must fail for at least two reasons. First, appellants do not explain why the Takings Clause applies to their claims. Second, they did not plead a takings claim to the Claims Court, see Com- plaint, at 1–10, and a claim not properly presented in the trial court is forfeited, San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 639 F.3d 1346, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). Appellants also argue that 15 U.S.C. § 1125, a provi- sion of the Lanham Act, provides the requisite money-man- dating source of substantive law. Parenteau Informal Br. at 5. But district courts, not the Claims Court, have juris- diction over “all actions arising under” the Lanham Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1121(a); Proxtronics Dosimetry, LLC v. United States, 128 Fed. Cl. 656, 672 (2016) (“It is an unre- markable proposition that the Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction over Lanham Act claims.”). Because the Lanham Act names the district courts as the proper federal forum, the Claims Court lacks Tucker Act jurisdiction. See United States v. Bormes, 568 U.S. 6, 11–13 (2012). III We have reviewed the remainder of appellants’ argu- ments in their various filings and find them unpersuasive. We affirm the Claims Court’s decision to dismiss appel- lants’ claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Case: 24-2140 Document: 226 Page: 7 Filed: 05/06/2025
PARENTEAU v. US 7
The parties shall bear their own costs. AFFIRMED