25CA1247 Parental Resp Conc YKH 09-03-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1247 El Paso County District Court No. 22DR31836 Honorable Chad Miller, Judge
In re the Parental Responsibilities Concerning Y.K.H., a Child, and Concerning Rasha Chimene Khalaf, Appellee, and Rudolf Haraga, Appellant.
JUDGMENT AND ORDERS AFFIRMED
Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN Meirink and Taubman*, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced September 3, 2026
Law Office of Joel M Pratt, Joel M Pratt, Colorado Springs, Colorado; Jessica K. Peck, Attorney at Law, LLC, Jessica K. Peck, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee
Rudolf Haraga, Pro Se
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2026.
¶1 Rudolf Haraga (father) appeals the district court’s permanent orders allocating parental responsibilities between him and Rasha Chimene Khalaf (mother), as well as other interlocutory and postjudgment orders. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In October 2022, mother petitioned for an allocation of parental responsibilities for the parties’ shared minor child. After holding a hearing, the district court issued permanent orders in May 2025. In the permanent orders, the court awarded the parties equal parenting time and implemented a 5-2-2-5 schedule to accommodate father’s frequent travel. In doing so, it clarified that mother would have a right of first refusal to care for the child when father couldn’t provide care during his parenting time.
¶3 The court also granted the parties joint decision-making authority, clarifying that mother would have tiebreaking authority if the parties couldn’t agree.
II. Discussion
¶4 Father challenges the district court’s permanent orders and various interlocutory and postjudgment orders on several grounds. We address each contention in turn and discern no reversible error.
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A. General Legal Principles
¶5 When allocating parental responsibilities, a district court must “determine the allocation of parental responsibilities, including parenting time and decision-making responsibilities, in accordance with the best interests of the child,” giving paramount consideration to the child’s safety and physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs. § 14-10-124(1.5), C.R.S. 2026.
¶6 Allocating parental responsibilities falls within the district court’s “sound discretion.” In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 15. If the district court’s findings are supported by the record, “its resolution of conflicting evidence is binding on review.” Id.
B. Prehearing Orders
¶7 Before holding the permanent orders hearing, the district court issued three interlocutory orders that father challenges on appeal. We address each challenge but see no basis to reverse.
1. Compelling Father’s Counsel to Attend Mediation
¶8 After the litigation commenced, the district court ordered the parties to attend mediation. See § 13-22-311(1), C.R.S. 2026 (subject to certain limitations, a court may, “in its discretion, refer
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any case for mediation services”). Mother requested that the court compel father’s attorney to attend mediation, arguing that father would otherwise have no incentive to meaningfully participate.1 Father countered that he couldn’t afford to pay his attorney to attend the mediation.
¶9 The court granted mother’s motion and ordered father’s attorney to attend mediation, reasoning that his attorney’s attendance would maximize the chances of reaching a resolution and therefore save the parties money. The parties and their attorneys attended mediation but didn’t reach an agreement. Shortly thereafter, the court granted father’s attorney’s request to withdraw.
¶ 10 On appeal, father contends that the district court erred by compelling his attorney to attend mediation. He argues that the court’s ruling “produced collateral consequences” because he incurred additional attorney fees and his attorney later withdrew, forcing him to litigate the remainder of the case without counsel.
1 Nothing in the record suggests that father’s attorney had agreed to
provide limited legal services as authorized by C.R.C.P. 11(b) and Colo. RPC 1.2(c).
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He requests that we vacate the court’s order and “provide public policy” on this issue.
¶ 11 But vacating the court’s order wouldn’t allow father to recoup the fees he paid his attorney. See In re Marriage of Weydert, 703 P.2d 1336, 1337 (Colo. App. 1985) (“A court may not adjudicate the rights of persons not actually or constructively before it.”). And we can’t appoint counsel for father or force the district court to retry this case with father represented by counsel. See In re Marriage of Hartley, 886 P.2d 665, 674 n.16 (Colo. 1994) (the constitutional right to counsel doesn’t extend to proceedings under the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act).
¶ 12 Even putting aside those concerns, a more fundamental problem exists: We can’t issue a judicial opinion simply to “provide public policy” if the requested relief would have no practical effect on an existing controversy. See Stor-N-Lock Partners # 15, LLC v. City of Thornton, 2018 COA 65, ¶ 38 (“[W]e must avoid issuing advisory opinions.”); Taylor v. State Pers. Bd., 228 P.3d 273, 278-79 (Colo. App. 2010) (declining to address a party’s contention because the requested relief “would do nothing more than state a legal conclusion regarding what should have occurred” and wouldn’t
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“afford [the party] any present relief”). Father doesn’t identify what practical effect an order relieving his attorney from having to attend mediation would have at this stage.
¶ 13 Accordingly, we decline to review father’s challenge to the court’s order requiring his attorney to attend mediation.
2. Stop Threats Order
¶ 14 Father next contends that a “stop threats” order issued by the district court violated his right to due process. In response to mother’s motion requesting that the court “implement boundaries in communication between the parties” due to father’s “escalating pattern of threats [and] harassment,” the court ordered father to cease threatening communications:
With respect to t[h]reats contained in emails: . . . Father is ordered to IMMEDIATELY cease making any of these threats to Petitioner Mother, and/or her counsel. If [father]
believes he has a meritorious claim [against mother’s counsel] he may bring that claim to the attention of the appropriate regulatory body without continuing to threaten to do so.
Because the court issued its order before father had an opportunity to respond, father claims the court denied him due process and violated C.R.C.P. 121, section 1-15(1)(b). See In re Marriage of
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Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 329 (Colo. App. 2007) (“The opportunity to be heard is an inherent element of due process . . . .”).
¶ 15 We agree with father that the court erred by ruling on mother’s motion without first affording him an opportunity to respond. Rule 121, section 1-15(1)(b), states that a party responding to a motion “shall have 21 days after the filing of the motion or such lesser or greater time as the court may allow in which to file a responsive brief.” Here, the court issued its ruling just three days after mother filed her motion, before father had responded, and without first shortening father’s response period. See Francis v. Dahl, 107 P.3d 1171, 1175 (Colo. App. 2005) (“A trial court abuses its discretion when it grants a motion before the nonmoving party responds within the time allowed under C.R.C.P. 121 § 1-15(1).”).
¶ 16 Although the court erred, we nonetheless discern no basis to reverse. Father hasn’t explained how the order directing him to cease making threats prejudiced his substantial rights, nor do we perceive any such prejudice. See C.A.R. 35(c) (“The appellate court may disregard any error or defect not affecting the substantial rights of the parties.”); C.R.C.P. 61 (similar); Poudre Valley Rural Elec. Ass’n v. City of Loveland, 807 P.2d 547, 557 (Colo. 1991) (“[I]t
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is incumbent upon [the complaining party] to show that the error was prejudicial.”).
¶ 17 Under these circumstances, we decline to disturb the district court’s stop threats order.
3. Denial of Attorney Fees
¶ 18 Father also contends that the district court erred by denying his prehearing motion for attorney fees under section 13-17-102, C.R.S. 2026. Specifically, relying on In re Marriage of Aldrich, 945 P.2d 1370 (Colo. 1997), father contends that the court erred by denying his motion without making findings.
¶ 19 Section 13-17-102(4) requires the court to assess attorney fees if, as relevant here, a party brings or defends an action “that lacked substantial justification,” interposes an action for “delay or harassment,” or “unnecessarily expand[s] the proceeding by other improper conduct.” We review a district court’s order granting or denying attorney fees under section 13-17-102 for an abuse of discretion and reverse only if the court’s decision isn’t supported by the evidence. See Spring Creek Ranchers Ass’n v. McNichols, 165 P.3d 244, 245-46 (Colo. 2007). A court abuses its discretion when
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its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it misapplies the law. Herrera v. Lerma, 2018 COA 141, ¶ 14.
¶ 20 We conclude that father misreads Aldrich. In that case, the supreme court didn’t hold that a district court must make findings anytime it rules on an attorney fees motion under section 13-17- 102. See Aldrich, 945 P.2d at 1379. Rather, it said that a district court must make findings “to award attorney fees and costs under section 13–17–102.” Aldrich, 945 P.2d at 1379 (emphasis added). Here, the district court didn’t award father attorney fees, so Aldrich doesn’t apply.
¶ 21 Further, father argued below that mother’s filing of serial motions, including advocating for three continuances, improperly expanded the proceedings and therefore entitled him to fees under section 13-17-102(4). But of mother’s eight motions that father identified, the district court ultimately denied only one — mother’s motion to appoint a child legal representative.2 Cf. Colo. Ins. Guar.
2 While the court initially denied mother’s motion to terminate the
parental responsibilities evaluator (PRE), it later excluded the PRE’s testimony. Similarly, the court initially denied mother’s motion to continue a February 29, 2024, hearing but eventually changed course and granted the requested continuance.
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Ass’n v. Menor, 166 P.3d 205, 216 (Colo. App. 2007) (concluding appeal didn’t lack substantial justification because the division ruled in appellant’s favor). In addition, the court’s permanent orders addressed the delay arguments advanced by father, finding that “both sides” caused delays and that other delays weren’t “caused by either party.”
¶ 22 On this record, we conclude that the district court didn’t abuse its discretion by denying father’s motion for attorney fees.
C. Expert-Related Rulings
¶ 23 Father also contends that the district court abused its discretion when ruling on the admissibility of three proffered experts. We detect no abuse of discretion.
1. Additional Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 24 CRE 702 provides that “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” To be admissible under the rule, the expert testimony must be both
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reliable and relevant. Core-Mark Midcontinent, Inc. v. Sonitrol Corp., 2012 COA 120, ¶ 28.
¶ 25 To determine whether testimony meets these requirements, the court must consider whether (1) the expert utilized scientific, technical, or specialized principles that are reasonably reliable; (2) the expert is qualified to opine on the matter; (3) the expert’s testimony will be helpful to the fact finder; and (4) the testimony’s probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68, 77-78 (Colo. 2001); Core- Mark, ¶ 28.
¶ 26 A court may also permit a witness to give lay testimony. See CRE 701. Such testimony must be rationally based on the witness’s perceptions; helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s testimony or the determination of a fact in issue; and not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702. CRE 701.
¶ 27 We review a district court’s decision to admit or exclude testimony — both expert and lay — for an abuse of discretion. See Herrera, ¶ 14; Specialized Grading Enters., Inc. v. Goodland Constr., Inc., 181 P.3d 352, 357 (Colo. App. 2007).
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2. Parental Responsibilities Evaluator
¶ 28 In February 2023, mother filed a motion requesting that the district court appoint Joyce Miller as a parental responsibilities evaluator (PRE). The court granted the motion and directed Miller to complete an evaluation and file a written report. See § 14-10- 127(1)(a)(I)(A), C.R.S. 2026 (discussing appointment and duties of PREs). Miller filed her report in July 2024.
¶ 29 At a December 2024 hearing, father notified the court that the State Court Administrator’s Office had barred Miller from accepting court appointments. See § 13-3-101(3.5)(a), C.R.S. 2026 (providing that “the state court administrator is responsible for accepting complaints regarding violations of a chief justice directive concerning . . . parental responsibilities evaluators” and “is authorized to administer appropriate sanctions”). The court said that it couldn’t consider Miller’s report or testimony because she had been removed from the PRE eligibility roster. See § 14-10- 127(1)(a)(I)(B) (requiring that a PRE “be selected from an eligibility roster established pursuant to applicable chief justice directive”). Mother’s counsel agreed, but father argued that the court should permit Miller to testify nonetheless. The court ruled that it was
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required to exclude Miller due to her removal from the eligibility roster but invited father to provide contrary authority.
¶ 30 A few days later, father moved to admit Miller’s expert testimony, arguing she was qualified. Mother opposed the motion by pointing out, among other things, that father hadn’t provided any authority to justify admitting a discredited PRE’s testimony and that Miller’s report was unreliable. The court denied father’s motion “for the reasons laid out in [mother’s] response.” Father then moved to designate Miller as a lay witness. The court also denied that motion, reasoning that Miller’s lay testimony wouldn’t be “distinguishable from her PRE work.”
¶ 31 Father now contends that the court abused its discretion by excluding Miller’s testimony and report, arguing she was qualified
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under CRE 702 and CRE 403 and that she was the only prospective witness who had interviewed both parents and the child.3
¶ 32 While we haven’t located any authority requiring the district court to exclude a PRE who has been removed from the eligibility roster after their appointment, we can’t say the court abused its discretion by excluding Miller’s testimony and report on that basis. The court could have reasonably found that Miller was no longer qualified under section 14-10-127 based on the State Court Administrator’s decision to remove her from the eligibility roster and bar her from accepting court appointments. See § 14-10-127(4), (4)(f) (“A person shall not testify as an expert witness regarding a parental responsibilities or parenting time evaluation that the person has performed . . . unless the court finds that the person is
3 Father also contends that the court erred by not making any
reliability findings or permitting Miller to testify in a limited manner. But by denying father’s motion for “the reasons laid out in [mother’s] response,” the court adopted mother’s argument that Miller’s testimony wasn’t reliable. And father doesn’t provide any authority to support his argument that the court should have permitted Miller to testify in a limited manner. See Fisher v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2015 COA 57, ¶ 18 (“We generally decline to address arguments presented to us in a conclusory manner that are lacking citations to any supporting authority.”), aff’d, 2018 CO 39.
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qualified as competent” in certain areas, including the “legal and ethical requirements of parental responsibilities evaluation.”).
¶ 33 Nor did the court abuse its discretion by excluding Miller as a lay witness. The court determined that Miller’s lay testimony would merely rehash the opinions in her inadmissible report. See Glustrom v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 2012 CO 53, ¶¶ 21-22 (court properly excluded lay testimony that “involved subjects properly addressed by expert testimony”). And father didn’t identify any lay testimony that Miller could have offered that differed from the opinions she had formed while acting as a PRE. See CRE 103(a)(2) (to predicate error on the exclusion of evidence, the objecting party must present the “substance of the evidence” to the court); Rhodig v. Cummings, 418 P.2d 521, 522 (Colo. 1966) (rejecting contention that the court erred by excluding evidence when the party “made no offer of proof”).
¶ 34 We also reject father’s argument that the court should have admitted Miller’s testimony under CRE 403. That rule authorizes a court to exclude relevant evidence that is unfairly prejudicial; it doesn’t permit a court to admit otherwise inadmissible evidence
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simply because excluding it would prejudice one party. See CRE 403.
3. Mother’s Domestic Violence Expert
¶ 35 In August 2024, the district court issued an amended case management order stating that expert reports were due no later than December 31, 2024. At a December 19 hearing, mother’s counsel requested that father provide the underlying documents that father’s financial expert had relied on in the expert’s August 2023 report. Father said that he had already provided the underlying documents but that he could resend them.
¶ 36 The court ordered father to provide mother with the underlying documents within seven days and clarified that any updated expert report and related underlying documents would remain due on December 31. While father argued it would be difficult for him to meet the new seven-day deadline due to the upcoming holidays, the court explained that it shouldn’t be difficult for father to resend documents that he had already provided. The court further clarified that all experts were “required to provide their underlying data.”
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¶ 37 On December 31, the deadline for disclosing expert reports, mother filed a report by a domestic violence expert. But mother didn’t serve the expert’s underlying documents on father until one week later. Father moved to exclude mother’s expert due to the late disclosure. The court didn’t rule on that motion before the permanent orders hearing.
¶ 38 Mother’s domestic violence expert testified at the permanent orders hearing that she had master’s degrees in social work and social policy, carried a clinical social work license, and specialized in domestic violence. Mother then moved to qualify her as an expert in domestic abuse. During father’s voir dire, the expert testified that she used an evaluation technique employed by police departments across the country. The technique included reviewing an assessment completed by mother and interviewing mother and her parents, brother, and friend.
¶ 39 Father objected to mother’s expert, arguing that her “one- sided” review didn’t meet admissibility standards and would unduly prejudice him under CRE 403. The court overruled father’s objection and admitted the expert’s testimony.
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¶ 40 On appeal, father argues that the court erred by (1) shortening the deadline for him to provide his financial expert’s underlying documents; (2) treating the parties “asymmetrically” by permitting mother to provide her expert’s underlying documents after the December 31 deadline; and (3) admitting the “one-sided” testimony of mother’s domestic violence expert in violation of CRE 702 and CRE 403.
¶ 41 As to father’s first contention, father admitted that complying with the seven-day deadline would simply require him to resend documents that he had already provided. We therefore can’t conclude that the court abused its discretion by requiring father to resend the underlying documents within seven days. And in any event, father doesn’t explain how the shortened deadline prejudiced him. See C.R.C.P. 61; C.A.R. 35(c); Poudre Valley, 807 P.2d at 557.
¶ 42 Father’s second contention is belied by the record. The court didn’t treat the parties asymmetrically; rather, its rulings addressed different situations. The court imposed a condensed timeline for father to provide the underlying documents for an expert report he had already filed. But the court couldn’t require the same of mother because she hadn’t yet submitted her expert report. And
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while mother admittedly didn’t produce her expert’s underlying documents by the applicable deadline, we can’t say on this record that the brief seven-day delay denied father an adequate opportunity to defend against the evidence, particularly when mother timely disclosed the expert report itself. See Todd v. Bear Valley Vill. Apartments, 980 P.2d 973, 979 (Colo. 1999).
¶ 43 We similarly reject father’s third contention. Mother’s expert testified that she relied on a methodology used nationwide, had a clinical social work license, and specialized in domestic violence. From this, the court could have reasonably found that the expert’s testimony would be useful and probative in determining whether father had committed domestic violence, a statutory factor the court was required to consider when allocating parenting time. See § 14- 10-124(1.5)(a)(III.5); Shreck, 22 P.3d at 77-78.
¶ 44 Although father argues that the expert’s data was “one-sided” and lacked objective analysis, such objections go to the testimony’s weight, not its admissibility. See Schuessler v. Wolter, 2012 COA 86, ¶ 72 (arguments related to expert’s experience and familiarity with the subject matter didn’t require expert’s disqualification); People v. Day, 2023 COA 115, ¶¶ 26-27 (contention that expert
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witness’s opinions were speculative went to “the evidence’s weight, not its admissibility”), aff’d on other grounds, 2026 CO 16. Moreover, father had the opportunity to cross-examine the expert about the alleged deficiencies in her analysis. See Schuessler, ¶ 73.
4. Father’s Rebuttal Expert
¶ 45 At a prehearing conference, the court ordered father to file within seven days a “summary report” from his expert who would rebut mother’s domestic violence expert. But the documents that father submitted included only the expert’s background information and a letter from the proposed expert stating, among other things, that she wouldn’t be able to complete her report by the court- imposed deadline.
¶ 46 Mother objected to the rebuttal expert testifying. She argued that father failed to comply with the court’s deadline because the submitted documents didn’t summarize the rebuttal expert’s testimony. She also emphasized that the rebuttal expert stated that she wouldn’t be able to produce her report by the court’s deadline.
¶ 47 Agreeing with mother, the court ruled that the rebuttal expert’s testimony would “not be permitted” but didn’t elaborate on its reasoning.
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¶ 48 On appeal, father contends that the court abused its discretion by excluding his rebuttal expert without making any findings.4 We disagree and conclude that the court acted within its broad discretion by excluding father’s witness. Father’s rebuttal expert (1) didn’t comply with the court’s directive to provide a summary report; (2) admitted in her letter that she couldn’t meet the court’s deadline; and (3) failed to estimate how long it would take to complete a report if she were afforded more time. See Trattler v. Citron, 182 P.3d 674, 681 (Colo. 2008) (a court is required to exclude nondisclosed expert opinions). Given that the hearing was less than a month away, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the court’s order excluding father’s rebuttal expert.
¶ 49 While we recognize that father may believe that the district court was biased against him, its decision regarding each expert fell within its broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence, as explained above. Accordingly, the district court didn’t err when ruling on the admissibility of the three proffered experts.
4 Father argues that the court should have made a finding under
C.R.C.P. 37(c)(1) before excluding his rebuttal expert but doesn’t cite any supporting authority. As a result, we decline to address this argument. See Fisher, ¶ 18.
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D. Inconsistency Between the Oral Ruling and Permanent Orders
¶ 50 Father next contends that the district court erred by denying his C.R.C.P. 60(a) motion, arguing that the court didn’t eliminate inconsistencies between its oral ruling and written permanent orders. We disagree.
1. Additional Background
¶ 51 At the permanent orders hearing, the court issued an oral ruling and directed mother’s counsel to draft a written order. The court said that counsel couldn’t alter its decisions in the draft order and that father should object if he believed the draft order deviated from the court’s oral ruling.
¶ 52 Father objected to mother’s draft order, arguing it diverged from the court’s oral ruling in multiple ways. The court nonetheless adopted mother’s draft order verbatim. Father then filed a motion to correct the order under Rule 60(a), raising largely the same arguments he advanced in his objection. The court denied the motion.
2. Additional Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 53 Rule 60(a) permits a court to correct “[c]lerical mistakes” in judgments or orders. The rule allows the court to avoid enforcing
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an honestly mistaken judgment that is “not in accord with the expectations and understanding of the court and the parties.” In re Marriage of Buck, 60 P.3d 788, 789 (Colo. App. 2002).
¶ 54 We review a district court’s denial of a Rule 60(a) motion for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of McSoud, 131 P.3d 1208, 1212 (Colo. App. 2006).
3. Analysis
¶ 55 In challenging the denial of his Rule 60(a) motion, father says that the district court’s written order diverged from the court’s oral rulings related to relocation with the child, holiday schedules, and domestic violence language. But even accepting as true father’s argument that the order deviated from the court’s oral ruling, we still discern no basis to reverse.
¶ 56 In McSoud, a division of this court rejected a similar argument, explaining that the district court remains free to “modify its oral findings or orders at any time before issuing a final written order.” 131 P.3d at 1221. Similarly, here, the court retained discretion to modify its oral ruling before issuing the permanent orders.
¶ 57 Accordingly, the district court didn’t abuse its discretion by denying father’s Rule 60(a) motion.
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E. Permanent Orders
¶ 58 Father also appeals various aspects of the district court’s permanent orders, as well as a subsequent order that clarified the parties’ exchange times. Because the orders are supported by the record, we reject father’s contentions.
1. Right of First Refusal
¶ 59 We first address father’s contention that the district court erred by granting mother (but not father) a right of first refusal to care for the child if father couldn’t do so during his parenting time. Father argues that the court misapplied In re Marriage of DePalma, 176 P.3d 829 (Colo. App. 2007), and didn’t give the required “special weight” to father’s caregiving choices during his parenting time.
¶ 60 In DePalma, a division of this court recognized the presumptions that (1) a biological parent has a first and prior right to the custody of their child, and (2) a fit parent acts in their child’s best interests. Id. at 832. But the division clarified that “when two fit parents disagree, the court must weigh the wishes of both to determine what is in the child’s best interests.” Id. Applying this framework, the division upheld the district court’s order permitting
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the father to designate his new spouse as the children’s caregiver while he was deployed by the military, even though the court had initially granted the mother a right of first refusal. See id. at 833. The division explained that the mother hadn’t rebutted the presumption that the father’s caregiving choice during his parenting time was in the children’s best interests. Id.
¶ 61 Here, the district court also granted mother a right of first refusal. In doing so, the court concluded that, while DePalma wasn’t squarely on point, its principles still applied, including that a fit parent is permitted to delegate their parenting time to another caregiver and is presumed to act in the child’s best interests when doing so. The court then reasoned that the right of first refusal in mother’s favor was necessary due to father’s frequent travel.
¶ 62 Thus, contrary to father’s argument, the court explicitly stated that it had accounted for DePalma’s principles that a fit parent may delegate parenting time and is presumed to do so in the child’s best interests. Even so, the court, in effect, concluded that since the parents disagreed and both were fit, it had to determine the child’s best interests by weighing the parents’ respective wishes. See id. at 832. That approach fully aligned with DePalma. After conducting
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its weighing, the court determined that a right of first refusal in mother’s favor was in the child’s best interests due to father’s frequent travel. That conclusion is supported by the record. That the DePalma division reached a different conclusion under different circumstances doesn’t compel reversal.
2. Language Restriction
¶ 63 Father next contends that the district court erred by imposing a speech restriction requiring him to speak their “common language” (English) with the child when mother was also present. Father asserts that he should be entitled to speak with the child in father’s native Slovak even when mother is present.
¶ 64 In a post-hearing motion, mother pointed out that the court hadn’t ruled on her requested common-language speech restriction during its oral ruling at permanent orders. Mother asserted that she had presented testimony during the permanent orders hearing showing that her requested speech restriction would serve the child’s best interests. Specifically, mother explained that she doesn’t speak Slovak and that using a common language during exchanges would convey the appearance of mutual support and cooperation to the child. The court granted mother’s motion,
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stating that it had inadvertently omitted the restriction during its oral ruling.
¶ 65 Father hasn’t provided us with a transcript of the portion of the permanent orders hearing during which the parties presented evidence and argument related to the speech restriction. As a result, we must presume that the evidence at the hearing supports the court’s decision to impose the speech restriction. See Buckley Powder Co. v. State, 70 P.3d 547, 559 (Colo. App. 2002); see also C.A.R. 10(d)(3) (“The appellant must include in the record transcripts of all proceedings necessary for considering and deciding the issues on appeal.”).
¶ 66 Because father failed to designate the relevant transcripts, we also reject his arguments that the court erred by (1) not permitting him an opportunity to respond to mother’s request and (2) not making best interests findings before imposing the speech restriction. See Oman v. Morris, 471 P.2d 430, 432 (Colo. App. 1970) (appellate court presumes the “regularity of the trial court’s judgment” when no transcript is provided). Although father asserts in his reply brief that the missing transcripts are unnecessary to resolve his due process concerns, we disagree because the record
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before us doesn’t reveal the level of process provided by the court. As mentioned, without the relevant transcripts, we must presume that the “portions omitted from the record would support the judgment of the [district] court.” McSoud, 131 P.3d at 1223.
3. Exchange Times
¶ 67 Father also contends that the district court erred by granting mother’s motion for clarification of exchange times, arguing that the ordered exchange time contradicts the court’s oral ruling, disrupts his work schedule, and lacks authority or findings.
¶ 68 After the court issued permanent orders, mother filed a postjudgment motion requesting that the court clarify the exchange times when the child isn’t in school. She pointed out that the permanent orders — which specified that parenting time would begin at 5 p.m. and end at 9 a.m. when the child wasn’t in school — inadvertently left an eight-hour gap during which the child would be unaccounted for. Mother said she interpreted the court’s order to mean that exchanges would take place at 9 a.m. when the child wasn’t in school, arguing that such an interpretation would keep the exchange times consistent with the child’s school year routine and allow the child to spend a full day with the receiving parent.
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¶ 69 Father argued that a 5 p.m. exchange time would better accommodate his travel schedule and align with the court’s 5-2-2-5 parenting time schedule. He also pointed out that the parties had been utilizing a 4 p.m. exchange time for two years before the permanent orders.
¶ 70 The court granted mother’s motion, stating that mother’s interpretation was correct and that “[t]he exchanges w[ould] take place at 9 [a.m.] when there is no school.”
¶ 71 Mother didn’t cite any authority or rule that governed her postjudgment motion. But regardless of whether mother intended to bring her motion under C.R.C.P. 59(a), 60(a), or 60(b), we review the district court’s decision granting her request for an abuse of discretion. See Gold Hill Dev. Co., L.P. v. TSG Ski & Golf, LLC, 2015 COA 177, ¶¶ 52, 65; McSoud, 131 P.3d at 1212.
¶ 72 As discussed, the court was free to modify its oral ruling. See McSoud, 131 P.3d at 1221. And while we agree with father that it would have been better for mother and the court to cite authority for the modification, the court retained statutory authority to modify parenting time. See § 14-10-129(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2026.
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¶ 73 Moreover, by granting mother’s motion, the court implicitly agreed with mother’s argument that a 9 a.m. exchange time was in the child’s best interests. See People in Interest of C.L.T., 2017 COA 119, ¶ 36 (recognizing a court’s findings may be implicit in its ruling); Leaffer v. Zarlengo, 44 P.3d 1072, 1083 n.12 (Colo. 2002) (“The trial court’s order summarily denied Petitioners’ motion. Therefore, we must assume that it accepted Respondents’ argument.”). And because mother presented plausible arguments in support of a 9 a.m. exchange time, we can’t conclude that the court abused its discretion by adopting them. See E-470 Pub. Highway Auth. v. Revenig, 140 P.3d 227, 230-31 (Colo. App. 2006) (under the abuse of discretion standard, we ask “not whether we would have reached a different result but, rather, whether the trial court’s decision fell within a range of reasonable options”).
F. Cumulative Error
¶ 74 Finally, we reject father’s argument that the cumulative impact of the court’s errors deprived him of a meaningful opportunity to be heard and therefore requires reversal. “The doctrine of cumulative error, although applied regularly in criminal appeals, has not been extended to civil cases.” Acierno v.
30
Garyfallou, 2016 COA 91, ¶ 66. Even if the doctrine did apply here, we have identified only one error and determined that it didn’t affect father’s substantial rights. See Howard-Walker v. People, 2019 CO 69, ¶ 25 (reversal based on cumulative error requires the reviewing court to identify multiple errors that prejudice the defendant’s substantial rights).
¶ 75 Accordingly, the cumulative error doctrine provides no basis to reverse.
III. Disposition
¶ 76 We affirm the judgment and orders.
JUDGE MEIRINK and JUDGE TAUBMAN concur.