24CA0409 Parental Resp Conc SFC-M
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA0409 City and County of Denver District Court No. 21DR30028 Honorable Demetria E. Trujillo, Judge
In re the Parental Responsibilities Concerning SFC-M, a Child,
and Concerning Jennifer Clayton
Appellee,
and
Joel Austin Meaney,
Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division II Opinion by JUDGE JOHNSON Fox and Schock, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced November 27, 2024
GPS Legal Solutions, Jennifer Gilbert, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee
Bovo Law Group, LLC, Todd F. Bovo, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this post-decree allocation of parental responsibilities case,
Joel Austin Meaney (father) appeals the district court’s order that
denied his motion for reconsideration of a magistrate’s ruling. We
affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Father and Jennifer Clayton (mother) have one child together.
In 2020, mother alleged that father was physically and verbally
abusive, and, at her request, the county court issued a permanent
civil protection order that restricted his contact with her.
¶3 Mother then petitioned for an allocation of parental
responsibilities concerning their child. The parties agreed to
allocate primary parenting time to mother and to allow father to
exercise overnight visits every other week. The district court
adopted the parties’ agreement.
¶4 About a year later, mother filed an emergency motion to
restrict father’s parenting time alleging that his behavior was
placing the child in imminent emotional danger. She explained that
father had interfered with the child’s school attendance, kept the
child from mother during her parenting time, engaged in physical
altercations with personnel at the child’s school, and violated the
1 protection order. After a hearing, the magistrate granted the motion
and restricted father’s parenting time, allowing him to exercise one
supervised visit for up to four hours every other weekend.
¶5 After nine months, father asked the court to reinstate his
unsupervised parenting time. The magistrate denied his motion.
The magistrate found that retaining the supervised parenting time
order was in the child’s best interests and that there had not been
any substantial and continuing change in father’s behavior to
warrant lifting the restriction. At the conclusion of the order, the
magistrate advised father that
[p]ursuant to Colorado Rules for Magistrates 7(a)(5), a party may obtain review of a magistrate’s final order or judgment by filing a petition to review such final order or judgment with the reviewing judge no later than . . . 21 days from the date the final order or judgment is mailed or otherwise transmitted to the parties.
¶6 Fourteen days later, father filed in the district court a motion
to extend the deadline for “fil[ing] a motion for reconsideration
pursuant to C.R.C.P. 59.” The court did not rule on the extension.
¶7 Father then filed a “Motion for Reconsideration” of the
magistrate’s order “[p]ursuant to C.R.C.P. 59(a).” The district court
2 denied the motion. The court explained that the exclusive method
for seeking review of a magistrate’s order was a petition for review
under C.R.M. 7(a)(5). The court concluded that it did not have
jurisdiction to rule on father’s C.R.C.P. 59 motion, and it declined
to construe the motion as a petition for review.
II. District Court’s Order
¶8 Father contends that the district court erred by not construing
his C.R.C.P. 59 motion for reconsideration as a C.R.M. 7(a)(5)
petition for review. We discern no reversible error.
A. Preliminary Issue
¶9 Mother argues that father is barred from pursuing his appeal
because he did not file a petition for review under C.R.M. 7(a)(5).
Even though father may not challenge the magistrate’s ruling in the
absence of a petition for review under C.R.M. 7(a)(5), see C.R.M.
7(a)(11), that does not prevent us from reviewing the court’s order
on the C.R.C.P. 59 motion for reconsideration. That order fully
disposed of the litigation and, therefore, was a final order subject to
our appellate review. See Mulberry Frontage Metro. Dist. v. Sunstate
Equip. Co., LLC, 2023 COA 66, ¶ 14; In re Marriage of Thorburn,
2022 COA 80, ¶ 19. We thus have jurisdiction to review whether
3 the court erred by declining to construe father’s motion as a
petition for review.
B. Standard of Review
¶ 10 We review de novo the court’s application of the law and its
authority to rule on a motion. See Thorburn, ¶ 26; McDonald v.
Zions First Nat’l Bank, N.A., 2015 COA 29, ¶ 33; see also In re
Estate of Hillebrandt, 979 P.2d 36, 37-38 (Colo. App. 1999)
(concluding that a motion for reconsideration did not constitute a
petition for district court review).
C. Analysis
¶ 11 In a parental responsibilities case, a magistrate may preside
over a post-decree parenting time motion without the parties’
consent. C.R.M. (6)(b)(1)(B). When the magistrate issues a final
order on such a motion, a C.R.M. 7(a)(5) petition is the exclusive
manner by which a party may seek review of the magistrate’s
ruling. See In re Marriage of Cooprider, 140 P.3d 312, 313 (Colo.
App. 2006); In re Marriage of Tonn, 53 P.3d 1185, 1186-87 (Colo.
App. 2002). “C.R.M. 5(a) prohibits magistrates from reconsidering
their rulings or imposing postjudgment relief.” In re Marriage of
4 Matheny, 2024 COA 81, ¶ 19; see also Hillebrandt, 979 P.2d at 38;
accord In re Taylor, 134 P.3d 579, 583 (Colo. App. 2006).
¶ 12 A court may deem a motion for reconsideration of a
magistrate’s order as a petition for district court review. Cooprider,
140 P.3d at 313. But the court is under no obligation to do so. Id.
And we will uphold the court’s decision declining to construe the
motion as a petition for review when the record demonstrates that
the motion was not presented to the court as a petition for district
court review. See Hillebrandt, 979 P.2d at 37. For example, in
Hillebrandt, a division of this court upheld a court’s decision that
declined to construe a motion for reconsideration as a petition for
district court review where the motion was entitled a “motion for
reconsideration,” included no reference to the magistrate’s rules,
requested a reconsideration of the facts, and did not ask for review
by the district court judge. Id.; cf. Taylor, 134 P.3d at 581 (noting
that a court may treat a motion for reconsideration as a petition for
review when the motion in question is “identical in every material
respect to, [is] sufficient to constitute, and [is] timely as, a petition
for district court review”).
5 ¶ 13 When the magistrate denied father’s motion to reinstate
unsupervised parenting time, she advised the parties that if either
of them wished to have the decision reviewed, they could file a
C.R.M.
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24CA0409 Parental Resp Conc SFC-M
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA0409 City and County of Denver District Court No. 21DR30028 Honorable Demetria E. Trujillo, Judge
In re the Parental Responsibilities Concerning SFC-M, a Child,
and Concerning Jennifer Clayton
Appellee,
and
Joel Austin Meaney,
Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division II Opinion by JUDGE JOHNSON Fox and Schock, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced November 27, 2024
GPS Legal Solutions, Jennifer Gilbert, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee
Bovo Law Group, LLC, Todd F. Bovo, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this post-decree allocation of parental responsibilities case,
Joel Austin Meaney (father) appeals the district court’s order that
denied his motion for reconsideration of a magistrate’s ruling. We
affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Father and Jennifer Clayton (mother) have one child together.
In 2020, mother alleged that father was physically and verbally
abusive, and, at her request, the county court issued a permanent
civil protection order that restricted his contact with her.
¶3 Mother then petitioned for an allocation of parental
responsibilities concerning their child. The parties agreed to
allocate primary parenting time to mother and to allow father to
exercise overnight visits every other week. The district court
adopted the parties’ agreement.
¶4 About a year later, mother filed an emergency motion to
restrict father’s parenting time alleging that his behavior was
placing the child in imminent emotional danger. She explained that
father had interfered with the child’s school attendance, kept the
child from mother during her parenting time, engaged in physical
altercations with personnel at the child’s school, and violated the
1 protection order. After a hearing, the magistrate granted the motion
and restricted father’s parenting time, allowing him to exercise one
supervised visit for up to four hours every other weekend.
¶5 After nine months, father asked the court to reinstate his
unsupervised parenting time. The magistrate denied his motion.
The magistrate found that retaining the supervised parenting time
order was in the child’s best interests and that there had not been
any substantial and continuing change in father’s behavior to
warrant lifting the restriction. At the conclusion of the order, the
magistrate advised father that
[p]ursuant to Colorado Rules for Magistrates 7(a)(5), a party may obtain review of a magistrate’s final order or judgment by filing a petition to review such final order or judgment with the reviewing judge no later than . . . 21 days from the date the final order or judgment is mailed or otherwise transmitted to the parties.
¶6 Fourteen days later, father filed in the district court a motion
to extend the deadline for “fil[ing] a motion for reconsideration
pursuant to C.R.C.P. 59.” The court did not rule on the extension.
¶7 Father then filed a “Motion for Reconsideration” of the
magistrate’s order “[p]ursuant to C.R.C.P. 59(a).” The district court
2 denied the motion. The court explained that the exclusive method
for seeking review of a magistrate’s order was a petition for review
under C.R.M. 7(a)(5). The court concluded that it did not have
jurisdiction to rule on father’s C.R.C.P. 59 motion, and it declined
to construe the motion as a petition for review.
II. District Court’s Order
¶8 Father contends that the district court erred by not construing
his C.R.C.P. 59 motion for reconsideration as a C.R.M. 7(a)(5)
petition for review. We discern no reversible error.
A. Preliminary Issue
¶9 Mother argues that father is barred from pursuing his appeal
because he did not file a petition for review under C.R.M. 7(a)(5).
Even though father may not challenge the magistrate’s ruling in the
absence of a petition for review under C.R.M. 7(a)(5), see C.R.M.
7(a)(11), that does not prevent us from reviewing the court’s order
on the C.R.C.P. 59 motion for reconsideration. That order fully
disposed of the litigation and, therefore, was a final order subject to
our appellate review. See Mulberry Frontage Metro. Dist. v. Sunstate
Equip. Co., LLC, 2023 COA 66, ¶ 14; In re Marriage of Thorburn,
2022 COA 80, ¶ 19. We thus have jurisdiction to review whether
3 the court erred by declining to construe father’s motion as a
petition for review.
B. Standard of Review
¶ 10 We review de novo the court’s application of the law and its
authority to rule on a motion. See Thorburn, ¶ 26; McDonald v.
Zions First Nat’l Bank, N.A., 2015 COA 29, ¶ 33; see also In re
Estate of Hillebrandt, 979 P.2d 36, 37-38 (Colo. App. 1999)
(concluding that a motion for reconsideration did not constitute a
petition for district court review).
C. Analysis
¶ 11 In a parental responsibilities case, a magistrate may preside
over a post-decree parenting time motion without the parties’
consent. C.R.M. (6)(b)(1)(B). When the magistrate issues a final
order on such a motion, a C.R.M. 7(a)(5) petition is the exclusive
manner by which a party may seek review of the magistrate’s
ruling. See In re Marriage of Cooprider, 140 P.3d 312, 313 (Colo.
App. 2006); In re Marriage of Tonn, 53 P.3d 1185, 1186-87 (Colo.
App. 2002). “C.R.M. 5(a) prohibits magistrates from reconsidering
their rulings or imposing postjudgment relief.” In re Marriage of
4 Matheny, 2024 COA 81, ¶ 19; see also Hillebrandt, 979 P.2d at 38;
accord In re Taylor, 134 P.3d 579, 583 (Colo. App. 2006).
¶ 12 A court may deem a motion for reconsideration of a
magistrate’s order as a petition for district court review. Cooprider,
140 P.3d at 313. But the court is under no obligation to do so. Id.
And we will uphold the court’s decision declining to construe the
motion as a petition for review when the record demonstrates that
the motion was not presented to the court as a petition for district
court review. See Hillebrandt, 979 P.2d at 37. For example, in
Hillebrandt, a division of this court upheld a court’s decision that
declined to construe a motion for reconsideration as a petition for
district court review where the motion was entitled a “motion for
reconsideration,” included no reference to the magistrate’s rules,
requested a reconsideration of the facts, and did not ask for review
by the district court judge. Id.; cf. Taylor, 134 P.3d at 581 (noting
that a court may treat a motion for reconsideration as a petition for
review when the motion in question is “identical in every material
respect to, [is] sufficient to constitute, and [is] timely as, a petition
for district court review”).
5 ¶ 13 When the magistrate denied father’s motion to reinstate
unsupervised parenting time, she advised the parties that if either
of them wished to have the decision reviewed, they could file a
C.R.M. 7(a)(5) petition for district court review within twenty-one
days. Instead of filing that petition, father, who was represented by
an attorney, indicated that he intended to file a C.R.C.P. 59 motion
for reconsideration and asked for an extension of time to file that
motion, which the court never acted upon. As part of his requested
extension, father noted that “[his] deadline to submit a motion
pursuant to C.R.C.P. 59 is January 5, 2024.”
¶ 14 When he filed the motion for reconsideration, he neither
referenced C.R.M. 7(a)(5) nor sought a form of relief explicitly
provided by the magistrate rules. True, he asked for a new trial,
and C.R.M. 7(a)(8) allows the reviewing court to “conduct further
proceedings, take additional evidence, or order a trial de novo in the
district court.” But he did not explicitly rely on the magistrate
rules, which direct the reviewing court to either “adopt, reject, or
6 modify the initial order or judgment of the magistrate.”1 C.R.M.
7(a)(10). Under these circumstances, the court did not err by
declining to construe father’s motion as a petition for district court
review. See Hillebrandt, 979 P.2d at 37. Father opted to file a
C.R.C.P. 59 motion for reconsideration, and the court treated it as
such.
¶ 15 Nonetheless, father highlights a note in the register of actions
and argues that this note indicated the court understood his motion
was a petition for district court review. But the note merely stated,
“MAG REVW 309,” and it was added by the magistrate. Father
develops no legal argument explaining why such a note established
that his motion was actually a petition for review or how it rendered
the court’s decision declining to construe the motion as a petition
for review improper. See In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning
S.Z.S., 2022 COA 105, ¶ 29 (declining to address an undeveloped
1 We acknowledge that father filed his motion for reconsideration on
January 12, 2024, which was twenty-one days from the entry of the magistrate’s December 22, 2023 order and, thus, would have been timely if he had filed as a petition for review under C.R.M. 7(a)(5). But the record does not indicate father intended the timing of his filing to coincide with the magistrate rules. Until this appeal, father never acknowledged nor attempted to correct his mistake in filing his motion for reconsideration under C.R.C.P. 59.
7 argument). Regardless of the note, though, the record supports the
district court’s conclusion that father’s motion did not constitute a
petition for review. See Hillebrandt, 979 P.2d at 37.
III. Conclusion
¶ 16 The district court’s order is affirmed.
JUDGE FOX and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.