Parental Resp Conc MM

Opinion

24CA1737 Parental Resp Conc MM 06-05-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1737 Adams County District Court No. 22DR777 Honorable Rayna Gokli McIntyre, Judge

In re the Parental Responsibilities Concerning M.M., a Child,

and Concerning Atlantis Keisha Davis,

Appellee,

and

Maurice Juanell Means,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I Opinion by JUDGE KUHN Moultrie and Bernard*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 5, 2025

No Appearance for Appellee

Law Firm of Brian DeBauche, LLC, Brian DeBauche, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant

* Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024. ¶1 Maurice Juanell Means (father) appeals the district court’s

judgment allocating parental responsibilities between him and

Atlantis Keisha Davis (mother). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The parties have a son (the child) who was born in Illinois in

November 2017. The parties separated in the fall of 2018. Around

that time, father moved to Colorado with the child, while mother

stayed in Illinois.

¶3 In May 2022, mother filed a petition for an allocation of

parental responsibilities. She requested sole decision-making

responsibility and majority parenting time in Illinois. She asserted

that father should have parenting time in Colorado during the

child’s school breaks. Father responded to the petition and

requested sole decision-making responsibility and majority

parenting time in Colorado. He asserted that mother should have

parenting time during school breaks but should be required to

travel to Colorado to exercise it.

¶4 After a contested hearing, the court entered temporary orders

granting mother two months of summer parenting time for 2023;

the first three weeks were in Colorado and the remaining time was

1 in Illinois. Mother exercised her parenting time, and when the child

returned to Colorado, father took him to get a hair follicle test.1 The

test came back positive for cocaine and marijuana exposure.

Father then filed a motion to restrict mother’s parenting time, but

the court denied the motion noting that mother did not have any

parenting time before the permanent orders hearing and that the

issues father raised would be addressed then.

¶5 In December 2023, the district court held a contested

permanent orders hearing. Both parents testified that they were

not responsible for exposing the child to cocaine. At the end of the

hearing, the court ordered the parents to take a fingernail test and

stated that it would issue written permanent orders after it received

those results. Both parents complied, and the tests were negative

for cocaine.

¶6 However, before the district court issued permanent orders,

father filed a motion to reopen the matter for additional evidence

because mother had not disclosed that the Illinois Department of

1 The child had previously tested positive for exposure to marijuana

and father wanted to show that the child could have been exposed at either party’s home, not just his.

2 Children and Family Services (DCFS) was investigating her at the

time of the permanent orders hearing. The court granted the

request and held another evidentiary hearing for the parties to

present information they obtained after the December 2023

hearing. At the end of the hearing, the court took the matter under

advisement. About a month later, it issued permanent orders

granting father sole decision-making and majority parenting time.

The court granted mother weekend parenting time in Colorado, as

well as parenting time in Illinois during the child’s school breaks.

II. Analysis

¶7 Father contends that the district court erred by (1) finding that

the best interests of the child were served by a parenting plan

allowing out of state travel and (2) improperly weighing evidence of

domestic violence and drug use, including the child’s exposure to

cocaine. We first set forth the standard of review before addressing

his contentions in turn.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶8 When allocating parenting time and decision-making

responsibility, the court must focus on the child’s best interests,

giving paramount consideration to the child’s safety and their

3 physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs. See

§§ 14-10-123.4(1)(a), 14-10-124(1.5), (1.7), C.R.S. 2024; see also In

re Marriage of Morgan, 2018 COA 116M, ¶ 17. In making this

determination, the court must consider all relevant factors,

including those factors identified in section 14-10-124(1.5)(a) and

(b). Morgan, ¶¶ 17, 21.

¶9 The district court has broad discretion over the allocation of

parental responsibilities. Id. at ¶ 23 (analyzing decision-making

responsibility); In re Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 330 (Colo.

App. 2007) (analyzing parenting time). We exercise every

presumption in favor of upholding the court’s parenting decisions.

See Hatton, 160 P.3d at 330. We will not disturb a court’s

discretionary decision absent a showing that the court misapplied

the law or acted in a manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair

manner. See In re Marriage of Evans, 2021 COA 141, ¶ 25.

B. Out-of-State Parenting Time

¶ 10 Father contends that the district court abused its discretion

by finding that out-of-state parenting time with mother was in the

child’s best interests. We’re not persuaded.

4 ¶ 11 In making its parenting time determination, the district court

expressly considered the factors from section 14-10-124(1.5) and

made thorough findings about the child’s best interests. As

relevant to whether out-of-state parenting time was in the child’s

best interests, the court found that “distance [was] a primary

concern” because mother lives in Illinois and the child has to fly to

visit her. Nonetheless, it found that when mother was caring for

the child, she put the child’s needs above her own and ensured that

he had a safe place to live. The court also found that mother had

the ability to encourage the sharing of love, affection, and contact

between the child and father and that there was no reason to limit

the child’s ability to visit mother in Illinois for vacation and holiday

parenting time. Based on those findings, the court determined that

allowing the child to travel to Illinois for parenting time with mother

was in his best interests.

¶ 12 The record supports these findings. Mother testified that

although she understood it was best for the child to stay in his

“stable home environment” with father, she believed that the child

should spend his school breaks with her in Illinois. She noted that

she and her partner live in a three-bedroom home and that the

5 child would have his own bedroom when he visited Illinois. The

child’s maternal grandmother testified that when she took the child

to Illinois, she had no safety concerns about mother’s home. And

mother’s adult son testified that when he was younger, he lived with

mother in Illinois and felt safe at her home and in the

neighborhood.

¶ 13 We reject father’s argument that the court failed to properly

consider his testimony that he had safety concerns about mother’s

home and neighborhood. To the contrary, the court specifically

considered this testimony, noting that father testified that he was

worried that mother’s neighborhood was dangerous because it had

numerous liquor stores, gang activity, negative influences, and

“riffraff.” The court also noted that father was concerned that

mother was leaving the child with strangers when she went to work.

Nonetheless, the court found that besides father’s testimony, there

was “no objective evidence . . . that [Illinois] is so dangerous that

[the child] cannot spend time there with mother.”

¶ 14 Essentially, father points to a portion of the conflicting

evidence introduced at the hearing and asks us to reweigh that

evidence in his favor. But it is not our role to reweigh the evidence

6 or disturb the court’s findings when, as here, they have record

support and are based on credibility determinations. See In re

Marriage of Nelson, 2012 COA 205, ¶ 35 (“[Even where] there is

evidence in the record that could have supported a different

conclusion, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the

district court.”); see also Hatton, 160 P.3d at 330 (“It is the

responsibility of the trial court as the trier of fact to determine the

credibility of the witnesses and the sufficiency, probative effect, and

weight of the evidence.”)

¶ 15 Based on the foregoing, we perceive no abuse of discretion in

the district court’s finding that out-of-state parenting time with

mother was in the child’s best interests.

C. Evidence of Violence and Drug Exposure in Illinois

¶ 16 Father also contends that the court abused its discretion by

ignoring the evidence he presented about the high crime rates in

mother’s neighborhood; mother’s partner’s history of violence and

selling drugs; the child’s exposure to cocaine while in mother’s care;

and the fact that mother failed to disclose the ongoing DCFS

investigation. He argues that if the court had properly considered

this evidence, then then it would not have found that it was safe for

7 the child to spend time in Illinois with mother. However, the record

shows that the district court considered the evidence about the

living environment in Illinois and the child’s exposure to cocaine.

As noted above, it acknowledged father’s concerns about mother’s

home and neighborhood but did not find that those concerns were

sufficient to establish that it was unsafe for the child to visit Illinois.

Moreover, although the court was “extremely concerned about the

[child’s] positive cocaine test,” it found, with record support, that it

was unable to determine “where or when” the child was exposed

because both parents tested negative for cocaine. And although the

court shared father’s concerns over mother’s failure to disclose the

DCFS investigation, it found, again with record support, that the

DCFS finding of neglect against mother had been overturned and

expunged.

¶ 17 Based on the foregoing, we disagree with father’s assertion

that the court failed to “adequately analyze or weigh” the evidence

about possible safety risks at mother’s home. To the contrary, the

court considered and weighed the evidence, just not in the way

father preferred. Again, we cannot reweigh the evidence. See

8 Nelson, ¶ 35; Hatton, 160 P.3d at 330. Thus, we perceive no abuse

of discretion.

III. Disposition

¶ 18 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE MOULTRIE and JUDGE BERNARD concur.