Parental Resp Conc JSSR

Opinion

25CA0585 Parental Resp Conc JSSR 07-23-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0585 Garfield County District Court No. 23DR109 Honorable Anne K. Norrdin, Judge

In re the Parental Responsibilities Concerning J.S.S.R., a Child,

and Concerning Maria Isabel Rodriguez Lopez,

Appellant,

and

Jose De Jesus Solano Rosas,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE Kuhn and Taubman*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 23, 2026

Defiance Law Firm, Peter A Rachesky, Lara Horst, Glenwood Springs, Colorado, for Appellant

Coleman Law Office, P.C., Cassie L. Coleman, Glenwood Springs, Colorado, for Appellee

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 Petitioner, Maria Isabel Rodriguez Lopez (mother), appeals the

district court’s judgment concluding that she was never common

law married to respondent, Jose de Jesus Solano Rosas (father).

We affirm.

I. Relevant Facts

¶2 Mother and father began dating around 2008. The couple

later had a child, J.S.S.R. Mother claims she and father were

married under common law. Father disagrees and claims they

never intended to be married.

¶3 In 2023, father petitioned for a protection order against

mother, and mother petitioned for an allocation of parental

responsibilities for J.S.S.R., as well as a dissolution of marriage.

The district court later held hearings on the parties’ claims,

including mother’s claim that the parties had entered into a

common law marriage.1 After weighing the “compelling evidence on

each side of the issue,” the district court concluded that the parties

1 The district court denied mother’s common law marriage claim but

retained jurisdiction over the parties’ allocation of parental responsibilities under section 14-10-123(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2025. Accordingly, the district court ordered the clerk to reclassify the case as a parental responsibilities action.

1 had not entered into a common law marriage. Mother appeals that

judgment.2

II. Common Law Marriage

¶4 Mother contends that the district court erred in concluding

that no common marriage existed between father and her because

the court did not consider essential evidence that favored her claim.

We are not persuaded.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶5 Colorado recognizes common law marriage. See Hogsett v.

Neale, 2021 CO 1, ¶ 1. A party can establish a common law

marriage by showing that the parties intended to enter a marital

relationship — “that is, to share a life together as spouses in a

committed, intimate relationship of mutual support and obligation.”

Id. at ¶ 3. But an agreement to marry in the future does not

constitute a common law marriage. Crandell v. Resley, 804 P.2d

272, 276 (Colo. App. 1990).

2 The district court also entered judgment on restraining orders and

child support, but mother did not appeal those parts of the court’s judgment. Therefore, we find those issues abandoned. See In re Estate of Gonzalez, 2024 COA 63, ¶ 10 n.1 (a party abandons an issue when she does not present arguments on it).

2 ¶6 Courts must consider the totality of the circumstances when

considering whether a common law marriage exists. In re Estate of

Yudkin, 2021 CO 2, ¶ 19. And while courts may consider a number

of factors to make this determination, People v. Lucero, 747 P.2d

660, 663 (Colo. 1987), no single factor is dispositive. Yudkin, ¶ 19.

¶7 “A determination of whether a common law marriage exists

turns on issues of fact and credibility, which are properly within the

trial court’s discretion.” LaFleur v. Pyfer, 2021 CO 3, ¶ 50 (quoting

Lucero, 747 P.2d at 665); see also Schuler v. Oldervik, 143 P.3d

1197, 1201 (Colo. App. 2006) (“The trial court has ‘an unparalleled

opportunity to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the

weight to be afforded the evidence which is before the court.’”

(quoting M.D.C./Wood, Inc. v. Mortimer, 866 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Colo.

1994)) (citing Warren v. Farmers All. Mut. Ins. Co., 501 P.2d 135

(Colo. App. 1972))). “[W]e review the court’s factual findings for

clear error and its common law marriage finding for an abuse of

discretion.” LaFleur, ¶ 50. A finding is clearly erroneous when it

has no record support. Trinidad Area Health Ass’n v. Trinidad

Ambulance Dist., 2024 COA 113, ¶ 22. A trial court abuses its

discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or

3 unfair, or when it misapplies the law. Bullock v. Brooks, 2025 COA

6, ¶ 25.

B. Analysis

¶8 In applying Hogsett, the district court acknowledged that

mother presented evidence that coworkers and family considered

her and father to be married, but it also considered more significant

the following factors related to the possible existence of the parties’

common law marriage:

• Mother and father never filed joint tax returns and never

filed taxes with a status as “married, filing separately.”

• They never jointly owned real property in the United

States. Mother, however, said they jointly owned

property in Mexico.

• They never engaged in mutual estate planning.

• They never had a wedding ceremony.

• They never exchanged engagement or wedding rings.

• Neither party designated the other as a beneficiary on

insurance policies.

4 • They did not execute affidavits of common law marriage,

but the parties’ cultural values may explain why they did

not do so.

• Father named mother as his “esposa” — the Spanish

word for wife — on his redetermination of SNAP benefits

form.

• Their child, J.S.S.R., shares both of their surnames.

• Mother testified that she and father married in July 2011

but indicated they had married in 2009 in her petition for

dissolution of marriage.3

• Mother also said that, in the parties’ Mexican culture,

cohabitating meant they were considered married.

• Mother testified that father repeatedly said that the

couple and their child were already a family.

• Mother and other witnesses testified that father would

introduce himself as her husband at extended family

gatherings and referred to mother’s family as his in-laws.

3 Mother testified at the hearing that the parties “didn’t really recall

the exact date we went to live together, so it was we’ll just choose this date.”

5 • Other witnesses testified that father called mother his

wife.

• Mother testified that father was violent toward her, and

he used his power and control against her. She

contended that this abuse explained why some of the

Lucero and Hogsett factors were missing.4

• Father repeatedly promised to marry mother, often

following fights and hitting mother.

¶9 The district court found that father used marriage as a further

method of control in the pattern of domestic violence toward

mother. But the court found it persuasive that because father used

marriage as leverage in controlling mother, both parties knew that

they were not married. The court concluded, after considering

these factors, that the parties were not married at common law.

4 The district court, during its determination of the parties’

protection orders, found that “mother presented far more credible testimony and evidence that it was primarily father who committed acts of physical aggression, assaults and exercised coercion and control over mother rather than the reverse.” The court also said, “Mother’s description of the relationship was one marked by coercion, control, violent outbursts, physical aggression toward her, verbal aggression toward her, and I found her testimony in this regard to be highly credible and corroborated by [other] witnesses.”

6 ¶ 10 Mother contends the court did not consider (1) the parties’

decision to live together and create a marriage in July 2011; (2) the

parties’ cultural beliefs that when parties lived together they were

considered married and that having a child added to this cultural

belief; (3) that father named mother his “esposa” on his

redetermination of SNAP benefits form; (4) mother’s testimony that

father said wedding rings were not needed because they were

already a family; (5) father’s reference to mother’s sister as “cuñada”

and her mother as “suegra,” respectively meaning sister-in-law and

mother-in-law; (6) other witnesses’ testimony that they believed

father and mother were married; and (7) the parties’ conduct in

light of the domestic violence mother had experienced from father.

¶ 11 As described above, the district court considered each of the

factors mother now says are missing from the court’s oral order.

The district court reviewed the (conflicting) dates of the supposed

marriage, the parties’ culture, father’s alleged terms for mother and

her family, father’s redetermination of SNAP benefits form, other

witnesses’ testimony, and how domestic violence shaped these

factors. Thus, the record shows the court considered each of the

factors mother says the district court did not address. Accordingly,

7 we may not substitute our judgment for the district court’s and

reweigh the factors the court considered to give mother a different

outcome. See, e.g., Cronk v. Bowers, 2023 COA 68M, ¶ 20

(appellate courts are not at liberty to reweigh conflicting evidence).

¶ 12 Mother also contends that the district court abused its

discretion in “conclud[ing] that the parties did not have an

expressed or implied agreement to enter the legal and social

institution of marriage, and that the parties were not married at

common law.” Mother is correct that express or implied agreements

are not dispositive for a court to find the existence of a common law

marriage. See LaFleur, ¶ 52 (“‘[C]ourts should give weight to

evidence reflecting a couple’s express agreement to marry.’ In the

absence of such evidence, courts may infer such an agreement from

the parties’ conduct.” (quoting Hogsett, ¶ 49)). But the district

court here did not abuse its discretion by correctly acknowledging

that mother and father had no such agreement. And this

conclusion is corroborated by father routinely using a promise to

marry as a form of coercion following domestic violence incidents.

8 III. Father’s Attorney Fees

¶ 13 Father requests his appellate attorney fees. He asserts that

the “overwhelming evidence supported the fact that the parties were

never married.” To the contrary, the district court noted that both

parties presented “compelling evidence” to prove or disprove the

existence of a common law marriage. Our review of the record

supports the district court’s characterization of the evidence.

Therefore, we decline to grant father’s request for his attorney fees

incurred on appeal under C.A.R. 39.1.

IV. Disposition

¶ 14 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE KUHN and JUDGE TAUBMAN concur.