24CA1490 Parental Resp Conc JC 04-17-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1490 City and County of Denver District Court No. 23DR1747 Honorable Jennifer B. Torrington, Judge
In re the Parental Responsibilities Concerning J.C. and A.C., Children,
And Concerning Gwynneisha Cymone King
Appellee,
and
Javon Markel Calhoun,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ Welling and Kuhn, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 17, 2025
No Appearance for Appellee
Price Family Law, LLC, Bria Burgamy, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this allocation of parental responsibilities case, Javon
Markel Calhoun (father) appeals the district court’s permanent
orders allocating parental responsibilities to Gwynneisha Cymone
King (mother). We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I. Background
¶2 Mother and father are the parents of two minor children, A.C.
and J.C. Mother filed a petition for allocation of parental
responsibilities asserting that the children, who were then six and
ten years old, had always lived with her and did not have regular
contact with father.
¶3 After a hearing, the court issued temporary orders allocating
mother primary parental responsibilities and allowing father up to
four hours of parenting time per week, which he was to coordinate
through mother.
¶4 The court later held a permanent orders hearing where both
parties appeared pro se. Father requested parenting time every
other weekend from Friday to Monday. Mother objected to this
request, informing the court that father had recently said he was
homeless, and she did not feel comfortable having the children with
1 him. Mother also testified that following the temporary orders,
father had not exercised or requested any parenting time.
¶5 The court took the matter under advisement and issued
written permanent orders allocating mother primary parental
responsibilities. It limited father’s parenting time to four hours per
week, which it ordered must be supervised by a third party at
father’s expense. The order stated that father could petition for
unsupervised visits only after completing twelve supervised visits
and submitting the results of hair follicle and blood, drug, and
alcohol tests reflecting ninety days of sobriety.
¶6 Father moved for post-trial relief pursuant to C.R.C.P. 59,
which the court summarily denied.
II. Parenting Time
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶7 A district court must allocate parenting time according to the
child’s best interests, “giving paramount consideration to the child’s
safety and the physical, mental, and emotional conditions and
needs of the child.” § 14-10-124(1.5), C.R.S. 2024. In making the
best interests determination, the court must consider the factors
set forth in section 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(I)-(XI). In re Marriage of Finer,
2 920 P.2d 325, 327 (Colo. App. 1996). The district court is not
required to make specific findings on all statutory factors. In re
Marriage of Rodrick, 176 P.3d 806, 813 (Colo. App. 2007). However,
the court’s findings must be sufficient to give the reviewing court a
clear understanding of the factual basis for the order. In re
Marriage of Rozzi, 190 P.3d 815, 822 (Colo. App. 2008).
¶8 For a court to “impos[e] . . . a parenting time restriction,” the
court must find “that parenting time by the [restricted] party would
endanger the child’s physical health or significantly impair the
child’s emotional development” and “enumerate the specific factual
findings supporting the restriction,” including findings related to
child abuse. § 14-10-124(1.5)(a). “[W]hat constitutes
endangerment to a particular child’s physical or emotional health is
a highly individualized determination . . . .” In re Marriage of Parr,
240 P.3d 509, 512 (Colo. App. 2010).
¶9 We review a district court’s parenting time determinations for
an abuse of discretion, meaning that we will only reverse if the
court acted in a manifestly unfair, arbitrary, or unreasonable
manner. In re Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 330 (Colo. App.
2007). We generally review the district court’s factual findings for
3 clear error, meaning that we will not disturb the court’s findings
unless they are devoid of record support. Van Gundy v. Van Gundy,
2012 COA 194, ¶ 12.
B. Discussion
¶ 10 The district court’s parenting time determination must be
reversed for three reasons: (1) several of its factual findings are
clearly erroneous; (2) the order does not explain what statutory
factors the court considered when allocating parenting time; and
(3) the court restricted father’s parenting time without making an
endangerment finding.
¶ 11 First, we agree with father that several of the district court’s
factual findings are unsupported by the record. For example, the
court found that mother had concerns about father’s sobriety and
noted that it shared those concerns. However, although mother
expressed concerns about father’s unstable living arrangements, at
least on the record before us, she never suggested father was
abusing substances or questioned father’s sobriety.
¶ 12 The district court also found that father’s demeanor during the
permanent orders hearing led it to suspect that father was under
the influence. We acknowledge that questions related to a witness’s
4 credibility are left to the sound discretion of the district court. See
Black v. Black, 2018 COA 7, ¶ 122 (the court may consider
demeanor in assessing credibility). However, the court did not ask
father about any suspected intoxication or inquire about father’s
unusual speech patterns or general demeanor to gain an
understanding of his mental or physical state. This finding is
particularly concerning in light of father’s assertion in his post-trial
motion that he has a stutter — providing an explanation for his
unexplored speech pattern that troubled the court. And, as
discussed, the court’s finding that mother had raised questions
about father’s sobriety has no record support.
¶ 13 Additionally, the district court found that father had “not
provided through filing or testimony any record of the parenting
time he is willing or available to exercise.” However, the record
shows that father asked for parenting time every other weekend in
two filings and at the permanent orders hearing.
¶ 14 Second, the parenting time determination must be reversed
because although the district court recited the factors set forth in
section 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(I)-(XI), the order does not explain what
factors the court actually considered when deciding to allocate
5 father only four hours of parenting time a week to father. See In re
Marriage of Gibbs, 2019 COA 104, ¶ 9 (“The district court must
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24CA1490 Parental Resp Conc JC 04-17-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1490 City and County of Denver District Court No. 23DR1747 Honorable Jennifer B. Torrington, Judge
In re the Parental Responsibilities Concerning J.C. and A.C., Children,
And Concerning Gwynneisha Cymone King
Appellee,
and
Javon Markel Calhoun,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ Welling and Kuhn, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 17, 2025
No Appearance for Appellee
Price Family Law, LLC, Bria Burgamy, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this allocation of parental responsibilities case, Javon
Markel Calhoun (father) appeals the district court’s permanent
orders allocating parental responsibilities to Gwynneisha Cymone
King (mother). We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I. Background
¶2 Mother and father are the parents of two minor children, A.C.
and J.C. Mother filed a petition for allocation of parental
responsibilities asserting that the children, who were then six and
ten years old, had always lived with her and did not have regular
contact with father.
¶3 After a hearing, the court issued temporary orders allocating
mother primary parental responsibilities and allowing father up to
four hours of parenting time per week, which he was to coordinate
through mother.
¶4 The court later held a permanent orders hearing where both
parties appeared pro se. Father requested parenting time every
other weekend from Friday to Monday. Mother objected to this
request, informing the court that father had recently said he was
homeless, and she did not feel comfortable having the children with
1 him. Mother also testified that following the temporary orders,
father had not exercised or requested any parenting time.
¶5 The court took the matter under advisement and issued
written permanent orders allocating mother primary parental
responsibilities. It limited father’s parenting time to four hours per
week, which it ordered must be supervised by a third party at
father’s expense. The order stated that father could petition for
unsupervised visits only after completing twelve supervised visits
and submitting the results of hair follicle and blood, drug, and
alcohol tests reflecting ninety days of sobriety.
¶6 Father moved for post-trial relief pursuant to C.R.C.P. 59,
which the court summarily denied.
II. Parenting Time
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶7 A district court must allocate parenting time according to the
child’s best interests, “giving paramount consideration to the child’s
safety and the physical, mental, and emotional conditions and
needs of the child.” § 14-10-124(1.5), C.R.S. 2024. In making the
best interests determination, the court must consider the factors
set forth in section 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(I)-(XI). In re Marriage of Finer,
2 920 P.2d 325, 327 (Colo. App. 1996). The district court is not
required to make specific findings on all statutory factors. In re
Marriage of Rodrick, 176 P.3d 806, 813 (Colo. App. 2007). However,
the court’s findings must be sufficient to give the reviewing court a
clear understanding of the factual basis for the order. In re
Marriage of Rozzi, 190 P.3d 815, 822 (Colo. App. 2008).
¶8 For a court to “impos[e] . . . a parenting time restriction,” the
court must find “that parenting time by the [restricted] party would
endanger the child’s physical health or significantly impair the
child’s emotional development” and “enumerate the specific factual
findings supporting the restriction,” including findings related to
child abuse. § 14-10-124(1.5)(a). “[W]hat constitutes
endangerment to a particular child’s physical or emotional health is
a highly individualized determination . . . .” In re Marriage of Parr,
240 P.3d 509, 512 (Colo. App. 2010).
¶9 We review a district court’s parenting time determinations for
an abuse of discretion, meaning that we will only reverse if the
court acted in a manifestly unfair, arbitrary, or unreasonable
manner. In re Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 330 (Colo. App.
2007). We generally review the district court’s factual findings for
3 clear error, meaning that we will not disturb the court’s findings
unless they are devoid of record support. Van Gundy v. Van Gundy,
2012 COA 194, ¶ 12.
B. Discussion
¶ 10 The district court’s parenting time determination must be
reversed for three reasons: (1) several of its factual findings are
clearly erroneous; (2) the order does not explain what statutory
factors the court considered when allocating parenting time; and
(3) the court restricted father’s parenting time without making an
endangerment finding.
¶ 11 First, we agree with father that several of the district court’s
factual findings are unsupported by the record. For example, the
court found that mother had concerns about father’s sobriety and
noted that it shared those concerns. However, although mother
expressed concerns about father’s unstable living arrangements, at
least on the record before us, she never suggested father was
abusing substances or questioned father’s sobriety.
¶ 12 The district court also found that father’s demeanor during the
permanent orders hearing led it to suspect that father was under
the influence. We acknowledge that questions related to a witness’s
4 credibility are left to the sound discretion of the district court. See
Black v. Black, 2018 COA 7, ¶ 122 (the court may consider
demeanor in assessing credibility). However, the court did not ask
father about any suspected intoxication or inquire about father’s
unusual speech patterns or general demeanor to gain an
understanding of his mental or physical state. This finding is
particularly concerning in light of father’s assertion in his post-trial
motion that he has a stutter — providing an explanation for his
unexplored speech pattern that troubled the court. And, as
discussed, the court’s finding that mother had raised questions
about father’s sobriety has no record support.
¶ 13 Additionally, the district court found that father had “not
provided through filing or testimony any record of the parenting
time he is willing or available to exercise.” However, the record
shows that father asked for parenting time every other weekend in
two filings and at the permanent orders hearing.
¶ 14 Second, the parenting time determination must be reversed
because although the district court recited the factors set forth in
section 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(I)-(XI), the order does not explain what
factors the court actually considered when deciding to allocate
5 father only four hours of parenting time a week to father. See In re
Marriage of Gibbs, 2019 COA 104, ¶ 9 (“The district court must
make sufficiently explicit findings of fact to give the appellate court
a clear understanding of the basis of its order.”).
¶ 15 Lastly, the district court restricted father’s parenting time by
requiring that it be supervised and by requiring father to submit
test results demonstrating ninety days of sobriety before moving to
unsupervised time. See In re Marriage of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80,
¶ 29 (supervised parenting time is a restriction on parenting time).
But it made no required finding of endangerment to support its
restriction on parenting time. See § 14-10-129(1)(b)(I), C.R.S. 2024
(“The court shall not restrict a parent’s parenting time rights unless
it finds that the parenting time would endanger the child’s physical
health or significantly impair the child’s emotional development.”).
¶ 16 The order also does not explain what evidence the district
court relied on to support the parenting time restriction. Although
it made unsupported findings about father’s sobriety, it did not
explain whether or how those findings established endangerment.
And the order did not connect father’s unstable housing situation to
the court’s parenting time restriction. But see In re Marriage of
6 Jarman, 752 P.2d 1068, 1069 (Colo. App. 1998) (instability alone is
not sufficient to support a restriction on visitation).
III. Disposition
¶ 17 Based on the foregoing, we reverse the district court’s
permanent orders regarding the allocation of father’s parenting time
and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE KUHN concur.