Parental Resp Conc IGA

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 26, 2025
• Docket: 24CA1965
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA1965 Parental Resp Conc IGA 11-26-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1965 Adams County District Court No. 22JV2218 Honorable Emily Lieberman, Judge

In re the Parental Responsibilities Concerning I.G.A., a Child,

and Concerning A.A.,

Appellant,

and

A.J.G.,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI Opinion by JUDGE WELLING Gomez and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced November 26, 2025

Fuller & Ahern, P.C., Brian M. Close, Parker, Colorado, for Appellant

Warren Domangue, Littleton, Colorado, for Appellee ¶1 In this action under the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), A.A.

(mother) appeals the juvenile court’s denial of retroactive child

support and attorney fees. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The child was born in 2008; A.J.G. (father) was present at the

child’s birth, but the parents weren’t married and didn’t live

together. Father’s name didn’t appear on the child’s birth

certificate. Although father had some contact with the child during

the first year after the child’s birth, he otherwise had very limited

contact until the filing of this case.

¶3 In September 2022, mother requested child support through

the Adams County Delegate Child Support Services (CSS) Unit.

When the parents couldn’t reach an agreement on the child support

issues, the CSS Unit entered a temporary support order and

initiated this case.

¶4 A month later, mother filed a petition to establish parentage

under the UPA, in which she also requested an allocation of

parental responsibilities (APR) and a child support order. Father

initially considered relinquishing his parental rights but instead

1 filed his own APR motion. He also submitted to genetic testing,

which established that he was the child’s biological father.

¶5 In April 2024, the juvenile court held an evidentiary hearing

on the APR and child support issues. After hearing the evidence,

the court awarded mother physical custody and sole decision-

making and father one day of parenting time per month. The court

also ordered father to pay future child support, along with

retroactive child support for 2022, 2023, and part of 2024.

However, the court denied mother’s request for additional

retroactive child support back to the child’s birth. The court also

declined mother’s request for attorney fees.

¶6 In August 2024, mother moved for reconsideration under

C.R.C.P. 59. The court granted the motion in part, but it denied

mother’s requests to reconsider retroactive child support and

attorney fees.

II. Retroactive Child Support

¶7 Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by denying her

request for retroactive child support. We disagree.

¶8 The juvenile court has broad discretion in determining

whether a parent should be responsible for retroactive child support

2 and the amount of that support. In re Marriage of Smith, 7 P.3d

1012, 1016 (Colo. App. 1999). A court abuses its discretion when

its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or

when it misapplies the law. People in Interest of A.N-B., 2019 COA

46, ¶ 9. We defer to the court’s factual findings but review de novo

whether the court applied the correct legal standard. See People in

Interest of K.L.W., 2021 COA 56, ¶ 42.

¶9 Under section 19-4-116(4), C.R.S. 2025, the juvenile court

may order a parent to pay a “reasonable” amount of retroactive

child support. See also People in Interest of B.W., 17 P.3d 199, 201

(Colo. App. 2000) (interpreting the statute to allow retroactive child

support back to the child’s birth). But the court may limit the

amount to a sum that it “deems just.” § 19-4-116(4). In this case,

the court denied most of mother’s request for retroactive child

support finding that awarding the denied sum would be “unjust and

unreasonable under the particular circumstances of the case.”

¶ 10 In determining retroactive child support, the juvenile court

must consider “all relevant facts,” which include, as pertinent to

this appeal, (1) the child’s needs; (2) the parents’ living standards

and circumstances; (3) the parents’ relative financial means; (4) the

3 parents’ earning ability; (5) the child’s age; (6) the value of services

contributed by the parent with whom the child resides the majority

of the time; and (7) the standard of living the child would have

enjoyed had the parents been married. § 19-4-116(6). The court

may also consider other relevant factors in reaching its decision.

See People v. Rieger, 2019 COA 14, ¶ 14 (noting that a list of factors

introduced with the word “including” indicates that the list is

illustrative, not exhaustive).

¶ 11 The juvenile court considered the factors in section 19-4-

116(6), along with other relevant factors, in denying mother’s

request for retroactive child support. Among other things, the court

placed significant weight on evidence that mother had known

father’s identity since the child’s birth, but she had taken no action

to secure child support for over thirteen years. The court found

that, because mother had neither filed a case nor asked father for

support for a significant time, it would be unjust to require him to

pay such a large sum of retroactive child support. The court also

questioned whether the retroactive support could be used for the

child’s benefit before he turned nineteen, considering that mother

had adequately provided for the child without any assistance and

4 hadn’t accumulated any significant debt in the process. However,

the court stated that it had decided to award some retroactive child

support based on evidence of documented medical expenses.

Finally, the court expressed that it didn’t believe that the evidence

showed there was a “significant need” for retroactive support, and it

weighed the lack of a significant need for support against the

“financial hardship” such an order would cause father.

¶ 12 Based on our review of the record, the juvenile court properly

considered the criteria in section 19-4-116(6), along with other

relevant factors, to reach its decision. And the record supports the

court’s factual findings underlying its decision. See K.L.W., ¶ 42

(reviewing courts defer to the juvenile court’s factual findings if

supported by the record). We therefore discern no abuse of

discretion. See Smith, 7 P.3d at 1016; see also Pate v. State ex rel.

Corkren, 526 So.2d 30, 32 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988) (no abuse of

discretion in declining to order retroactive child support where

father had attempted to pay support and mother refused to accept

any support); Gelin v. Murray, 494 P.3d 1112, 1116 (Ariz. Ct. App.

2021) (no abuse of discretion in declining to order retroactive child

5 support where mother chose to deliberately keep father out of the

child’s life).

¶ 13 Mother asserts, for the following six reasons, that the juvenile

court erred. We aren’t persuaded.

¶ 14 First, mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding

that she never informally requested support from father. But father

testified that mother never requested any support from him, and

the court found father’s testimony credible. See In re Marriage of

Zisch, 967 P.2d 199, 203 (Colo. App. 1998) (recognizing that a

reviewing court must defer to the trial court’s credibility

determinations). We therefore reject mother’s assertion because the

record supports the court’s factual finding, and we can’t reweigh

the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile

court. See K.L.W., ¶ 62.

¶ 15 Second, mother asserts that the juvenile court improperly

shifted the burden by requiring her to show that she had debt from

raising the child by herself. We disagree because the criteria in

section 19-4-116(6) permit the court to consider, among other

things, the child’s needs and the parents’ relative financial means.

§ 19-4-116(6)(a)-(b). And whether a parent accumulated any debt

6 when caring for the child and meeting the child’s needs while

certainly not dispositive of any statutory factor, is an appropriate

consideration in assessing the child’s needs and the parents’

relative financial means. So, we discern no error in the court’s

consideration of evidence showing mother’s lack of debt.

¶ 16 Third, mother maintains that the juvenile court erred by

finding that it didn’t have the authority to direct father to use his

retirement account to pay for retroactive support. The court

specifically addressed this complaint in its Rule 59 order, noting

that it had determined that it didn’t have the authority to direct

father “to use any specific source of funds to pay [a] support order.”

The court clarified that it had considered father’s financial means,

including the retirement fund, but it had concluded that “[t]he

existence of a retirement account [did] not negate [the] financial

hardship” father would face. We therefore discern no error.

¶ 17 Fourth, mother argues that the juvenile court should have

determined a reasonable amount of support that could be used

before the child’s nineteenth birthday instead of denying the entire

amount. However, the court didn’t deny the entire amount of

retroactive support. Rather, the court ordered a limited amount of

7 retroactive support based on evidence of outstanding medical

expenses. The court otherwise denied retroactive child support

because the court found it would be unjust to require father to pay

such support based on mother’s delay in filing the case.

¶ 18 Fifth, mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding

that it would be unjust to require father to pay retroactive support

based on mother’s delay. To be sure, a parent’s delay in moving for

child support isn’t one of the enumerated factors listed in section

19-4-116(6), but as noted, section 19-4-116(6) isn’t an exhaustive

list. Mother provides no authority indicating that a court may not

consider a parent’s delay when deciding if retroactive support

should be awarded. Other jurisdictions permit a court to deny

retroactive support based on a parent’s delay. See, e.g., Burrow v.

Vrontikis, 788 P.2d 1046, 1048 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (concluding

that the parent’s failure to file for child support for seven years was

“an unreasonable delay”). And we don’t discern any abuse of

discretion in the court considering this fact here.

¶ 19 Finally, mother contends that the juvenile court disregarded

the child’s best interests when it based its decision on “setting a

standard for future cases rather than for the needs of the specific

8 child under consideration.” Although the court noted that granting

mother’s request in full “would incentivize a parent to wait for

[years] to seek a parentage finding,” we aren’t persuaded that its

decision disregarded the child’s best interests. Rather, the court

explicitly considered the child’s best interests and awarded an

amount of retroactive support necessary to serve those interests. It

otherwise denied the additional amount mother requested, after

considering the criteria in section 19-4-116(6). We therefore reject

mother’s final assertion.

III. Attorney Fees

¶ 20 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by denying her

request for attorney fees. We disagree.

¶ 21 Section 19-4-117, C.R.S. 2025, permits a juvenile court to

award attorney fees in a parentage action. In deciding whether to

award attorney fees under section 19-4-117, the court may consider

(1) the parties’ finances; (2) the protracted nature of the litigation;

and (3) the high costs of fees resulting from the protracted litigation.

See In re N.J.C., 2019 COA 153M, ¶ 44. We won’t disturb the

court’s attorney fees determination absent an abuse of discretion.

W.C. in Interest of A.M.K., 907 P.2d 719, 723 (Colo. App. 1995).

9 ¶ 22 The juvenile court denied mother’s request for attorney fees,

“[g]iven the current near-equal income of the parties,” and it

ordered that each party be responsible for their own attorney fees.

The court also found that mother’s request for retroactive child

support and to limit father’s parenting time determined the “scope

of litigation” and its “contentious nature.” Finally, the court

determined that father’s request for an APR didn’t “expand” the

scope of litigation because mother had already raised that issue

through her motion.

¶ 23 Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by employing

“speculative and irrelevant criteria” to deny her request. She also

asserts that the court erred by finding that she controlled the scope

of litigation. We aren’t persuaded.

¶ 24 The juvenile court considered appropriate factors when it

denied mother’s request, namely (1) the parties’ financial

circumstances and (2) the nature of the litigation. See N.J.C., ¶ 44.

The record supports the court’s finding that the parties had similar

incomes, which mother doesn’t dispute. As for the nature of the

litigation, the record shows that mother retained an attorney and

filed her request for additional support after she declined the

10 support amount proposed by the CSS Unit. Her APR request asked

the court to deny father any parenting time unless the child agreed

to it, which, as the court pointed out, is generally impermissible.

See In re Marriage of Elmer, 936 P.2d 617, 621 (Colo. App. 1997) (a

trial court may not delegate decisions about parenting time to

others). Based on all of this, the court didn’t abuse its discretion in

denying mother’s request for attorney fees.

¶ 25 Finally, mother requests an award of her appellate attorney

fees under section 19-4-117. We reject her argument for the same

reasons described above. To the extent mother’s request has some

other basis, she fails to explain that basis, and we therefore decline

to address her argument. See In re Parental Responsibilities

Concerning I.M., 2013 COA 107, ¶ 31.

IV. Disposition

¶ 26 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE GOMEZ and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.