24CA2002 Parental Resp Conc DB 07-31-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA2002 El Paso County District Court No. 19DR30839 Honorable Catherine Mitchell Helton, Judge
In re the Parental Responsibilities Concerning D.B., a Child,
and Concerning Bryan Heim,
Appellant,
and
Callie Jessica Bible,
Appellee,
Ondis Bible and Irene Bible,
Intervenors.
ORDER AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division III Opinion by JUDGE BROWN Dunn and Schock, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 31, 2025
Kumpf Charsley & Hansen, LLC, Robert E. Wells, Englewood, Colorado, for Appellant
No Appearance for Appellee No Appearance for Intervenors ¶1 Bryan Heim (father) appeals the district court’s order that
granted a motion concerning grandparent visitation disputes filed
by maternal grandparents, Ondis Bible and Irene Bible (collectively,
grandparents). We affirm the order in part, reverse it in part, and
remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.
I. Relevant Facts
¶2 Callie Jessica Bible (mother) and father are the parents of D.B.
(child). In 2020, the court allocated parenting time primarily to
mother, who had moved to Tennessee. Father remained in
Colorado.
¶3 About a year later, father filed a motion to increase his
parenting time. Shortly after that, a dependency and neglect case
was initiated in Tennessee due to mother’s substance abuse. As
part of that proceeding, grandparents, who also lived in Tennessee,
were granted temporary custody of the child. The Tennessee court
later transferred the matter to Colorado, and father received
temporary custody of the child. Grandparents then intervened in
this case.
1 ¶4 In a December 2021 ruling, the district court allocated
parenting time primarily to father, restricted mother’s parenting
time, and ordered family time for grandparents (APR order).
¶5 As to mother, the court ordered that she could exercise
parenting time supervised by grandparents for one week per month
until the child began school in August 2022. To be entitled to her
parenting time, however, mother was required to submit to random
urinalysis testing and provide father with proof of her negative
results no less than twice per month.
¶6 Concerning grandparents, the court ordered that they could
exercise family time with the child “every other spring break, the
latter half of the holiday vacation, a portion of fall break, and two
weeks each summer.” And if mother did not comply with the
conditions for her parenting time, grandparents could also exercise
mother’s one-week-per-month visits until the child started school.
¶7 With respect to transportation costs, the court ordered that
“[t]he receiving party shall pay for the child’s transportation costs.”
¶8 About six months later, grandparents filed a motion alleging
that father had violated the APR order and interfered with their
family time in March 2022, April 2022, July 2022, August 2022,
2 winter break 2022 and spring break 2023. They alleged that father
was (1) requiring them to exercise their family time in Colorado;
(2) imposing conditions on their visits that the court had not
ordered; and (3) refusing to pay for his share of the child’s travel
costs. They also alleged that father’s conduct was interfering with
their upcoming summer 2023 visit with the child.
¶9 Due to grandparents’ allegations concerning the upcoming
summer visit, the court held an expedited status conference to
address the issue on an interim basis. The court directed father to
allow the child to visit grandparents in Tennessee and confirmed
that the travel costs were allocated pursuant to the APR order.
¶ 10 Before the court resolved grandparents’ motion, grandparents
supplemented it with allegations that father had committed
additional violations by refusing to pay a portion of the child’s travel
costs during their winter 2023 and summer 2024 visits in
Tennessee and by again placing conditions on these visits that the
court had not ordered.
¶ 11 After a hearing, the court granted grandparents’ motion in
part. The court first found no violations associated with
grandparents’ allegations concerning their ability to exercise
3 mother’s parenting time from March 2022 through August 2022.
But the court found that father denied grandparents eight days of
family time in winter 2022 by demanding that the visit occur in
Colorado and by imposing conditions to limit mother’s contact with
the child during grandparents’ visits. The court also found that
father violated the APR order in spring 2023 by requiring
grandparents to exercise that visit in Colorado and by imposing
additional conditions on their time with the child. The court found
that, until it intervened at the status conference, father had been
refusing to allow the child to go to Tennessee for the summer 2023
visit and was again requiring that grandparents agree to additional
conditions in violation of the APR order. And the court found that
father violated the APR order in winter 2023 and summer 2024 by
refusing to pay his portion of the child’s transportation costs
associated with these visits.
¶ 12 For its remedial orders, the court awarded grandparents eight
days of makeup family time for the missed visit in winter 2022 and
ordered father to reimburse grandparents for the additional travel
costs they incurred related to the visits in spring 2023, winter 2023,
4 and summer 2024. It also awarded grandparents 25% of their
attorney fees — $3,382.
II. Grandparents’ Family Time Disputes
¶ 13 Father contends that the district court’s order must be
reversed. We agree with father that the court erred by determining
that he violated the APR order concerning grandparents’ visits in
winter 2022, spring 2023, and summer 2023. We therefore reverse
those parts of the court’s order and the remedial orders associated
with those violations. However, we reject father’s contention related
to the winter 2023 and summer 2024 visits. Given the partial
reversal, we must also reverse the court’s award of attorney fees
and remand that issue to the district court for reconsideration.
A. Governing Legal Standards
¶ 14 If the court finds that a parent did not comply with an order
regarding grandparent family time, the court may impose remedial
orders in the best interests of the child. See § 14-10-124.5(2),
C.R.S. 2024; In re Adoption of C.A., 137 P.3d 318, 324 (Colo. 2006);
see also § 19-1-117.5, C.R.S. 2022 (repealed and relocated to
section 14-10-124.5, effective Aug. 7, 2023).
5 ¶ 15 As with all orders concerning parenting time, the court has
broad discretion to resolve a motion concerning grandparent family
time disputes. See § 14-10-124.5(2); cf. In re Marriage of Dean,
2017 COA 51, ¶ 19. We will not disturb the court’s decision absent
a showing that the court misapplied the law or that it acted in a
manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair manner. See In re
Marriage of Collins, 2023 COA 116M, ¶ 8. We review de novo the
court’s legal conclusions and its interpretation of a court order. See
In re Marriage of de Koning, 2016 CO 2, ¶ 17; Andrews v. Miller,
2019 COA 185, ¶ 8.
B. Family Time in Winter 2022, Spring 2023, and Summer 2023
¶ 16 The district court determined that father violated the APR
order concerning grandparents’ family time in winter 2022, spring
2023, and summer 2023 for two reasons: (1) father required
grandparents to exercise their family time in Colorado; and
(2) father imposed conditions on grandparents’ family time that had
not been ordered by the court. We agree with father that the court
erred by making these determinations.
6 1. Father’s Decision on Family Time in Colorado
¶ 17 Father argues that the APR order did not prevent him from
deciding that the winter 2022, spring 2023, and summer 2023
visits should occur in Colorado. We agree.
¶ 18 To violate an order regarding grandparent visitation, a party
must have failed to comply with exactly what the order required.
Cf. In re Marriage of Davis, 252 P.3d 530, 537 (Colo. App. 2011) (“In
order to be held in contempt . . . , a party must have refused to do
exactly what the court order required.”). When interpreting a
court’s prior order to determine whether a party complied, we apply
principles of contract interpretation and must give effect to the
court’s intent as determined by the plain language of the order. See
Blecker v. Kofoed, 672 P.2d 526, 528 (Colo. 1983); In re Marriage of
Crowder, 77 P.3d 858, 860-61 (Colo. App. 2003).
¶ 19 Nothing in the written APR order addressed the location of
grandparents’ family time or limited father’s right to decide the
location of visits. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000)
(recognizing a parent’s fundamental interest in the care, custody,
and control of a child). The court merely set forth the schedule of
7 grandparents’ family time, which was a schedule that father agreed
they could exercise.
¶ 20 To be sure, the court expanded on its written order during its
oral ruling. See In re Marriage of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 9 n.1
(recognizing that a court’s oral findings may supplement the written
order when they do not conflict). But the court’s oral statements
still did not make clear that father could not decide that the winter
2022, spring 2023, and summer 2023 visits would occur in
¶ 21 During the oral ruling, the court noted that, in addition to the
family time it allocated to grandparents, grandparents had asked
for an additional week per month with the child until school began
in August 2022. Father did not object to these one-week-per-month
visits but wanted the visits to occur in Colorado. The court
ultimately declined to award grandparents these additional visits
but ordered that if mother did not meet the conditions necessary to
exercise her supervised parenting time, grandparents could exercise
mother’s one-week-per-month visits until the child started school.
¶ 22 Father asked the court to clarify the location of the “one week
per month” visits. The court confirmed that it had denied father’s
8 request that they occur in Colorado but clarified that it was “not
overriding [father’s] decision, as far as grandparent time; that is
time [it] allocated to [mother].” Then, near the end of the oral
ruling, grandparents asked whether the “one week per month” visits
would occur in Tennessee. The court responded, “Can either be in
Tennessee or Colorado.”
¶ 23 Reviewed as a whole, the court’s comments concerning the
location of visits and the denial of father’s request that they occur
in Colorado related to grandparents’ ability to exercise mother’s
parenting time if she could not, until the child began school in
August 2022. The court did not address where grandparents’ visits
would occur after August 2022. Nor did it determine that father
could not decide whether the visits should occur in Colorado.
¶ 24 This reading of the APR order is supported by the absence of
any findings by the court determining that grandparents had
overcome the presumption that father’s decisions on grandparents’
family time were in the child’s best interests. When there is a
dispute between a parent and grandparents, a fit parent’s decisions
on visits must be given special weight, and the court must presume
that the parent is acting in the child’s best interests. Troxel, 530
9 U.S. at 68-70; C.A., 137 P.3d at 324-25, 327-28. To overcome that
presumption and interfere with father’s fundamental right to the
care, custody, and control of the child, the court needed to find that
grandparents had shown by clear and convincing evidence that
father’s decisions concerning family time — and the location of the
visits in particular — not in the child’s best interests. See C.A., 137
P.3d at 327-28. The court made no such findings.
¶ 25 Father was entitled to the presumption that he was acting in
the child’s best interest when he decided that the child should not
travel to Tennessee due to mother’s noncompliance with the
conditions of her parenting time related to her sobriety. The court
did not afford father that presumption. Consequently, we conclude
that the court erred when it determined that father violated the APR
order by requiring grandparents’ visits to occur in Colorado during
winter 2022, spring 2023, and summer 2023.
2. Additional Conditions Imposed by Father
¶ 26 Father also argues that the district court erred by finding that
he violated the APR order by imposing additional conditions not
ordered by the court related to grandparents’ winter 2022, spring
2023, and summer 2023 visits. Again, we agree.
10 ¶ 27 The court determined that father had improperly imposed
additional conditions on grandparents’ exercise of family time in
winter 2022 by requiring them to (1) sign a contract, in which they
would agree that mother could not be near or have “face to face
interaction” with the child; (2) agree that the child would not have
video contact with mother; and (3) agree to let father know when
there would be phone calls between the child and mother. The
court also found that father imposed additional conditions on
grandparents’ family time in spring 2023 and summer 2023, but it
did not specify what conditions father imposed related to those
visits beyond the conditions imposed on the winter 2022 visit.
¶ 28 Beginning with father’s proposed contract, the record does not
support the court’s finding that father attempted to force
grandparents to sign that contract in connection with family time in
winter 2022, spring 2023, or summer 2023. Grandmother testified
that father sent grandparents a contract to limit the child’s contact
with mother while grandparents exercised her parenting time and
that father asked them to sign the contract before the child could
visit grandparents in July 2022. In support of her testimony,
grandmother presented the court with a message from father, which
11 showed that he sent them the contract in May 2022 related to an
upcoming visit later that month. In that communication, father
explained that mother was not entitled to any parenting time
because she had not provided proof of her sobriety as required by
the APR order, and he asked for grandparents’ assurances that the
child would not have unauthorized contact with mother.
¶ 29 Although this evidence shows that father presented
grandparents with a contract in May 2022, grandmother testified
that grandparents did not sign it and yet still exercised mother’s
parenting time later that month. And the court determined that
father had not violated the APR order in May 2022 — the month
father sent grandparents the proposed contract — or July 2022 —
the month grandmother said their visit had been conditioned on
grandparents signing the contract. Grandparents did not direct the
court to any evidence showing that father asked them to sign the
contract again. Nor does the record reveal that he conditioned
grandparents’ family time in winter 2022, spring 2023, or summer
2023 on the proposed contract. Thus, we conclude that the record
does not support the court’s finding that father violated the APR
order by demanding that grandparents sign a contract before
12 exercising their family time in winter 2022, spring 2023, or summer
2023. Cf. Rumford v. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Ass’n, 883 P.2d 614, 616
(Colo. App. 1994) (“An abuse of discretion occurs when there is no
competent evidence in the record to support the decision.”).
¶ 30 Moving to the court’s findings on father’s additional conditions
limiting the child’s contact with mother, we conclude that the court
erred by determining that father violated the APR order by imposing
the conditions. In the APR order, the court found that parenting
time with mother endangered the child. The court allowed her to
exercise only supervised parenting time and only if she provided
father with proof of her sobriety no less than twice per month.
¶ 31 In father’s communications with grandparents, he informed
them that, at the time of the winter 2022, spring 2023, and summer
2023 visits, mother had not provided him with proof of her sobriety.
As a result, mother was not allowed to visit the child under the APR
order. Father then sought assurances from grandparents that
mother would not visit or interact with the child unless and until
mother met the court-ordered conditions for her to exercise
supervised parenting time.
13 ¶ 32 The court made no express findings that mother had met the
necessary conditions to exercise her family time. Thus, father’s
requests that grandparents not allow contact with mother were not
conditions beyond what was required by the APR order. Rather,
father’s requests were consistent with the court-ordered restriction
on mother’s parenting time until he received twice-monthly clean
urinalysis tests.
¶ 33 In the end, we conclude that the court erred by determining
that father violated the APR order related to grandparents’ family
time in winter 2022, spring 2023, and summer 2023. We reverse
those portions of the order and the associated remedial orders,
which include the award of eight days of makeup family time,
$1,900 in travel costs for the spring 2023 visit, and attorney fees
related to these purported violations.
C. Family Time in Winter 2023 and Summer 2024
¶ 34 Father contends that the court erred by determining that he
violated the APR order when he refused to pay transportation costs
to return the child from grandparents’ family time in winter 2023
and summer 2024. We disagree.
14 ¶ 35 Under the APR order, the “receiving party” was obligated to
pay the child’s transportation costs. The court found that father
was the receiving party when the child was returning to Colorado
following the winter 2023 and summer 2024 visits with
grandparents in Tennessee. And it found that father refused to pay
for the child’s return flights.
¶ 36 Father acknowledges that the court’s written APR order
required the “receiving party” to pay the child’s transportation costs
and that he did not pay for the child’s transportation back to
Colorado in winter 2023 and summer 2024. But he argues that the
court misinterpreted the APR order because its oral ruling limited
this obligation to the “[r]eceiving parent” when the child was
returning from “parenting time.” (Emphasis added.) He thus
argues that the court erred by extending his obligation to pay
transportation costs to grandparents’ family time.
¶ 37 But the written APR order plainly obligates the “receiving
party” to pay the child’s transportation costs. (Emphasis added.)
See Blecker, 672 P.2d at 528; Crowder, 77 P.3d at 860-61. The
order did not limit this obligation to parents or to the exercise of
mother’s parenting time. Because grandparents were parties to the
15 case, they were included in this part of the APR order. See A.M. v.
A.C., 2013 CO 16, ¶ 16 (recognizing that an intervening party
becomes a party to the litigation). Father likewise was a party to
the case and was obligated to pay for the child’s transportation
costs when he was receiving the child following a visit with
grandparents. To the extent the written order conflicts with the
court’s oral statements, the written order prevails. In re Marriage of
Pawelec, 2024 COA 107, ¶ 41.
¶ 38 Father also contends that neither section 14-10-124.4, C.R.S.
2024, nor section 19-1-117, C.R.S. 2022 (repealed and relocated to
section 14-10-124.4, effective Aug. 7, 2023) authorized the court to
enter an order that required him to pay transportation costs related
to grandparents’ family time. But father did not appeal the APR
order. See C.A.R. 4(a)(1) (A party must appeal “within 49 days after
entry of the judgment, decree, or order being appealed.”). It is
therefore a final and binding order. See In re Marriage of Barber,
811 P.2d 451, 454 (Colo. App. 1991) (recognizing that orders not
timely appealed are final and not subject to review). It is too late for
father to challenge his obligation to pay transportation costs as set
forth in the APR order. See In re Marriage of James, 2023 COA 51,
16 ¶ 8 (“The timely filing of a notice of appeal is a jurisdictional
prerequisite for appellate review.”).
¶ 39 In any event, a court may, in its discretion, enter orders in the
child’s best interests to facilitate grandparents’ family time. See
§ 14-10-124.4(4), (7) (directing the court to focus on the child’s best
interests when determining a grandparent’s request for family time);
§ 19-1-117(2), (4) (same). An order allocating transportation costs
associated with grandparent visitation falls within that discretion.
¶ 40 Thus, we conclude that the court did not err by determining
that father violated his obligation to pay the child’s transportation
costs when returning to Colorado following grandparents’ family
time in winter 2023 and summer 2024.
D. Award of Attorney Fees
¶ 41 The district court awarded grandparents 25% of their
reasonable attorney fees, but it did not explain how the amount of
fees it awarded related to father’s multiple violations other than
noting that grandparents incurred additional fees when the court
intervened for their summer 2023 visit. Given that we have
reversed the court’s order in part, we must reverse the award of
attorney fees and direct the court to reconsider this issue. See
17 Nagy v. Landau, 807 P.2d 1227, 1229 (Colo. App. 1990) (an award
of attorney fees is necessarily reversed where the judgment upon
which it relied was reversed). On remand, the court shall determine
the reasonable amount of attorney fees, if any, to award
grandparents based on father’s violations related to grandparents’
winter 2023 and summer 2024 family time. See § 14-10-124.5(2)(f).
III. Disposition
¶ 42 We reverse the portions of the district court’s order concerning
grandparents’ winter 2022, spring 2023, and summer 2023 family
time and the associated remedial orders. We also reverse the
court’s award of attorney fees and remand the case for the court to
reconsider that issue consistent with this opinion. The order is
otherwise affirmed.
JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.