25CA1145 Parental Resp Conc CLR 02-19-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1145 Weld County District Court No. 23DR894 Honorable Kimberly B. Schutt, Judge
In re the Parental Responsibilities Concerning C.L.R., a Child,
and Concerning Luiz Fernando Rodrigues,
Appellant,
and
Flaviane Landroni Lobo Do Prado,
Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART, APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division I Opinion by JUDGE LUM J. Jones and Meirink, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced February 19, 2026
Luiz Fernando Rodrigues, Pro Se
Harwich Brickey, LLC, Kara M. Harwich, Fort Collins, Colorado, for Appellee ¶1 Luiz Fernando Rodrigues (father) appeals the district court’s
judgment allocating parental responsibilities for C.L.R. (the child) to
Flaviane Landroni Lobo Do Prado (mother). Father also untimely
appeals, for the second time, the permanent protection order issued
against him in 2023.
¶2 We dismiss the portion of the appeal concerning the
permanent protection order. We affirm the judgment and remand
to the district court to determine mother’s appellate attorney fees
and costs.
I. Relevant Facts
¶3 The child was born in July 2022, and the parents separated
nearly a year later. Mother later sought and was granted a
temporary civil protection order against father. The parties
stipulated to dismiss the protection order and to have no contact
with each other, outside of that about the child, and the court
granted the stipulation.
¶4 At the same time, father petitioned for an allocation of
parental responsibilities (APR), and the parties agreed to a
temporary parenting time schedule providing that mother would
1 supervise father’s visits.1 The parties also filed a temporary
parenting time stipulation, but it was never made an order of the
court.
¶5 About three weeks after filing their temporary parenting time
stipulation, mother filed an emergency motion to restrict father’s
parenting time and a complaint for a temporary protection order
against father. Mother alleged that, after the no-contact agreement
had been entered, father refused to leave her home until several
hours after his parenting time ended and, two days later, came to
her home and demanded entry. She called the police and locked
herself and the child in a bathroom. The district court granted the
motion to restrict and entered the temporary protection order.
Then, after a hearing in August 2023, the court credited mother’s
allegations, granted mother a permanent protection order (PPO),
and ordered that father’s parenting time be supervised at Lutheran
Family Services. Father exercised no parenting time during the rest
of the case.
1 On mother’s request to change venue, the underlying case was
moved from Jefferson County to Weld County, where mother resided with the child.
2 ¶6 After a full-day permanent orders hearing, the court entered a
detailed, written ruling regarding the APR. The court continued the
restriction on father’s parenting time, allocating him one hour of
supervised parenting time each week. In addition, the court drew
an adverse inference about father’s income due to his repeated
failure to comply with mandatory financial disclosures, imputed
him with an income of $6,791.67 per month, and ordered him to
pay monthly and retroactive child support. The court also ordered
that father pay $30,000 of mother’s attorney fees under § 13-17-
102, C.R.S. 2025, and § 14-10-119, C.R.S. 2025.
II. Father’s Opening Brief
¶7 Mother requests that we dismiss father’s appeal for failure to
comply with C.A.R. 28. We agree that father’s opening brief does
not comply with this rule. Father fails to state the applicable
standards of review, whether issues were preserved, and, if so, “the
precise location[s] in the record where” any issues were raised and
“where the court ruled.” See C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(A). He also rarely cites
any authorities or the parts of the record he references. See
C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(B). While father represents himself, he must
3 “comply with procedural rules to the same extent as parties
represented by attorneys.” Adams v. Sagee, 2017 COA 133, ¶ 10.
¶8 We would be within our discretion to dismiss father’s appeal,
but we opt to address his arguments to the extent that we can
discern them. See Harris v. Reg’l Transp. Dist., 155 P.3d 583, 586-
87 (Colo. App. 2006) (appellate court has discretion in determining
whether to sanction pro se party who failed to comply with appellate
rules). However, we will not comb the record for facts supporting
father’s arguments that aren’t cited in his brief. See Cikraji v.
Snowberger, 2015 COA 66, ¶ 10; see also Brighton Sch. Dist. 27J v.
Transamerica Premier Ins. Co., 923 P.2d 328, 335 (Colo. App. 1996)
(“[I]t is not the duty of the reviewing court to search the record for
evidence to support bald assertions.”), aff’d, 940 P.2d 348 (Colo.
1997). And we warn father that if he fails to comply with the
appellate rules in the future, he may face sanctions, including
dismissal of any appeal. See C.A.R. 38(a).
III. PPO
¶9 The PPO was entered in August 2023. Father filed a post-trial
motion requesting relief from that judgment, which was denied.
Father then filed untimely appeal of the court’s denial of his post-
4 trial motion, which was dismissed with prejudice. See In re Parental
Responsibilities Concerning C.L.R., (Colo. App. No. 24CA0770, June
3, 2024) (unpublished order); C.A.R. 4(a)(1); In re Marriage of
James, 2023 COA 51, ¶ 8 (“The timely filing of a notice of appeal is
a jurisdictional prerequisite for appellate review.”); see also In re
Marriage of Wiggs, 2025 COA 10, ¶ 24 (holding a PPO issued in an
ongoing dissolution case is a final, appealable order).
¶ 10 Despite that, he now appeals the PPO, claiming that the
district court erroneously entered it for numerous reasons.
Because his appeal is untimely, we dismiss it with prejudice for
lack of jurisdiction. See James, ¶ 8.
IV. Due Process
¶ 11 Father argues that the district court denied him due process
because it didn’t permit him to call witnesses or present evidence at
the permanent orders hearing. We aren’t persuaded.
¶ 12 Due process requires a party to be provided with a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. See In re Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d
326, 329 (Colo. App. 2007). However, a party generally may not
obtain relief on a due process claim absent a showing of harm or
prejudice. See People in Interest of J.A.S., 160 P.3d 257, 262 (Colo.
5 App. 2007); see also In re Marriage of Dauwe, 148 P.3d 282, 286
(Colo. App. 2006) (due process right to a full and fair hearing was
not violated where party failed to show any prejudice in connection
with the district court’s quashing of a subpoena for one of his
witnesses).
¶ 13 Father doesn’t identify the witness testimony and other
evidence the court excluded, nor how his case was harmed by his
inability to present that evidence at the hearing. Because he fails to
show how the court’s alleged error prejudiced him, we reject his
argument. See id.
V. Supervised Parenting Time
¶ 14 Father asserts that the court erred by continuing the
restriction on his parenting time in its permanent orders. He says
that the court didn’t make any finding that he was “unfit, abusive,
or present[ed] any risk to the child” necessitating the restriction.
We again are unpersuaded.
¶ 15 A district court has broad discretion over parenting time
matters, and we exercise every presumption in favor of upholding
its decision. See In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning S.Z.S.,
2022 COA 105, ¶ 13. A court abuses its discretion when its
6 decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or is based
on a misapplication of the law. In re Marriage of Evans, 2021 COA
141, ¶ 25.
¶ 16 A court must allocate parenting time in accordance with the
child’s best interests, giving paramount consideration to the child’s
safety and physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs.
§ 14-10-124(1.5)(a), C.R.S. 2025. A court cannot restrict parenting
time unless it “finds, after a hearing, that parenting time by the
party would endanger the child’s physical health or significantly
impair the child’s emotional development.” Id. In addition to
finding endangerment, when a court continues a restriction, it must
“enumerate the specific factual findings supporting the restriction.”
Id.
¶ 17 Here, the child was nearly three years old when the court
entered permanent orders. The court allocated father — who had
not seen the child since she was a year old — supervised visits of
one hour per week to build a bond with her. And it ordered that
7 father may have two supervised visits per week after at least ten
consistent visits.2
¶ 18 In support of the ongoing restriction, the court determined
that (1) supervised parenting time continued to be in the child’s
best interests and “necessary for her safety” and (2) “[u]nsupervised
time would most certainly be endangering to” her. See id. Thus,
contrary to father’s assertion, the court made the required
endangerment findings when it determined that supervised
parenting time was necessary for the child’s safety.
¶ 19 In doing so, the court credited mother’s testimony about
father’s past conduct, including (1) calling mother names such as
“demon” or “bitch”; (2) threatening to kill mother’s dog; (3) making
threats against mother or threats of self-harm when mother didn’t
give in to requests to continue their relationship and allow him
access to the child; and (4) suggesting the child would up in an
orphanage. The court also noted, with record support, that father
had repeatedly called and messaged mother and violated the PPO.
2 Due to father’s “stated refusal to participate in supervised
parenting time,” the court did not order any further phased parenting time for him but did outline conditions father must demonstrate before it would consider lifting the restriction.
8 ¶ 20 The court found that father’s conduct fell “squarely in the
definition of domestic abuse” and stated its concern about the
“traumatic effect on the child from exposure to [such] conduct being
directed against” mother. The court indicated it was also concerned
that father would “use the child as a means of manipulation,
control or harm to [m]other, including potentially leaving the
country with the child, without [m]other’s consent.” And it had
“very little confidence that [f]ather would follow any parenting time
conditions” put in place to ensure the child’s safety. (Emphasis
added.)
¶ 21 To the extent father asserts otherwise, the evidence at the
permanent orders hearing amply supports the court’s findings. The
child’s maternal grandmother testified that she was “always
concerned” about the child because of father’s “explosive nature.”
Mother testified that father was “very controlling,” that his “biggest
threats were about custody,” and that she was “very scared that he
was going to take [the child] away.” She also described father’s
conduct that led her to obtain PPO and about the communications
she received from him after the PPO was in place. The
determination of what constitutes endangerment is highly
9 individualized, and we will not disturb findings on this issue when,
as here, the record supports them. See In re Marriage of Wenciker,
2022 COA 74, ¶ 26.
¶ 22 Nor do we agree with father’s assertion that the restriction is a
“de facto termination” of his parental rights because, as he asserts,
he cannot afford the supervising facility’s fee. Father objected to his
parenting time being supervised in his testimony and insisted that
a supervised visit was “never going to happen.” And the court
found that he had “purposefully chosen not to see the child in one
and a half years” following the restriction due to parenting time “not
being offered on his terms.”3
¶ 23 In any event, the APR did not amount to a termination
because father was granted parenting time and retained parental
responsibilities. See L.L. v. People, 10 P.3d 1271, 1277 (Colo. 2000)
(concluding that a guardianship order was not the functional
equivalent of a termination of parental rights).4
3 In an earlier order, the court also noted that, to the extent cost
was a barrier to exercising supervised parenting time, father could “follow the policies of Lutheran Family Services to request a reduced supervision fee.” 4 We do not further address father’s vague and undeveloped claims
that a “cumulative effect” of the rulings he challenges, or varying
10 ¶ 24 Accordingly, we discern no error in the court’s parenting time
allocation. See Evans, ¶ 25.
VI. Child Support
¶ 25 Father also asserts that the district court abused its discretion
by ignoring his financial circumstances and ordering him to pay an
unaffordable and “excessive” amount of child support, including
retroactive support. We are not convinced.
¶ 26 We review a court’s child support orders for an abuse of
discretion. In re Marriage of Schaefer, 2022 COA 112, ¶ 8. In doing
so, we will not disturb the court’s factual findings unless they are
clearly erroneous and unsupported by the record. Id.
¶ 27 In calculating child support, the court must consider the
parties’ financial resources, including each parent’s income.
See § 14-10-115(2)(b)(II), (V), C.R.S. 2025. “Income” for child
support purposes means a parent’s actual gross income from any
combinations of them, “de facto terminat[e]” or otherwise violate his constitutional rights. See People in Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530, 531 (Colo. App. 2004) (declining to address an appellate argument presented without supporting facts, specific argument, or specific supporting authorities).
11 source. § 14-10-115(5)(a)(I); In re Marriage of Davis, 252 P.3d 530,
534 (Colo. App. 2011).
¶ 28 Father testified at the permanent orders hearing that he was a
flooring installer and that he owned his own company. Father said,
however, that his company was bankrupt and that he was nearly
“broke,” explaining that his expenses exceeded his annual income
of roughly $70,000.
¶ 29 Contrary to his claim that the court ignored his financial
circumstances, the court heard his claims of financial hardship but
didn’t find them credible. See In re Marriage of Amich, 192 P.3d
422, 424 (Colo. App. 2007) (“The [district] court can believe all, part,
or none of a witness’s testimony . . . .”).
¶ 30 Further, we see no abuse of the court’s discretion in its
imputation of father’s income to $81,500 annually. Based on father
“repeatedly refus[ing] to comply with the Court’s order for disclosure
of financial documents,” the court drew an adverse inference that
he was concealing income. See In re Marriage of Sgarlatti, 801 P.2d
18, 19 (Colo. App. 1990) (the district court could draw the inference
that a party’s refusal to make a willing disclosure of his financial
status meant he was concealing income).
12 ¶ 31 Father’s and his business’s bank statements, subpoenaed by
mother and admitted at the hearing, showed deposits of nearly
$150,000 over forty weeks. As those statements did not account for
his take-home pay, the court took judicial notice of the average
wages of flooring installers (from the United States Bureau of Labor
Statistics), recognizing that the top ten percent of earners made
over $81,500.5 Based on this, the bank statements, and other
evidence, the court imputed father’s annual income consistent with
this figure.
¶ 32 We will not disturb the court’s finding concerning father’s
income based on the evidence available to it. See Schaefer, ¶ 8; see
also In re Marriage of Yates, 148 P.3d 304, 311 (Colo. App. 2006)
(upholding an order imputing income based on the only evidence
available when the party’s financial disclosures were “atrocious”).
Nor will we reweigh the evidence. See In re Marriage of Thorburn,
2022 COA 80, ¶ 49 (the weight, probative force, and sufficiency of
the evidence, and the inferences and conclusions drawn therefrom,
are matters within the sole discretion of the district court).
5 Father doesn’t contend that the court erred by taking judicial
notice of these figures.
13 ¶ 33 We are also not convinced that the support order was
excessive. Based on father’s imputed income and mother’s annual
income of roughly $40,000, and after an upward deviation of less
than two dollars from the guidelines, the court calculated a monthly
obligation of $825. And it ordered that father pay roughly $16,000
in retroactive child support over twenty-four months because of his
failure to voluntarily pay any child support during the pendency of
the case. See § 14-10-115(2)(a).
¶ 34 Father makes other conclusory allegations of error, including
that the court ignored the guidelines and “due process
requirements” and that the support order was “punitive.” But
because he fails to develop any remaining claims, we decline to
address them. See People in Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530, 531
(Colo. App. 2004). Moreover, father — who does not direct us to
where in the record he preserved any of his arguments — seemingly
makes all these claims for the first time on appeal. See Melat,
Pressman & Higbie, L.L.P. v. Hannon Law Firm, L.L.C., 2012 CO 61,
¶ 18 (“[I]ssues not raised in or decided by a lower court will not be
addressed for the first time on appeal.”); see also McGihon v. Cave,
14 2016 COA 78, ¶ 16 (an appellate court does not consider
constitutional issues raised for the first time on appeal).
¶ 35 Thus, the court’s child support order was not an abuse of its
discretion. See Schaefer, ¶ 8.
VII. Attorney Fees in the District Court
¶ 36 Father next asserts that the court erred by ordering that he
pay $30,000 of mother’s attorney fees, an amount “grossly
disproportionate to his financial ability,” and without a “finding of
bad faith or litigation misconduct.” We are not convinced.
¶ 37 The court found that, as of three months before it issued
permanent orders, mother incurred roughly $33,400 in attorney
fees. While noting it would typically apportion a greater sum of the
fees to mother, the court allocated father $30,000 of her fees to
avoid “further proceedings and opportunities for [f]ather to
perpetuate his abusive court filings through a determination of
additional fees incurred by [m]other in the last three months.” The
court in turn ordered that mother was responsible for the balance
of her attorney fees.
¶ 38 Despite father’s assertion, the court indeed determined that (1)
his conduct was substantially groundless, substantially frivolous,
15 or substantially vexatious and (2) father, while pro se, clearly knew
or reasonably should have known that his actions were without
substantial justification. See § 13-17-102(4), (6), C.R.S. 2025; In re
Marriage of Tognoni, 313 P.3d 655, 661 (Colo. App. 2011).
¶ 39 Moreover, the court found, with record support, that father
expanded the scope of the proceedings by “repeatedly fil[ing]
motions and other pleadings, including a premature appeal,” and
through his “willful failure” to provide mandatory disclosures. And
the court found, also with record support, that despite its clear
orders, deadline reminders, and father’s access to information for
pro se litigants, he “repeatedly failed to follow” its directions.
¶ 40 The court also concluded that this fee allocation was
appropriate under section 14-10-119, C.R.S. 2025. Under this
statute, the court may apportion attorney fees equitably between
parties based on their relative ability to pay. In re Marriage of
Boettcher, 2018 COA 34, ¶ 34, aff’d, 2019 CO 81. The court found
that mother’s financial circumstances had been
“severely . . . hindered by the prolonged litigation” father caused
and by his failure to pay any child support. And given their
incomes, it determined that father was in a better financial position
16 than mother. To the extent father asks to reweigh the evidence
surrounding his finances, we will not do so. See Thorburn, ¶ 49.
¶ 41 Further, we do not address father’s conclusory claim that the
attorney fees order penalized him “for exercising his right to seek
custody.” See D.B-J., 89 P.3d at 531.
¶ 42 Thus, we discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s well-
supported award of attorney fees. See Tognoni, 313 P.3d at 661;
Yates, 148 P.3d at 315.
VIII. Remaining Contentions
¶ 43 Father also argues that the court (1) was biased against him;
(2) failed to make findings supported by evidence; and (3)
erroneously imputed income to him without a required finding that
he was voluntarily underemployed. However, we do not address
these arguments because father makes or develops them for the
first time in his reply brief. See In re Marriage of Dean, 2017 COA
51, ¶ 31. Nor will we address any other issues that he references in
his briefs but does not sufficiently develop for our review. See
id.; D.B-J., 89 P.3d at 531.
17 IX. Appellate Attorney Fees and Costs
¶ 44 Relying on C.A.R. 38 and 39, section 13-17-102, and section
14-10-119, mother seeks her appellate attorney fees and costs.
Under section 13-17-102, she argues that father’s appeal is
frivolous and “another attempt at abusive court filings.”
¶ 45 An appeal may be frivolous as filed or as argued. Calvert v.
Mayberry, 2019 CO 23, ¶ 45. An appeal is frivolous as filed when
there is “no legitimately appealable issue[].” Id. It is frivolous as
argued when the appellant “fail[s] to set forth . . . a coherent
assertion of error, supported by legal authority.” Id. (quoting
Castillo v. Koppes-Conway, 148 P.3d 289, 292 (Colo. App. 2006)).
¶ 46 We conclude that the portion of father’s appeal concerning the
PPO is frivolous as filed. There is no legitimately appealable issue
in connection with the PPO because father is time-barred from
contesting it on appeal. See id. Further, mother moved to dismiss
father’s first appeal because it was untimely, father responded, and
a motions division of this court granted mother’s motion. Because
the first appeal concerned an order entered after the PPO, father
clearly knew or reasonably should have known that he was time-
barred from raising arguments about the PPO in this appeal and,
18 thus, that his PPO arguments are substantially frivolous. See § 13-
17-102(6) (a self-represented party should not be assessed attorney
fees unless the court finds that the party clearly knew or reasonably
should have known that the party’s action or any part of it was
substantially frivolous, groundless, or vexatious). Accordingly, we
award mother her reasonable attorney fees for defending this part of
the appeal. We exercise our discretion under C.A.R. 39.1 to remand
to the district court to determine the amount of the award.
¶ 47 We do not award fees under section 13-17-102 in connection
with the remainder of the appeal. As discussed, father failed to
follow C.A.R. 28 and asserted numerous conclusory and
undeveloped allegations of error. However, even if we assumed that
the remainder of the appeal, or some portion of it, lacked
substantial justification, we are not convinced that father clearly
knew or reasonably should have known that was the case. See §
13-17-102(6); see also Boettcher, ¶ 38 (“Fees should be awarded
only in clear and unequivocal cases . . . .”).
¶ 48 Mother also requests attorney fees under section 14-10-119,
based on the parties’ disparate financial circumstances. Because
the district court is better positioned to determine the parties’
19 current relative financial circumstances, we remand her request to
the district court. See C.A.R. 39.1; In re Marriage of Alvis, 2019
COA 97, ¶ 30.
¶ 49 Lastly, we award mother her costs in connection with C.A.R.
39(a)(1) and (2).
X. Disposition
¶ 50 The portion of the appeal concerning the PPO is dismissed.
The permanent orders judgment is affirmed. The case is remanded
to district court for further proceedings regarding (1) the amount of
mother’s reasonable appellate attorney fees with respect to the PPO
portion of the appeal under section 13-17-102; (2) whether to award
mother appellate attorney fees under section 14-10-119; and (3) the
amount of mother’s appellate costs under C.A.R. 39.
JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.